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CHk"TER I 
'mE QUESTI~ r; atIENTATI~ IN ARI~TOTIE 'S PHILOOOPHI OF MAN 
It. philosophy ot man seeks insight. into the ac tiona and experiences that 
make up the var.iegated total which is oalled human lite. It seeks to realize 
a unity in the multiplioity which human life presents, to projeot or discover 
structure in what is otherwise only a serie. of happenin88 wi thout ultimate 
shape or s1gn1t1oanee. 
f>Om kind of order is never wholly absent from human acts. The !lK)st 
minute aots, acts of the least duration or importanoe, exhibl t real meanings 
and purposes beh1nd their varieUes. Men are continually employing various 
standards, at leut 1.mpllcit,q and unref'l.eot1ngly, in their daily activity, and 
in this they reveal attitude. toward reality. The patterns which result trom 
an interplay ot suoh IOOtivations are simply part ot the actuality of human 
., 
experience. It is these that form the subjeot matter of a philosophy' ot man 
and are the starting point of its investig.t1ona. 
Philosophy Meles to discover the patterns latent in _n's acUons and 
powers, and the basic aims that reveal tbem8elve8 in _n's reasons for do1ng 
what they do. Thus ph110sopb¥ uy seek a formal or a teleological tmit\l", but 
at last the truth or good tJ1at it seeks 1s the same. to lcDow how hum.aft lite 
!unotions when it is in world.ng order. A 8 tructuring of human life has truth 
when it expre8ses a _aning that corresponds to the variety of human experience 
and illuminates it. This structure is an expression of a uni'V'eraal and 
1 
2 
totalistng order in human th1nga, the h1erarch1zatlon ot all that 1s found in 
human action and experience around the good wb1cb the exain&tlon discloses, to 
develop 1t and tulf11 1 t. 
The Hlcomaohean I!e!4C6 or Aristotle seeks to give expression to such a 
unity in human Ute. Its focus is malrLb" teleolog1oalJ that ls, the 8t1"aott:m1t 
1t reveals 1s in terma ot purpose 1n buItan action, ot ends prox1mate and 
ulti_te. of £ultilMnt of oapacities or powers found 1n the lmman person. 
finaUsr:t 1s the mettvd COIIIlOn to a great part of Aristotle's s18temaUc 
pb11osopb,y, and in terms ot it Aristotleta treatises t.1nd whateftr over-el1 
un1 ty they have. This 18 t.rne ot the ~Y!'!!oloR and the f!v!lc!J :I. t 1. 
e.poclallQ t.rue of tbe ¥!!!P!g:s1cs, where a l008e ..nea of analyaea ga1na a 
suggeetlve but attenuated sort of UBity tram Al"1atotlAt'. almoet incidental. 
an&b'si8 of t1na11t7ot .,t.1on in the tm1verse, the 1naert.ed Book J\. of btB 
earUer tbaolog_ The IW~, howIirt'er, with a aubjeot-lDatter lea. 't'Ut, 
manapa to realJ. .. a completer unity, but .t111 on th1a baais of t1nallt7.1 
• , . 
3 
The EtrhiC8 10 not a treatise independent ot Aristotle's other works.. It 
PI 
stands in need of completion h,' the treat.1ae an Pol1t.1.cs. (Ethics is ~ part, 
,~:~ the larger topic ot llfe in society, wh10b the Pol1t1oa in its proper sense 
I t 
oOl1\Tehttnds.) Furthe:rmore its !1.nellstic structure. dart. mat\V of their prin-
ciple. troL1 analyses which Aristotle haa made in athol' P!U"t8 of hts system ot 
teaching and which came to be embodiod in other treatises. Tlms the Ethics p 
It 
supposes many ot tho obaonaUms ot human activity wh1ch Aristotle 
ineozoporated in ~.8 iWtorlc. It presupposes IIIlCh of the anal.ys1a of ~ 
pOWl'S iIfhlch waa eventualq incorporawd in p~ of the !'NS1!:tloq. lor 
does the fH.comac~ !tb1ee stand by 1 t&elt as Aristotle's on4r work 1n the 
field of a ph1loaoptu ot man. For example, the dialog Protl'epttcup and the 
Eudemian Ethica, of Ariatotle's Platon1c and transitional perl.oda re8P8Ct1ve~, 
are %'9preeentat11'9 of the author's earlier attempts to t1nd urdt;y in bums1 
MUons. The llicomac~ _E.th1~C8_ thus atUl gains in intelligibility- when it 18 
setm in tha context of the rest of the CtOrpwt Ar1stotolloum and in its place in 
the h18torical. davelop1l8llt of Ar'1stoUe'a te~hf.np.2 
Dut. beyond the.. expl1cl t 01" nearl,;r expl1al t presupposl ti(')Q8 of the 
~nt ot the Eth1ce.-presupposl t.1.ons wbtch 11e out of sight onl.7 in the 
prosent. uork hut open to vie ... in the author., statements 1n other parts ot bis 
m-i t1n..~xiste tho whole body of those presuv,?ostt1ans wh1ch Aristotle seems 
not. to have ~. 
TIle order of bu'Ir.lan aot.i.ons wh1ch A:r1stotle propoaea 1n tho Et.b1.ca wUl be 
~ful Ol\l;r in l.1ght of buraarl natut'G as 1. t enata in Artstotle's 'tlDder-
standing of itJ that is, it depends on the i.lmGr etructuN ot human nature aa 
Ari.stotle sees 11,. But t.h1.s bierercb;r ot powers and valUGS w1tbf.n human nat'Ul'e 
owes all ita order in Jr1stotle •• Wldentandl.ng 'to aome mom bas1c huual val_ 
ao the ~ of aU o~ bU1UIl val._. Th18 standard 1n t.urrl aaat bold 1 til 
place 1n a cons1atent \1Ddentl:Dd1ng of the urd.vene of u;per1G1l08 or must be 
tlle beat. of 8UCh an UDde.retMldSna. Yet the Ye'Il'3' gl'O\D18 on wh10h nch a 
1I1der order ... do t.beEelws bp~ a r1nal or1elltatlon in the m1nd of the 
th1nlcer, an .1;.11'.ude. 
1ft ot.her WOI'da, ewry d8Lnation of P.tt.erna or ata'ldard8 lmpl1ea a JIIOJ.'e 
tmdamlmtal standard Which in tm'rl 81 ther 1s accepted w1 tbout eza:1 natJ.Cl'l, or 
18 .-.tned tu:rt.her but not w1t.bout l.eavi.ftg ~ 1fwela of the quea\lCID J'ltf 
8tr1.~ htstor1cal AristoteJiaD poa1 tlona. .....fhe preatJnt, study see:ks onl¥ to 
examine tho phllo$ophical orientation of t.he author of the B1comaeman . ' 
whoever he 1fU, Whether Ar1etotle as u.dit1on baa tt, ar, D' !S&ii'. • 
Pl."OVd CQ~, '1'heophrastlUJ. S1nce tho work e'ND 1n th1s later theory 1s 
811lU attrtbttted to a s1ngl$ man, aDd the ... man to 1dlom the other M1n 
AristoteUan wr1t1nga a:re also to b. ucrtbod, tho question of the phUosopl'(yf. 
authorsb:tp is related to the preaent historiCal. studT of the phUosophioal 
dootn.ne but does not intrinsically aflact an 'UIldentand1ng of it .• 
to be touched. In a1 ther case a 11ne of reflecting on pr1nciples gOGS to .. 
certain depth of its GYJIl, then S'tops at that dopt.b. The l>bilosophor, 
su~pODedly', couU oartj the cxm.t1.nation dEropar th.an he evar actually does) or 
11.' he 1s prcctically unable to CnrI"'J 1. t daaper I other philosophers at least nee 
not fltop whot'o he does. For countless areas of dit.tarence in na.tural endotr..1allt 
c:,-:porter£c9, and espceial~l', histor1oal perspective, equip oach philosopher 
uni'1ooi,y tor the reflections 00 wUl rcak8. low penpectives raise nevI' 
quoations: tJBy seek broader un1 ties I they requ1..re deeper probit.gs 1n.to the 
8l1,)1-,osl tiOll8 of 110' giwn question and anmre:r. 
Such is the purpose ot the pr'eMnt atttt.V J n.ame4r I to O%Mi M Ar1stotle'. 
st..'""Uetur1rJ.g of bumatl 11te, and to do so nth a view to mald.ng axplic1t t.he 
standards on which that structure dcpenda. 
Aristotle.s retlect10na on tba un1ty of ~ Ute. its expertoncos and 
goals, :find expreNion in his use ot the tAX'lIl ba.pp1nen ( -edciayuov/o..- ).' 
• r I La 
'ct. Roam, P. 19O, ttAr1stotl.e accepts trom .the matV" tOO vie .. that tbD 
end is filda')-'oJl(a,. The COJ"l'e8pond1ng adjective or~ meant 'watched over 
by a good genius', but 1n ord1.nar.1 Greek _age the 1lOrd meana just good 
.fortune, otten with spec1al reterenco to extemal prosper! tor. '!be conventtonal 
translation tbapp1ne8. t is unsu!. table in tho Ethl~4J tor Whereas 'bapp1Mss' 
mans a state ot teel..1ng, dUter1ng from 'p19uu..~ only by its sugge$t1an of 
pormanence. depth, and seren1 1;1. Aristotle 1ns1aw that. ea~at~ov(a -1sa k1nd 
of aetiviVJ that it is not s:ny k1nd of pleasure, thought pleasure naturalq 
accompani_ it. The more non-commtttal translat.1on twll-be1ngt is t,horetore 
be-;,;.tor. If the qneatlon be aslced whether Aristotle mas a hedonist, it 18 
bettar to go b7 h.i.s repeated and deliberate ltatemlmt that the end ot Ute 18 
activitu rather than b:r his uoe, for want of :1 betwr WON, or ona Wh1ch 
augge8ts not action but teellng.u Note also that both eu"daf:,M-ovla and 
hill 'piooss suggest by their etymolor,ies an elo!::.1O!lt ot tho advent! t1.ous whioh 18 
foreign to AriatotJ.e's conoept.. 
6 
Jlost of the length of Book ~ of the Eth108 i. devoted to a general 
• 
examinat10n or t.he chief' directi.oM of human action in Ught of the un! \7 wbich 
the not1otl ot happ1nus introduce. into them. But. t.b1s noUon appears more in 
its ttmotlon of urd.f)1Dg the other subordinate dinctlone than 1n i til own 
ad.gn1t1oance. Ewn Anatot.lets det1n1tlon ot happ1neas 88 ,acUv1!1: .m &CooN 
!!!!!. "xceU;!noe senu lell to tell what happ1neae 1s in itself than it does to 
lIQ' d~ the lJ.Dee which later clar1t1cationa of it. meal1ng wUl tollow. At 
laut the true slgn1t1canoe of the defin1 tlon carmot 118 Htm until the mean1ng 
of act! vi ty and excel.l.enoe have become clear through the extended dtsctuJ810na 
ot the reet of the Rth101. 
F I 
Purthel' explJ.c1 t development. of the idea of happinelS doe. not OC~ unt11 
the last p888age8 ot the 1th1~,1 where Al'18t.otJ.e de80rtba that aotlv1ty wbtch 
be OOIUJ1dere \be obtet espr ••• 1Cft ot humatt happ1.neu. Aga1n, th1a d1Muasion 
doe. not d1reot~ olarif)' the -metardng ot happ1neasJ yet eo_ ot the author t., 
UI'lderatancU.ng or the tera can be dnwn from his -t.I"6atment ot the act1vity 1tl 
" 
wtd.ch be t1nds its ohlet iMtance. lfItarJIId.le in other e_Iter pusagea, 
ch1etq in Boo. SeYeb and Ten, he baa contlibuted to dist1ngu1eb!.ng bapp1De •• 
from the rut. ot man Is act1on8 by h18 di5cUBslon ot pleUt1.l"e _d 1. ts dlat.t.acti 
tram actinv. 
It Jf!Il1' be 0DlJr by 1nd1rect lnterence &om thee. distinctions and .. apUA 
cat1cma t.hat OM om uncover the It.andard which give. meaning to AriatOUeI. 
&d1.D1t1<m. of happ1DeJa. The _mt.ng does not ext.t in a state ot explioitne •• 
in Aristotlets mill bTmdlJ.ng ot the aubject. 11ms the ve17 Gtandam on wh10b he 
buea the ohief eonc1ua1ona ot b1a Itbloa rema1ns at leut in tDPl"eplon unde" 
tel"ll1lled. Qle can pus readily and W1. til a large part of certainty from 
1 
Aristotle ta explicit .t.atemants to this :t.q>l1clt standard, though. The 
prine1ple which Ul'lderl1es the stl'uetun is not very tar from actual exPl101t-
ness, even 1t 11. 1s not tOl'lIula;t.ect. 
But. the examination ot Aristotle's idea of' happ1ne •• can be c8l"l'1.ed deeper 
than th1a. Q1ce t.he author-•• ~ard of happiness has been made expl1c1t b1 
t.ba foregoing exa1.:oat1on. 1 t .1.s st.ill possible to seale the IK)ft .taa.d&mtmtal 
ph1losopb.t.oal or1efttatl00 on 1fhi.oh th18 standard 1 taelt 18 based. Th1e w.U1 
amount to a queatJ.on 1Iby tbe oortteDt of Ar1etotle Is notLon 1·8 8\1Ch as lt la, 
1fbat there 18 1n h1a genenl ~ to pbiloaophiJing that detera1nH for b1m 
.uch a etanc!ard. 
~ 2!!l!:!?!~ !! thlf ~ then, 1s twofold. Fint, to mat. expl1c1 t t.be 
maaninI of happineas 1ft Ar1noUe fa !1ooIuc~ EtJl1P!' ' t.bat 18, to dl8COYer 
~Uc1t standard by whicb .Ar1atotJ.e j1Jdaea tt. nltiJlat,e ~ of the varl0U8 
torma ot hmum activit.)". (This standard, it W\ll be Men, 18 human Ute 
patterned by ordcr~ act1cln and refleot1ve ~f.t in short, the praaenoe 1Il 
man of the Ideal.) Second, to projeot thia etanc!ard on the bac~ ot II 
deep,~r or1Emtat1on 1n Aristotle's thought. (tis or1ontat1oD wU.l appear as II 
focus of phU.osopb1cal attention on the eternal and uncond1tlODad excellence of 
P'Q.nt tOl'll and an attendant 1Dattentlon to tMsubjeot in wh1eh tona ls found.) 
Tho upUoitation of Aristotle'. notion of happ1nesa-and tbe pr.l.mar.1 con-
com of this 8t~ be acbieved by an a:am1naUon of the main passages in 
the NLoomaoheap M:N=9!. Book ca., .. blob treat the not1cm happiness. next of 
those passage. 1n Books Seven and 11m whtch develop the -antnr. of p1euura--a 
reaUt,. wbleh IlU8t be car.tully diat1ngu1fJhed from bapp1neas J cd t1nAll1' 1ft 
Book Ten, ot the cultrd.nat1ng chapters of the 'P,;thle,s~ whteh show the activit,' of 
8 
reflect.iou to ;)E) the highest form of hulaIm happiness. theile three SUtpa of the 
exam1naUon Will take place respactlvely in Ohapters 'l\«), '!1lree, and Four. 
The further oxu.d.nation, locating this standard of l1ttmtm happiness in the 
larger context of Aristotle fa balo philosophical orj.entatlon, is a vaster 
problem and can tJf) only touched on in the j2"esent study. SUch an exam1.natlon 
goes berond Ar1stotle's own conaiderat1on of the 1'I8tr.r. Bence tl'1erft 1s no 
passage in h1a wrlt1nga which gi'tH special support to the lnterpnttat10D that 
wUl be .atabl1ahed. A. reliable esamlnat10ll could atend to the 'dlole 
Aristotel1an corpus. '!'he present, inquiry does not arlbU.lon this klnd of 
thorout")lneaa J but 1ntends cmJ.y a further refinement of Ar1atotl.e IS standard, a 
deduction, by ~ of eoroll.ar7, from the conclusion which the f1rat aamination 
w:U.l htMt ach1ewd. Bence it .. will pJ"OC(Jed by a coaparisOft of Aristotle .•• 
standard ot bapplntta. with the ll1Pllcatlona of other pueagea in the H1c0lUC~~ 
l!}1'l\1c. in Which he d1scUlU_ the foundat1.Ona of h'lendahip and self-love and tb 
meaning of the ille of honor. 'l'hi8 compar1sOft, along with a 8'UDIllar7 of the 
ArgWllmt and a t'1nal estimate of ita ooncl.ua$.ons, wUl constitute Chapter Five 
ot the present study. 
CHAPTER II 
Dook Q).e ot Aristotle'. !\comacbeanEt __ hi.c.a i. composed ot a aerie. ot d1s-
CU88iona centes1.ng D>l"8 or l •• s ... lc1:.17 8l"01md the subject ot happ1neas. The 
tirst three chapters are devoted to a general. introduction to the whole treatl 
on ethicsa its f'ur1crt1on as science, its importance u the sclence wh1ch puts 
order into t"he matter-human activ1 t7'-0n whloh all the other sc1enoe8 
converge" t1nally the d:l.apoal tiona in the philosopher lfh1ch :I. t.s study require •• 
Chapter Four introduce. the conaon conviotion that happines. i. the goal of aU 
J:Juman actions but points out that disagreement enters when lt i8 asked what 
happ1neas:l.s. In Chapter Pift Aristotle 8ketohea out the tour main views ot 
what happiness le.....p1euure, honor, walth, and retlect1an-and briet17 diapoee 
ot the t1.ret thr!8e e£ tbam as inadequate, wb.U.e post,pon1ng disc'lUlsion ot the 
'. 
" 
fourth until a later u... Chapter Six returns to a cans1derat1on ot the 
approach to be made to the probl .. , with a dtscuuion ot the Platcnic theor,y ot 
a universal good l3Ilderl.ying all specUic and I*rtloular goods, this approach 1. 
:rejected in tavor ot an inductive method centered on iDtaD actlv1t,.. 
The tIIOre IQ1Itematl0 ~at.at. of t.he pJ'Clblea beiina in Chapter Seven with 
a de8CJ'ipticn ot the way ord1naJ:'y b:aman actin ty 8ubordUaatea certain actlone 
purposes which they Ml"'ft, and 11'1 th an analysis ot the notiOll ot goal in both 
ita relative and abtolute],y t1nal .enna. This prepares tor the question ot 
9 
10 
what human acUv1'tl' best tult11s this notion ot t1nal1ty. At last. a def1n1t1on 
ot happiness appeara-acU vi. t¥ according to excellence-, and thi. 18 to ael"ftt 
... a guide toward determ1n1ng what happ1.rrae. 18. 1n Chapter rJ.ght this 
formulation 1s cOq'larod with a rrambar ot tradlt10nal ideas of happ1D888 and 
more ot 1ta character1st1ca are bl"o1.J8ht to light. 
Chapter H1ne 1n1t1ates an :lntormal eerie. ot q'Q8atlC1t'lS on the ambject of 
hapP1ne8., the an8W8l'8 to which Hl"ft to define stW mora the meaning of tb1a 
state. 1'0 a qn_te1on about luck as the source of happine •• A:riatoUe .boa the 
dependence ot happ1ne •• on cbaraotAtr. In Chaptara Ten and Eleven Aristotle d1 
cusses how far changea ot fortune can affect happ1neu. In Chapter 'twelve be 
describes bow ""'a ordlDary wa;ra oflpea1d.ng betl"q a regard for bapp1neaa 
other goode. F1nalJ.y 11'1 Ohapter Thirteen, with a dJ,y1liOl1 of man'. tacultie. 
into Itlb-oNt1onal and rational, he prep81"88 tor the detaU.ttd d1.8auaa1cma ot 




The cl"der ot Al'Utotl.'s approach to the ..m.ng ot happ1neu 18 cleanat 
in the central Ohapter Seven, while the later chapt,en, which contain important 
u 
aegmentAI of the doctrine ot Book (be, 11e outside the ti.ght at.ructuring of the 
pas8agu that introduce the det1n1tlon and OOJEent on it.. '1'tm8 it 1. hard to 
fonW.ate a briet but adequate 8xpreeslon of Arl..totle'8 doctrine Without de-
parting some'IIhat tMm t.hn or1g1nal order ot itD presentation. 2 
Tbe def1n1tion itself ls eat.lstactor.v 1ft t.he ..,. it reduce. Artstotle'. 
notion of happ1Desa to the tWDpJ.e.t pos.lble tol'll1lat ttThe act,iva a_roUe of 
the hmDarl soul'. tacult1ea in conto1'lD1ty- with exceU-. .... tt3 ru. 
t'tInct.1onal "I1.ewJ.ng ot happ.t.neea 18 corud.atent 111 th .Q1.atotl.'a preference tor a. 
teleological atl'UoturinK ot his subject atter. ~r 1. t 18 tho key to 
Ar1stotle'a digreaaion from the q1.W8t:J.on of happiDNa throtIgbout BlDat of the 
length of the lth1ca. lor such detaUed di8CUU1ONJ of the v1rtuea in genenl 
and part.1CNl.ar are not. neoa-al7 tor an 'ODderstaocU.ng of the happy Ute (which 8_ 111 .Al"1atotle's t1nal vlew of the quaatlon to Ue be10Dd the concerns of 
12 
the moral 111'e) J but such a aeries ot d1scU8sions does havo a place 1n a f'ul1 
under8tanding ot the implications ot "activity 1n accord with excellence" sinoe 
as Aristotle makes clear, excellence 18 of at least two k1nds, lIOl"al as _11 as 
intellectual. 
Yet Aristotle" treat.nt 01 happ1neas even in Book Qle conta1ne l'IIUCh ~ 
than the skeleton detin1tiOfl sugge8W. The notion of II hlerarahtaation of 
value., lor example, is bnrely hinted at 1n the phrase "in' aoaOl"d with excel-
lence," while thi8 hieftl'Chi.zation is porhap8 the IIlO8t ~t aspect of the 
doctri.neJ nor does the UIpol"tallt, qaeaUca ot bapp1llea' dependence on outward 
, condi t.1ona receive adequate not1oe. 8fmce 1 t wUl be uaetul to put ArlatotlAJ la 
C-oneral notion ot happ1neH lnto a llOl'e expl1c:lt tonmla, though this will 1n 
ita own tt1m require further aubdivt.11on .s the d1.acuae1_ 'tltMo._ IlIOn polbte4 
AcoOrd1ng to this tal'lllla, happ1neas will be charaoteria4Jd u a natural 
ac~:rt!( .:l!!1!!.~ !!S S1!JozflPlAr. Each ot thue tour characteristics 
opens onto m 1mportant, _peat, ot happ1 ..... , wb1le adequate dlaous81on of UleIa, 
espec~ ot the 8ubord1Date _8I.I\i.nga whioh, the terms ~ and aht1v1~ 
~, will 1mol.,. oovel'ing the whole raage of Aristotle's remarks, but in a 
laas randoa tuh1an.4 
T. 
bror A;r:tatotle'8 own .-ry of the oonel1J8ions reached 1n the oourae ot 
t.his book see his raoap1tulation in Book Ten, U16a3o-b9, U71812,131 "Having 
now dlscUlsed the various Jd.nds of Virtue, of Friendship and of Pl.eM'UI"8, it 
1.:'01;mJ.ns for us !:io treat in outl1ne ot HaPP1noea, 1na."Jm.uoh as~l'O oount this to 
be the End of bIJa81 lite. But. it will shortent.be d~,,;xm"81on it we reoapltula 
what has bhn said already. 
"How we stated that, happ1neaa 18 not a certain dlsposlt.t.on of oharacter) 
, since if 1 t were it m:l.ght be po88e8sod by a man who pueed the whole ot his 
We asleep, llV1ng ·Uie lite of' a vegetable, or by one who was plunged 1n the 
deepest m1.sfortune. It then we reject Lhis as unsat1stacto17, and toel boubd 
olass happiness ratller as SO_ form of aotlv.lty, as has been said in 'the earUe 
part of this t.reatlae, and if aotiv1t1ea are of' two kLnds, SOmB merely 
1. Happ1neas as natural. 
Happineas 1s natural in t.be senae that 1 t is to be 'Understood 1n the 
conteXt of an adequate underatanding of lraman nature. It tollowa the patterns 
laid down b,y human nat..ul'e and is attainable Wi. th1n that nature. 1his 
or1entat1ou ot happ1neee reoe1wa 0Dl7 obUque reference trom Aristotle, but 18 
tmpl1c1t in the whole work, 1t tor no other reason than that no power or 
1n.tluence outs!.. the scope at human nature 1 taelt 18 appealed to. 
~ !:!. ~~ ~ SI'Wl'e. 'l'h1a pr1nolp18 1s present in the l1De 
of ~ that culmlnatee in Ar1stotle's det1ni.t1011 of happ1neaa. D.1 an 
examination ot the .... maD charaaterlst10ally act.a wU.l be d1acownd wbat 18 
~/ ) his twlcal tunotlca. (epr0V". 1t.Are.. thea to auppoae that, 1dd.le the 
carpenter and the 8hoamaker have det1n1te t'nfto\1ona or bu1nea888 belonalng to 
.. auaary .ana ad del1nble 0I1l7 tor the .a. ot so_t.b1ng else, ou. ... 
dea1ftble in tbelBe1W8, it 18 clear that happ1neu 18 to be clasaed IIBmg 
act1v1t1n deliz-abl. 1n ... lYea, and not _ tho .. deaiNble as a ... to 
so_~ elM. moe happ1neas laoka notbtng. aftd 1. a.U.....utfic1ent. 
-But, thoae aoUv1t.1aa an dea1rable 1n ~lft. Wb1ch do not 81m at .,., 
reault bqond tba _1'8 ...rc1ae of the "1'9'1t.y. low th1.e 1a lelt to be the 
nature at actlona in contond. ty with virtue J tor to do noble and Y1rtuous deeda 
18 a tb1Dg .suable tor Ita 01JfJ sake." 
"Bu\ 1t bapps.nea. oonalats 1n aotl'f'1.W in accozrdanae with Ylrt.ue, 1t 1. 
reuonabl.e that it should be act.i:tityin 8OOOl"danoe 1f1th the h1gheat Yinue 
rl ••• uoeUeaatuaper67, W W.a will be thit 'f'1rtne at the beat part. ot us." 
'f'.tru Ari.atotle wJ.U leJ into hi. di8<N881011 of \be ntleotive l11e. 
them, l1li1 as such has nona, and 1. not designed by natUJ'8 to .tultU azv 
function .,..S 
. 
JIoreoftr, the good man, whose exper1eDoe and preterenaee ~ are 
Aristotle fa guide. in deciding the excellence of a wrq of l1te6, leada aUt. 
in wld.oh conflicting dealre. and Ol'O$s purposes have DO place, tor the verr 
S:J.097b29-,31. ct. 22-28, -To e-.y bowver that the SUpreme Good ls 
happine.s will probab~ appear a trui8llJ we .tl11 require a more expliclt ac-
count ot what constitute. happin.... P8rhapa then _ ...,. arrive at thl. lV' 
asoertaining lfbat 18 man'a tunct1on •••• £Qt JUl' be held that the good of 
mm realde. 1n \be fuDo'UOIl ot man, it be baS a ftr4cUon. fI Jlao Part. An. 
639bl4-22. ttPla1n.l7, hawver, that. oause ls the firet which ... ci1T""tbi'"'"f'1nal. 
ODe. For this is the Beaaon, IIDd t.be Reason tora the atart.1.ng-point, al1ka 111 
the worka ot art and in works ot nat1lJ'e. .101' consider bow the physician or 
the builder aeta about hi. work. He starts by fol"lll1ng tor himaeU a de.f'1D1 te 
picture. • .and th18 he holds tornrd as the reaeon and explanation ot each 
subsequent step that be takes, and of hi. act1l2a 1n tbis or that • .,. as the 
cue may be. Bow 1n the r.>rka ot nature the good aud the t1nal.. cause i. sUll 
IIOnt doainant tblll in worD of art such as the ...... ft. lb1d. 64lblo-)O, 
tor an extension ot tb1a concept of t1nal1t7 in_iura to the whole univer., 
ne An. 4l5b15-l8. "Xt 18 mmitut that the aoul is also the t1nal C4UIht ot i 
~ For nature, like mlnd, alW8.)'B doe. Whatev8l" 1t does tor the sake of so_ 
tId,ng, whioh 80111th1ng 18 1 ts eDI. To that eo_thing corresponds in the cause 
of animal. the soul and in this it tollowe 1'Jl8 order ot nature, all natural 
bodi.. are oreana of the soul- J Und. 43Wl. ·For all thing. thit exiat by 
Nature are means to an end, or will be coneom1tant.. ot .ana to an end." 
6The whoa present passage 18 an example of Ari.stotle's dependence on th1a 
standard. See 109Sb4-8. "Perhaps then ff)r U8 at all events 1. t 1s proper to 
start from what 1.8 kno'Im to us. Thie 1s why in order to be a COllllfJt.ent student 
ot thet Right and Just. • • the pupil is bound to have been well trained in h1a 
habl tee For ;the start1ng-point or first principle 1s the taet that a thi.ng ls 
80, if this be satJ.afactorlq ascertained, there .Ul be DO need also to know 
the reaeon 'ttt\v 1. t 1. so. And the man of good _ral tralning 1movrs tlrst 
pr1nciples already, or can easily acca1re them." Ct. Stewart, I, 54-57 on thl. 
paseage. See alao llSla18,19. "[RJO mre in ethics than in mathe.tics are 
the f'1rat princ1ple. reached by a process ot reasoning, but by vlrtue, whether 
natural or ao~red by training in right opinion as to the tirst princ1ple". 
1166a)3 • "ri 7trtue ~d the nrtuous man ..." to be the standard 1n e,"r..Y 
also lO94a2Y-l'095aU, 1104 12-14, and Pol. ~33tsa.9. Por an examination of 
Aristotle's use ot this standard and an indictment ot his fatlure to g1ve 1t a 
more lOUd. toundation than the oomraon agreement of gentlemen of his day, ot. 
Marjorie Grene, "An .Iq>1101t Preml .. 1n Aristotle's Ethics", Et.hics, 1945-46 
(56), no. 2. 
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reason t.hat h1.a lUra. follow the dJ.reotioruJ t.hat. nature 1.,. down and nature 
'7 doeS not contradict herself. It Ls posa1ble tor men to develop various 
pexverted t.Ut.ea or be d1spoeed to them oocause of faulty conatltutlone .. or 
8L~ly to act aca1.nat the Virtu.. by exc.. 0.1' deteot6, but all such 
aberrations are recogn1S1td by normal pers0U8 tor what, thay are, nazooly 
departurtMl, bl.amuworthy or not, froI!l the rule whioh the rational eleroont 1n wan 
natur~ ought to ~e on the lower appet1tes.9 
Further, maine!! !!. Itta!e!RlI, acoord1ru.{ .se na;tu~. QlCe it 18 held 
r..aturtl acts purpoa1ve13 producing det1n1te means tor definite ends, :1 t doea not 
make seNte to talk about achieving anell that 11e bcqond the meaD8 at one'8 d.U-
pos3l.. When the quostion 1s raised whether bapp1neas 18 a girt. ot the goda or 
ot l'UC~O Aristotle does not directly deJv' the possibility of happinea$' 
oom.1.ng fltom noh directions. 1'be question or divine intervention in hural 
affairs lt1 not a matter than can bed1sct1l$aed in the context of tl18 present 
~tt Q1. the other band, the rtse and fall of luck 1s known to atteot 
happ1ne8s but not in en:! essential.,-. Nor,would it be tltt1ng for" ohance to 
plq a 'ft/1:'I 1apoJ"tant. role • 
••• n 
71099&12-1.6. 
Bs ••• the d1scufJs1ona ot bid aot1oua u a depart ... hom the mean, n0bal2 





rHJappS:Deas can be at.tained t.hrout:h acme procen ot atudy or etton by 
i'l.l persons Whoh capacity tor axocllence has not been stt'llted or maiMd. 
Aga1n, it 1t 1s better to be happr as a result ot one's own e:.rertiona than 
bY, the gift of furtIabe, 1 t is reasonable to auppo_ that this 18 how 
happJ.Daaa 18 WODJ 1nasmuch as 10 the world or nature th1.ngs have a 
natural tendency to be ordared in the beat posa1ble "iIfI¥, and the same 1. 
true ot the prod1.1ctl ot an04 and of causat.1on of ar:q ldnd, eapeciall7 the 
h1gheat Ct... inteU1gllDc!f. Whereas that. the greatest and noblest ot 
aU tb.1.ngs_ should be lett to fortune wdOld be too oontral7 to the fi t.I'l888 
or th1Dga.U 
In anot,ber context Ar1l1totle diat1ngu1shea wJ..ah1ng tram ohooaine by' tbla 
difference, tbat the former oan be concerned wi t.h imposstb111tJ.ss while the 
latter onl3 w.lt.h t'tl1n5~s 111th1a att.a.1nllm.t.. "Oholoe cannot have tor it.8 obj.~ 
imposslb1lJ.tiea; 1£ a man 1f'8l'8 to ~ be chose saaeth1ng i.mposslble he would be 
thOught a foal; but .". oan nah tor thi.ngs that are impossible, for lnstal1C4t 
i1wilOl'tal1t7. [*NJo one obOos •• what doq not rest wJ.th h1.mself, but onJ.;y what 
he th.1.nka oan be atta1nad b.Y his 0'IIn act." 12 
'l'ba acUvlt:q that will perteot man wUl be, atter all, IODrthi.ng posa1ble 
to 111m because he has a natul"al capac1 tT tor 1. t. What he bas no capaelt¥ for 
------- " ~. In this and in otbar quotations throughout the prGsent, 
etudT the translation !9!ll;!!M.t! ~place8 Rackbua's or Roea's !f:!:WI .. wrnrever 
the teNd; .... to favor a ~re.ta:'icted rander1ng Qf Ar.Latot.lili""7tper'; • 
This applJ. •• to oognate. ot the WOl'd as well. 
12Xmpoa.ib1lJ.t¥ of attailUlleDt wu &lao th«t reason why the Platonio Uniwr-
sal Good. had to be excluded fl:om .Aristotle t. discuaa10n of the good tor lIt8l1l 
It And lJ.kew1ae with the Idea of the Good I tor even it the goodness predicated of 
various thing. in OotGOll re:aJ.l¥ 1s a un1 tty or some t.h1ng ex1ating separate or 
absolute, it olearly will not be prac\loable or attainable b7 man. but. the Good 
which 'We are now aeeld.ng 18 a good within human reacb." 109&31-34. cr. also 
11l2a18-l4. 
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will never t.ak8 place in h1m. 'fbe capacity does not constitute the actlv1V' 
too act,1v1t.y must be brougbt about by effort and even the disposition 80 to act 
must be doveloped beyond the state ot mere oa,.l)aei tty to that of habl t. But the 
ca.pac!. t7 1.a basic I 
f:NJo one ot the l:lOral virtues is on..~red in us by natura, for no 
natural property can be altered i:rJ habit rwt4re~J of course, vl..rtuea are 
s'l18ooptibla of corrupt1on 7. •• • CrJe't tbo vl.rtuss • • • arc eni~Mldered in us neither t>:f' nature nor 19t 1n violation of nature; nat1.:ll'e 
gives us the eapac1t7 to mceb" them, and this capacit1 is brought to 
_tun. ty by habit. 
~Oftr, the taculties given us by nature are beatowed on us f'irtrl' .. 
in a potential tona, .., exhibt t their actual exercise afterwards. 'lh18 itt 
clearly so with our' senseSI ., did not, acquire the fe.culty of sight or 
hear1ng by repeatedly seeing or repeatedly l1st..en.1ng, but the ot. ... lft9' 
about.-because .. p bad 1:.be senses .. began to;".YB., e t.hem, we did not t'Gt them 
by ustng them."" " "';, 
1'bus 1t 1. not necessary tor Aristotle to baYe .made aplicit rere~ to 
happiness' achievement solely w1tb1n the scope of nature. SUch a chan.nel.U'tg ot 
human JlUl'P088S and powers 18 t.be natural preauppos1 Uon ot the dJ..~'!nplon, and,. 
except for a tow 1nstancd lJJce thoe>} unaowred in the present examination, 
passes without the Qtlthor's adftrtence. 
2. Happ1neaa as aotiviV 
Happinass- 1s an activity (evepreLa). Th1a termlb signi,f1 •• the presence 
of a roalitJ' 1n the t..rue .nse of the WDI"d ac~, not merely disposit1onal. 
Moreo.,r in ita ver'I der1vatim (ev.e'pr-ov) it S'Uggests a quaUtq of illlD8ll8M8, 
J E I J 
13U03a18-31. 
lLct. H. Bonita. ~9!? Aristotol1cus (ortg1nally vol. :5 of w Royal 
Prussian AcaiieIl\Y odit.lon 0 Matott." ~nd ad. (Grata, 1955), p. 25la2-b42, 
tor the Ar1stotel.1an uses ot the term. Also see Yet. lQ48b,$-1051a31, as a 
s~ ot 1t. 
of reality tllat takes place w1th1n the person and 1s independent of outward 
oondi tiona. 
F1rst, h!pp1.neas !!! state 2t notuatlor.. To be active (in the rtght 
of aoti:ri.ty) 1s to be happy. while marel,y to he well disposed to such actiVity 
1s not by that fact to be happy_ 
Ariatotlo's languap a~1y 1d&nV~fie. happiness with the &at1v1ty that 
bt.:lSt. aobJ.eves it. "CwJe ident1.f'<; the end Wi til oerta1n actions and actlvi~1e. 
for: . thUs 1 t. falls ancng goods of the soul and not among external goode.-15 
And again. "COJur def1ni:tlclon acoorcfa 1d:tb the descript10n of the happy mill U 
om who 'Uvea _11' or 'does well'. tor it hU!irt;.ualq ldentU'iod bapplQe.s 
16 
wi. th a form of f.;t\tH1 11£e or ~1ng _11. n Is this an accident of language. 
is what Arlstotlo re$l.ly intends to sq. not that. happ1ness and rtv,ht actlvlt7 
are the a;.nm9 t.h1ng, but that happiness !!!!At.1I f'l'o!I right aotim? (h the 
eontJl'aJ.7, there ia no reuon to ,l'eConstrue bts words 'When they are pla1nly tar 
1d.anUt1cat1on, and when in other con'testa he is careful to distinguish 
, t .. 
151098b17-U. (Boas, tr. ct. note 29 tor further diocu881on of th1a 
reading.) 
16:L098b20..2Z. Arlst.ot.le usuaUy pairs haP.a and do!:mt well ill 
paral.lel eons truetienG I as inftnl tift., for aitilii)~ e U ~ a 7« ove7v-and E';:;"-
rr~TI"ellr ~,or as subetant.iW8,euda5Movla. a.nd el1:rrpasfa, even ezi5wia.. 
;::;oe also 1095&19-21, \thore tho same parallelism is present 1n his ~; 
aad 1l'{8b28,.dlere the specific actlvlty of ~pe/lr 1$ singlGd out. i?..8 
idantical :Ild til e-U. Oa-~veJY. 
I""'" 
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activity £rom quallU,os wb1ch result from lt ,and at the same tina does not. 
thUS d1stinSulah aoti. v1 ty from. happ1ne ... 
As actnal, activi tq goes beyond mere dispositions. Virtue (excellence of 
charact.er, good bahl t) 18 a dlspoal tion tv do what 1& good. But tl'ere is no 
actual good until one movee into actlon according to his diepoal tion. ntapos!-
-
tion by itself counts tor notb1ng. 
-
170r• Cb. In, no. 2, of tho present study for the distinction of plea-
sure and aoUv1V_ In 1097b4,$, bowver, Aristotle's language does seem to 
imply 80m sort 9! relationship, thus lack of identity, betlftMn activity am. 
bapp1.neasl "Ca'Jut .. _also choose them Lhonor, pleasure, lntel.llgence, and 
excellence of obaractAr'Jtor the salce of bapp1ness, in the bel1ef tbat they 
1f1U be a meana to our S8cUl1.ne It.~ (Italic. added.) 001'A:pal"8' tta~p"u MetJa. J~ 
--'I""': - '" \ ~ I ,_a.::' )" -' n/-/("a.£. rf)s eu?Jayuoy/'a.s-'yapJl/; ota 'TO'uTCUV u.rrO/Ld"y..-vli/Ovres .eucJtlyttov!Jd'"'ely. • • • 
A llne· elU"l1er, in another conneotion, '2;,ci, 18 aed with tlls accuaaUw to express 
tho unmistakably oausal or intentional ~ter. But the dld.hsre 1s different 
because in the genit1ve. ct. Bonita, p~ " a7-1::t4, on Ari.8toUe t e use of the 
preposit1on~/a1lith genlt1 ... and 1d.th aoeu&atiw. 'the accusative 1s the usual. 
way ot expressing U6USfh The gen1t1ve on the other hand 1s used loo~ and 
temporally, or f:!I.')dally, or to cOft'ftrt -no'UD8 to adw1"blal use. :n this last 
8Onao, then,o/a. with tho c,.'\lnit1va suggests an intimacy bet_en activities and 
happiness which ~s Ol:Jnstitutive rather than oausal, so that it i8 less mts14ad-
1ng to randel' Olc:t. TOt.l.r",v"1,n exercising thea" than -they will be a lMtaruJ to 
eeouring". Thus the apparent sundering or at} activity and happiness"as terms oj 
11 relationship is not. neoe8si tated by A:r1stotJ.e's own wordi.rs8, though the 
phraseology does not preclude such a readlDg. 
20 
CBJut no doubt it makes a great difference whether we conceive the 
Supreme Good to depend on possessing virtue or on displqing i t-on 
disposi tton, or on the manttestation of a diaposi tion in action. For a 
man ~ possess the disposition without its producing any good result, 
as for instance when he is asleep, or has ceased to function from S01II8 
other cause; but virtue in active exercise cannot be inoperative-it will 
of nece8.i t1' act, and act well. • • .so it iSlr'>se who !2l rightly who 
carry off the priZes and good things of lite. 
The same view of activity' and the happiness identified with it is present to 
Aristotle's mind when he is diSCUSsing the happiness of the dead, even it in 
this context he does not seem to draw as full conclusions from the viewpoint as 
he might be expected to. 
Are we then t,o count no other human being happy either, as lonp; as he is 
alive? Jfuat we obey Solon's warning, and tlook to the end'? And if we 
are indeed to lq down this rule, can a man really be happy attar he is 
dead? Surely that is an extrelOOly 8~e notion, especially tor us who 
define happinesfJ as a form of activity' 
!f,as can happen" circumstances keep a man trom acting the way he would if 
he were unhindered, it. will make l1ttlo difference what his dispositions are. 
His excellence of character JDa¥ remain but it achieves nothing if the act to 
which it disposes him cannot take place. Disposition must be able to move into 
" 
act i.f happiness 1s to be present. In a later passage summarlzing the 
conclusions of Book (he" Aris1x>tle will illustrate the notion of happiness' 
actiV8ness by ment10ning two instances in which good disposition ma..y remain 




diSp081 tion of character; s1neG if .l t. 'Mire 1 t m1ght be potIaeseed by a man ..., 
,used Om lIbole of his Ut. asleep, l1v1og the We ot a vegetable, or by one 
who was pltmged in the deepeat misfortUDfh,,20 TrOuble in lU'e 1s one of tbe 
l:ain b1ndranoea to the act.ivlt)r wh1ch constitutes hl&pp1neas. It 1a ~ 
trJ.'ougb trouble that outward 1..aU. tie. llAVe 1nfluanoe on the QSUI:'.n'Mally 1... __ _ 
reality that is activity. 
For int w aecond qual1ty act1v1tZ !-!. S; re~ ~!Dl e!!f!ftd, not 
somthing ooparate from oneeelt and allanablo l.:1.kB a piece of propartor. 
This immanence, or independence ot outward :reaU.ty. 1a t..'1a :1eaning of the 
term self-sufficiency (a.c!. -,-t£pK'eUL) 1Ih1ch Aristotle appUes t.o happ1neu .. an 
essential. not.e of it. "CWJ- t.a.ke a Hlt~ thing to l!'ItfU'). a tb1DI 
which merely 8 t.andi.na b:r 1 UltJlf' &loDe mnder. Ufo dea1rabla and lac1d.na 111 
21 
nothing, and sucb \WIt deem happ1nass to be." 
~d1at4l.y ~ 1n tM tiama text .Ar.1stotle m.al:Qa 1;1» 3MIl'l1ng of tb1s 
sel£' -euf.f'1c:lena;r s tUl cleat'er: 
!lbreover we tblnk ~ tho mat do$1rable of all. good 'th1tlg1 without 
b&:1.ng 1ts(!)lf reckoned as on. among the rest, tor if it weN so recK218d, 
it iH clear that .. ahauld coaalder it IIIDft da81nblo '\!1lxm tmtn tbt 
smal.l4at or other good thlng8 W1"G oomb1.ned w1th 1t, Hince t'hls add1t1<m 
would raeult. 1n a larpr ~ of' good, and of two goods the greater is 
always to". nore desirable. 
Thus whatever aetlv.t.ty oont;tt1tutel happ1nels will be all that one requirGS to 
t I J 
22 
be happy, while all other goods will be on a different level from this. They 
wq be dispensed with if only one may continuet.he chief activity. 
But suoh independence of outward reall ties has to be qualified, indeed it 
has already been qualified by the remarks whioh introduoed the discussion of 
happiness' independence. For the salt-sufficient activity is carried on in 
society and for man this JIItl8t always be the case. 
CIJt is felt that the final good must be a thing sufficient in itself. 
The term selt-sufficient, howeVer, we employ with reference not to one-
self alone, living a lite of isolation, but also to one '8 parents and 
ohildren and life, and one's tri~nds and tellow oitizens in general, since 
man is by nature a social being.Z3 
Of course, the range of one t s dependence cannot be extended indefinitely; a 
person does not need mere acquaintances of his the same way in which he needs 
his family and close friends. Yet the difference is only one of degree, and at 
any rate he is not simply sufficient unto himself. For this reason, whatever 
occurs in the nilieu in which he li vas Will have some effect on his personal 
-
lite. 
The lack of complete independence is iJ.W)ortant to the notion of human 
happiness. For human happiness muat be a lasting thing if it is to deserve the 
name happiness. Immediately atter achieving his definition of happiness 
Aristotle thinks fit to oonjoin with it the quality of durability. "lIoreover 
this activity !"U.St (lCcUW a complete lifetime; for one swallow does not make 
23lO97b8-U. ct. Pol. 1253&27-29: "CTJhe individual, when isolated, i 
not self-sufficing; andtheretore he is like a part in relation to the whole. 
But he who is unable to Uve in society, or who has no need because he is 





spring, nor does one fine day; and similarly one dq or a brief period of 
happiness does not make a. man supremely blessed and happy.,,24 
Thus the question of the relative influences of inward and out-ward reality 
is an important one for the understanding of Aristotle fa notion of self-activit 
as constitutive of happiness. How far does a change ot outward circumstanoea 
influence one'. happiness? The anawr wst be sought in two passages of Book 
()le I the seventh oha.pter~ in which Aristotle olassified the chief human good 
as an inward good, and then the tenth, in whioh he discusses the resistance ot 
virtuous activity to changes of fortune. 
Aristotle makes use of the traditional division of all goods into those 
that are outward, those that belong to body, and those that belong to soul, and 
he r,1vss preference k' the third class.25 Goods of the soul are "good in the 
.fullest sanse and the highest degree.,,26 Shortly afterward, however, this 
thre£ """Part division is changed tor a dl vision into two olas88sl Goods ot the 
soul are unqualitiedly oontrasted with outward, and bodily goods, apparentl.7, 
are to be classed among outward goods. Tile end of human life is shoWn to 
"consist in actions or activities of some sort, tor thus the End is included 
among goods of the soul, and not among external goods.n27 This realignment, 
241098a18-20. 
25C£. Stewart, I, 119, 120, tor a discussion of the origin of this divisio 
and A:r1stotle fa various uses of it. 
2~098bl2-17 t "Now things good have beon di vidad into three classes, exte 
nal goods on the one hand, and goods of the soul and of the body on the other, 
and of these three kinds of goods, those of the soul we commonly pronounce good 
in the fullest sense and the highest degree." 
27 8b18 /&J' /~ .. , ,/ .. / / t:/ 
.. )09 , ,19., .. ~ •• ~J"""s TIJ/es AeJ:ovra!., ~at-, etlep(euu To 77!!A05"' OUrtiJ 
raf> TUJV'rrepl. t;'1tj"pyara.!llUv r/yerat -' k'q,t o~ TtuV'eI('JtJS." 
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which gee. without. eouant., .. signa to soul all the functions ot the human 
]:.arson, those usually referred speclally to t.he ~, as well as toose higher 
func"' .. i.ons uaua.lly resel""9'8d ~'i soul in the Bense of dOl!le Idf,hcr t.han physical 
1dtbout. lhe effect 1s a realigJlllOm. or tbe tradUJ.onal tnroo-P&Tt division 
inw a div1alul1 of two parts. outward and personal.26 Theae porsonal goods 
all of thea among the pel"'sonal J ir. th1.. case, hit~ber and dynamic bota.ly goods, 
like acUo.na and acUvit.1.8, will be l'eterred to the liv:1.ng principle, 1.e. be 
29 
considered personal goods,' whUe static bodily goods l1ke beauty or health 
will be referred w what somehow ll.es outside the l1 v1ng principle, to the b 
28lfJuxi, the llv1n& principle, i.s more adequately oxPressed b7 the word 
tErson than by 8O~~31noe the l&"ter baa a narrower meanlllg to the tllOdern 
ian It IIIl8t have. tor .AriBtot.l.e, while on the other hand, reon unless 
~n in its technical meaning t!OnW1S be\W.- the sonae of 11~ it tot.aU~ 
which Ariswtle'a usa olearly presupposes. " ' .. 
291098b14. I~cording to Ross's trooslatton, "and psychical actions and 
tivh,le8 1'18 class as relating to soul" (tor reading. "Tt;15' oe rrpafiets k"a~ ,as 
'I'''WK~~ el/epr!tas Tiep/. 'tU.X?//, Tl9e,Mev ,,). Raokhala translates, "BUt it is 
acUons and the soul's actJ.ve exercise of its functions that .. posit (as be 
l-~1nesa >" for the conJectured reading " ulS oel rrpa. Jets Kdt. Tas evepreLas 
r4S ~P' ~u4.?Y T(e~eV' • fJ 
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as reoalftr ot lite &om the soul, and thus will be counted outward goods.30 
The line of divilion between personal and outward 18 not yet det1n1teJ it 
will be settled more satisfactorily later on, when Aristotle deacribaa the per-
fectnes. of happiness. For the preaent, the ma1n meaning of outward liaa in 
its emmpl1f1catlon by a number or poselble objects of human. desire which are 
approved u naceeaary or rejected, according to the way the,. enter lnto the 
constitution ot Ute or do not. 
A oerta1n amount of out.1t'ard proaperi t7 cannot be diepeneed w1 the "CTJM 
~ good things ["the out1nrd J a1"8 a1 ther merely indispenaable condition_ 
ot hapPu.ss, or an of the natura of awdliary meana, and useful 
inatJ'UlDal'ltallT •••• ,,31 _ nGIIIber of tblnga ant cl.earlT not pctraonal goods, 
yet so_how I tor OM or other of the reasons mentlcm.ed, hIma to be included 
among the goode which a happy man p0888 .... t 
lor mID1 DOble actions require 1na~te tor their perfOl"MnOe, in the 
shape of Menda or weal ttl or poll tlo81 power, al.eo there .. cert.a1n ex-
ternal advantages, the lack of which sull1_ supre_ fel1cit7, such as 
good bUth, Mt1.etaotory cb11dren, and pereonal be-t7* a 118ft of ftJ7 
ugly appearance or low b1.rth, or chUdlee. and slone 1n the world, 18 not 
0'01' idea of a happy JIIIl, aut stUl 1 ... 80 perbapa 11 one who tau ch1L.""'e!l 
3~ bu18 of the dln1netiOl1 18 haI"dl7 clear in Arlst.o\le, thc:nJgh tbt 
ooncluslooa he dft1l8 trOll it are adequately set forth u the doot.r1ne develDpa. 
ct. RaaIc:ha, DOte c. to I, vUl, 2, .". tum of pbrue asaociatea fbod1.ly 
eood8' wlth 'Ioods of the soul'. both being personal, in con\ra8t with the t.h1l':1 
claN, ,e:.td;emal goode'. But it at once appeara that the tmportarlt dlaUnct1cm 
1s bet.en tsoods of the soul t on the one band and all the reat ('the goode 1D 
the body and tho.. outs1de and ot fort,una t. • • ) on the otber. Hence 1n II l 
.external goode' DIU8t include tbod117 goods t, as also Ills;, t., Where extemal 
goods' are 811bd:l Y1ded into the instrDanta and the 1ndlapeuable cond1 t.1ona ot 
wU-be1ng (and 80 in lIOn IIc1entU'1c l.anguaae clx. 1), the latter subdivis10n 
1.ncl'dd1nl beau., the 0Dl;r bodily good there speclt1ed.· 
,ll.099b21,28. 
or Mendl2wbo are worthleas, or who bas had good 0I'l88 but loat them by death.' 
Now there is a d1tterence between those outward goode needed for .. ro188 of 
•• 1 
actions t.hat make one happy, and those outward goode needed as acoO!£E;!!i!!t8 
ot such actions) the formal' are onl7 maans, the latter seam to haw a value 
surpassing that of mere _ans, 8tnoe they contr1bute to the act10n not by just 
mald.ng 1t posslble lmt by maJd.ng 1 t de81.rable. 
It there _re questlon only ot outwal'd goods as means, a problem wuld not 
ar1se bare. so_thing can be an lnd18penaable oondt Uon wi. thout entering into 
that ot w;i.oh it 18 condition. But 1t the outward _t be added t.o the 
personal to make the personal de81rable-C.n other lIOrds, 11 the personal 18 not 
de81nble or 1s even les. dealrable Witbout the out1fal"d-outwal'd p1"Osperi.t¥ la 
not altogether extr1D81c to happ1ne8s after all. Olltaard goods, then, 111 eo. 
ooculCb.8 at l ... t, OCCUW a DDl"8 1mportant pan t10n 1n the const.1tutJ.on of 
happtn.a tbu Ariatotle 1nd1.cated whim be equated the goods constitutive of 
happiMa. wi tb Personal goode. 
.' 
The problea 18 not t.a.d1ately rettOlvable. But Ar1stotle dewteI tbrw 
later chapters33 to a dison.lon at fortune'a ert"ta on happ1neN and ti.nallT 
aoh1ewa a delioate, not. al'tO{)etber unaablguous, bal.ance between happ1Jla •• ' 
dependence and independence. 1tle tnat.-nt tOOWJe8 aI'01Sld the oaae ot a man 
321099bl-6. 
'31099b8-ll01b7.. The tbne chapte1"8 anti tled in Rosa'8 tranalation. "Ie 
happ1neas aequ1ntd b.Y leam1ng or bahi tllation, or aent. b;y God or by chance?· 
"Should a man be called happy wh1.le he 11vu'l", ttl)) the fortunes ot t.he 11v1.ng 
affect the dead1tt 
~~--------------~ 
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who has knOllD. a high degNe ot bapp1neas in IDe and t'1nalq met overwbeJ.m.t.ng 
miSfortune. such i8 the oaH ot Priam. Ki.ng ot Troy. To the queetlon whether 
a person in such oircUll'lStanoea Clan be happy Aristotltt usually answers in the 
Mgatives "t:s:Joone would pronounce a man 11 v1ng a ill. ot misery to be 
happy, unleu tor tile sake ot maintaining a paradox ... ,4 But t.his commonsense 
View ot happiness coex18ts with another which makes happ1neBs something ea-
sentta1l7 1.mra:.rd. thus not :really 8'UIlCept,lble of Wl'DdCe .from 1I'1t.hout. 
Aristotle'. treatment ... to make the core-real1ty of happines. at 0Il0ti .aJm1\ 
p"nd exclude condi tlon1ngs tram outside it. 
Ar1stotle f'1rst ot all makes 1. t clear that t.he problem of intlUGllCtts on 
happinees artaes only'.1n the CaM ot wry I8r1OUS misfortune, ninee tl"iv1al ot" 
passing troublee ean affect an illMr state onlT superfleial.l.)r or not at all. 
ew. 7e have M8U8td happJ..aeaa to be somatJl1ng permanent and by no meana 
euTq cbclged, wblle a .ingle man mq sutter IUD)" t:am1I of fortune-. 
wheel. For e learl,. it we were ti> keep pace wi t.h his tort\meB we sho1l1.d 
often call the same man bapw and again wretcbed, lI81d.ng the haW7 maD out 
to be a "chameleon and 1nsecmrely' bued". Or La this keeping pace w1 th 
hi8 tortlmes quite lIl'ODg? SUooeft or ta1111l'8 1D lU. doe. not depend on 
thestl t but human lite, as we said, needs the .. as more add1 t.1orls, while 
ueeUent aotJ.v1t1 •• or their oppoelt.es are what cona\ltute happineBa or 
t.he reverN. • II 
• 
The quest.1on we bave now d1scuued cont1rms our dotin1.tiOft. For no funct 
of JIIIl has 80 atch permanence as excellent aotJ.Y1t1ea •••• st&b111V, 
then, Will belong to too happy man, and he will be hapw throughout hi • 
,~ ct. l.lOOa8. ·DfJ 0 one oalls a mill happy' who meets 1d.tb 
misfort.unes like Priam's, and come. to a m18.~abl.e end" J and US3bl9-21. 
"('JOnaoqu.,ntlJ' t.hoae who say that, if a man be good, he rill be ham eftn when 
on the raolc, or when tallen tnt.o the clil"eet m18tOl't1me, are 1nt.enttonal.l7 or 
uni.ntentionally t.alld.:ng nonsense. 11 
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lJ.te. tor alwap, or b7 preference to ever.ytb1.rag .lse, be wUl be engaged 
1n excellent action and contaplatlon, and be wUl bear the chaDcea of 
lUe met ZlO~ and altogether ~I 1t he 18 .~ good' and 'r~ 'beyond reproach' .3::> 
Yet I\1Cb rea:t.atence to cbaDge u this 18 due B)N to the :relaUw 
Ughtne8836 than tc) tho fact that. t.bI!I trouble 1s onl.7 outward. lor Hl"10U8 
chang.. of fOl"tlme do affect. 0118 's imler state. 
-
But the aoeidenw of fort.. are marl7 and Vt!tI7 in degne of magnl:tu4eJ and 
a1~ ..u p1eoes of good luck, u also of ms.startune, clearly do not 
change the whole CO'O.l"8a or ill., Jet gNat and NPfJ&ted 11\1088 .... wiU 
render at. more bl1aaM a1nee ~h ot their o. nature they h,'!lp to 
embelU.sh it, aM also t.he7 can be nobl7 and ~11 utll.1aedJ while 
gNat and t.requent "'''lerNa can crush and mar our bU_ both b.Y
7
the paJA 
t.hey cause and b7 the h1ndra1oe they otter to m.aD.Y aot1rl t.i.d.3 
The double att •• of outward ~ 18 qatn apparen'. ~ aot1on 1tHlt s.. 
arfeotad, and ..... ..,...abl .... ot it., and a a1gn1t1caat chanp in .ither work1i 
a ehm1p in bapp ...... . 
A:r:l.e'tOt,l.e'. last statement on the P.r1a difficulty ooml'>J..Das both Y1ewpo1n 
in a diat1nCt1on ~ bapp1Deas and bl ...... (e.U.O?OV7~~Kq'p(a)J 
between a state of happ1neN \bat 18 deteot1ve yet stUl bapp1.nep, and a stat. 
" 
'!i.u.00b2-21. (Tl". W.n. RoM.) Ital1ca added. 
36ct• 1l.01.a2l-b8, when Jri,st,otle di8CU88e1 tJ.'.8 e.tt •• wb1ch the Yiola. 
tudee ot t_U,~' 8bd MeDda 1R:ni1d have on one deceased. The tort... ot a:ucb 
persons probably have sea .ftect. on the dead (11 tblt dead are ...... at all), 
but 11; cannot ever be a serious .fteet. 'lhe en teri.on again tB OM ot deane. 
'7l.lOOb22-JO. RotA that here, 1n either C&H, of good luck or bad, 
Aristotle 1nd1oatee tIIO wap 1n which luck art.eta bapp1ne8a. f.t can ombell1a 
the activity or mar it. or it can contribute to the activity itself (be 
utU1aed) or b1.nder it. The distinction amotalta to ODe betwen the Jll)nt 
aupe:rticlal and the .more penetrattng ef'fecta of fon1'JDl. 
Yet ~l.e88 awn 1n adftN1 V nobll1t7 ab1.nea through, when a .. 
durea repeated and aewre misfortune with patience, not. ow1ng to lnsenslbi 
l1q but f:nx!l g8nel'O$itq and grea\neaa of soul. And 1£, as .. Said, a 
manta Ute 1s determ1ned by his act1.v1t.1ee, no supramal,y happr man oan 
ever become m1aenble. For he 'wUl never do bateful. or 'hue acti0D8, 
sinee 1'10 hold that the tl'ul.:I good and wtse maD will bear all 1d.nds of 
fort1me 1n .. aeem.l7 wq. and will al.1IIQ"8 80t in the noblest maunar tha~ 
the circumstance. allow. • • • .And this being 80, tho hapPY' :man can ftCi:lVel'I 
becatW Id.serable; though 1. t is true that be 1I1U not be supremely bl.eeaed 
it he encounters the l'd.sforttmes of a Mam.,lJ 
In this .t'onulatlon of the theory" happ1ness as such remains an inward state 
that can be .8sentiaU:r affected b7 cireulllJt.aIlC8S oul7 it c1rot1llltanoee cause 
to be di.acont1rlUed the actions Wh1ch const1tute happ1naas. For example, 
dest! tution Oa"l rob Otta ot the le1aul'e raqu1red tor the ponu1 t ot act1 vi ties 
wortbwbile 1n themselves J cl1sappoint.mant can lead to d1scou...mrmt and tbeDce 
to slack»ning of e,tfort, slcknHa can make activity 81mpl.y ~ble. In such 
ways outward events can 1n.t.trrupt the activity itself. Ql the other band, the 
extra ~. which Otttward circumstances earl add to -the happy act! n:t,y 
remains oxtrlnd.c to the acUvi ty 1 tHlf • 1bus remov1ng the agJ'Geableneas doe. 
not affect t..:'to activity euenti~_B in the radical sense of mak1ng the 
" 
acti v1 tq cease altogether. 
1Ms 801ut1on is ma1nl;y satisfactory. Aristotle does ma1ntatn that 
happiness in the r.dds" ot mi.G8l7 is p3radox1oal, and tbat MAIl's mistorttG188 
lett, b1m a miserable, not a happy'. man, and tbat Q. happy man oan be dislodged 
from h.1.8 happ1nees by a aeries of ......... and frequent mlatort.UDes.39 Yet tb1e 
3SuCXlb3O-UOla8. 
"., tor example, 1n lO96al, UOOa8, l101all. 
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can be understood 1n llIht of the principle that outward mlaf'ortUDe8 attect 
ba.PP1I1888 1ntd.n81calq oal7 in the _nee thAt the7 ca make the good aotivit.1e 
tbat consUtute 1.t Stop.4O .And thie vi_ is OOl181atent with tba d18t1..nct.1on 
be~ happ1Deu IIDd bleaaedneae fOUDd in his solutton ot the Prl.aa queaUCD. 
EVen tbo'Ogh it. oan be 8al4 that M_ ended hi. ~ ttnbappUy (Ar1atotle Id.II-
self used this language ... 11,,), 1 t 1s more accurate to say that "the haPW 
l'l'lSl'l can never beooJaa m.serabl.e" but fJ.'IB:T 1ndeed lose the state of supreme 
bleaaedneaa. lb the preeent oon'brtxt, 1I01"8OftJ', Aristotle .... to apply the 
8UIII atandard to Pries tbat be .... ta1ned so. Jd.nd of happ1Maa at leu' 111 
1. ta ..... t.hoa&b be loat all elM and oou14 no longer be ca1.led bl.eMed.. He 
could st.U1 be eall.ed bapw ... lcIin« as he GOUld at leut act as .. ftOble 111ft 
1IOUl.d. 
!be ftri.at1on 1ft Ari.atotle.s view ot Pd_ ntleot8 hi8 itpJrfeet. 
reao1uttoo of U. 8~ be .... tbt SJltel1sotual and the bo~ nat.ure of , 
and bet.1IIen .. fa private and 800141 character. at tbe one band 18 the tact 
tbat one tn a c~l t10Il of' a~ •• tOJ'tuDe oan hardl7 be expectAld to ma1.n 
the ao\i'fit7 1Ih1oh 18 h1.s bapp1ne •• J on t.bri other, the tact that there baft 
al'lRllS baeD OUGS 1IttenD DIll in 8UOh dilUter nevert.belMa atnta1ned a state ot 
soul that 1a adII.U'able and not 1Mppropr1ately ll1cltmed to happ1ne8a. 
'ftIU the M1 Manlftg of actS. vitl'ta 1mraJr4neea ntJIaId.ne ~ unresolved. 
Btlt It doea eo baG.- ~le" v1ew of the trca.an PGl"SOft lt1Mtlt ~ 
I • b 
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partly tm'e801wd. An 1nveatJ.gatlon ot Ar1atotle's doctr1ne on the CODIP081t1cm 
of the btJntm person wUl probabq not bnng out ~ t1nal and. dat1nl.t.lw 
AJ"lst.Otel1an anawer t,o t.ha queat1an. But it oan perhaps ..... to he1gbten t.bI 
diftl'l1ni tandene!. .. ot bi. tJlought OIl the matteJ.t. SUch an investigation 18 
1I(lUed in an adequate tnatIIIIm'L ot the nut chU'act.er1at1c of happ1naae wb1ch 
baS to be s1.ngled out. tor 8pMlal noUoe.41 
3. Happ1Dees all perfeo\ 
The oharaoterls\i.o of perfection iaprobabl;y the 101ft, bu10 1n Ar:1.8totle t. 
idea ot bappJ.aua, 81nce 1 t ,.... tbe teleolog1cal subol'd1.natJ.on ot aU ImmI'D 
acUows \1Ilder the ulUMte hwIaIl good. 1app1llua 18 oalled perteet in .. 
aenM81 Sot ex1ata tor ita 0Wl1 eake, and thua does not look ba)'ODd ltaelt to 
so. end btgbar th.aallt8eltJ second, lt 18 a funotion ot the b1gbe8t part. ot 
maD, and thus aoella tho tvaotlou ot ..,.,. loIrer 1liiian taoultyr. JIapp1neIa.t.s 
t1nal m1 .. at aceUent.. h2 'lbeae two senaes ot perfect, an ol.oeEtq nlat.ecl. 
It 18 ~ attar an extended deve~t oltha meaning and leftls ot the 
ooneept ot ,0&1. that, t.he d1atlDctlon on whloh tbe two senses are ba8ed at lut 
blot. ell. II, no. 3 (1aaed1ately tollolrl.ng) of \h18 .~, ad JIII)N 
eapeoialq Cbo. IV, no • .3, 111 wbioh a cl1ecualoD of the pertectne88 of con+~1. 
tlOl1 lead8 81m to the quut.1on ot t,he eoapoa1 tlon of I'aIIaI1 nature. 
~ h2x ••• tbI doubl4J ~ of the Greek rrJLel.os, adj;eotiw based 011 the IlO\'m 
Tfi.loS' (f1n1s, end, goal, purpose) cOJf)rebending .f'i.nt the oos:nate S8IlH of 
~and 8tOODd tbe exteD4ed ._12na of ~ bcmoe ~rtect or again 5-
•• ot. BoD1ta, P. 7S1a59-7S2a8 on Ti A.e('J os , and ~~ tor the 
vatlvea of We ad3eOtift fora. 
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!!!15!!!8! .n.~ tor 1't.!' 2!!.!.!9.- At the beg1nld..Dg ot Book c:Dt A1'1atotle 
dison.see tJ18 protuslon of activ1 tie. in wh10b men engage and tbe purposes 
vm1ch theao act4.v1t1_ "preeent. SQn1S ot tbeae acUnU_ are performed more 
or leas tor their 0YI'l BakeaJ so_ merely tor what t..he7 produce.li3 
But among aU act.1v1t.1ea 18 d1aaem1ble 1Ibat ... be oaUed a scal1ng ot 
va.luefU DOt awry purpose looks CIDll' to ltaelfJ 80DIJ are obviously ahIad at a 
turther purpose, and no one would think ot tbaa as purposea in tbellllSelwa. kJ-
tiona 11ke thosH ot the crafts exist tor the articles they ~::.roduoe, work exists 
tor what it ~. _dlc1fte-tlld.ng tor bealth.bh 1IoIIet ... , there are 
cert.ain aotlY.lt1e. which are nDl'e or leN genaraJ..ly apreed upon a.I the chief 
punmi ta of I'iUIlJdm. 1'ba8e aoant t,o goods 1I'h1ch taU UDder cme ot three broad 
dlv1stone-t.llt ao.caUed 1'bne Lt..,... 
J I 
To judge t.rom maD f. livea, the mc>re or leas _.oned oollC8pt1ou of the 
Oood or l!app1r.Baa that. .... to preyaU. .... thea are t.be follO'ld.Dl. ~ 
the ana band the ~\.Y of lBl IIld the most ~ ldentit.r the Good 
113_ l.09laah.-7. lfn, 18 true that a certatn variety ls to be o~ "'_. 
the ends at whiCh the arts and sclGMe8 aim. in SOD8 cases the act1v1tq ot 
~ tbra an 18 it8elt the end, wlwJ:oeu in others the eo! 1s soma p:roduo\ 
over and above the mere aarc1. ot the art. J and in the arte wb:>se enda are 
cena1n th1nga ooslde tl'lG practice ot the arts themselves, the_ products are 
euent1all.7 aupertor in val ... to t,be actlY1tlea. ft And l~). "It there. 
tOft 8I'ICJAg tile ends at wh10h our act.ion.t a1a tbeJ'9 be one whlob we Wish tor ita 
own aake, 1Ib.UAt .. $11 the othan 0Dll' tor the aake of tJll8, aDd if .. do on, 
ohoose e~ tOJ' the saka ot aomatb1nf! else (Which would oblr1oulJ rel1llt 
in a proaeaa ad. &B(.1D1a 10 that. all delire lft)'IJ].d be tutile and vain), it 1. 
dlear that tbli ODe ~ t.e Ibc1 JIIl8t. be the Good, and 1ndeed the SUp,reme Good.. 
~. I.g. lO96aSo-7. "The XU. of ~ i8 • ccmatrai.Da4 
ld.nd of lUe, and 018&1"17 wealth 18 not the Good _ are 10 search ot, tor 1t 18 
onl7 good as baiDg 'I.lfiI8tul, a .ana to ~ else. fl 
13 
with pleaaure, and accordingly are content with the IUe of Enj07ntBnt-
fOOl" there are three srJGClall.y prominent. Lives, the one jUfJ~ mentioned, the 
ate of PoUtics, and thirdly, the Ute ot Contemplation.4.;l 
These punmlta seem to stand on their own a. goala desirable in theJnHlvea. 
Nevertheless on nrioua consideration SOl8 ot t~ .. ends have to give up the.il' 
claim to being final. Weal. th, for example, otten co.. to OCCttW a prollinent 
place in ments aill8J yet little reflection 1& needed to realize that I.IOIl87 la 
desired only for what :1 t oan bring in t..M wIlT of material advantage, influence, 
or the U.1ce. 
Ewn the h1gh ol"'der of values that honorable reputation repnaenw holds a 
place probably subordinate to a more baslc Jd.nd of value. 
Men ot refinement, on the ot.her hand, and JeD. of action think that t.be 
Good is honour-tor this JUq be said to btl the end ot t.he ille of Poll t.lca 
• • • La Jut _n'& 1'IIOti ve in p\1l'8U1ng honour aee_ to be to assure th ..... 
selves ot their own mart tJ at leut they seek to be honoured by men ot 
judgment and by people 1Ibo knOW the., that. ls, they de.ire to be honoured 
on the ground of excellence. It is olear therefore that in the opinion at 
all evente of lien ot action, exceUttnoe 18 a greater good than honour, and 
one might perhaps aooordingly ~zPpose that virtue rather than honour 18 
the end ot U.s Poll. tical We.4 
If reputation 8IIIOng men is valued not tor What it is itselt but for"be1ng a re-
eogni t10n ot an excellence, honor is in no a.nee final uone goals. 
4St09Sb15-19. Cf. Stewart., I, 58-62, on the origin of the triple division 
of Uvea, its development in Plato's Rep!bl~ S81). See also Aristotle'. 
other UatJ.ngs of the Chief ways ot lIr.. . 7b2. If ••• honour, pleasu.re .. 
intelligence, and excellence in its various forma •••• " 1174a5. It ••• 
sight, memory, knowledge, virtue •••• " The lists are parallel though varied 
in expression, the three ohief livea appearing under somewhat different (01"118, 
namely, agreeable use ot senses, USe ot intelligence, lite of moral oharacter. 
1'hus Aristotle oan speak of tho lit. o£ Poll tle8 in one oontext and in another 
context oall it the Ut. ot Honour, whereas honor, as Will be seen, and 
polittcs are both logioally subordinat ., of good charaoter, the 
aotive 11te. ,~vJ\ W€'~ 
US109Sb22_3l. V LOYOLA ~ 
UNIVERSITY 
In nook '1'Im Ar1fJtotle will t.ftat another claas ot goods 1th1cb Q.l'e final 
with regard t.o the actions that ex18'l; to support t.heIa, but are not t1nal With-
out quallf1catiozu the various apeeable actlv1 U.ea eaUed et1maa. 
Ari:Jtotla's notion of the meaning and rank of thaae pursuits i9 not altoeetber 
clearly defined in his extant 1lOrlcB. lIost of the act1v1ti.ea that lIIm turn to 
once work 18 done, 1n lut analyals come quite olose to being Uttle 1DOl"e than 
lf~'1J of ralax1ng or lettlng otf temd.OIUJ. l'n this they are usetul ooans .toward 
wU-be1ng but ought not be pursued Without that IItd1c1.nal end 1n JId.nd.41 
Wbate'ger the ambiguities of his d ;ctrlne, Aristotle hardl.y leaves l"'OOftl to 
cona1der such pursuits .f1nal 1n the tull sense. Aa.1Bemrtts cannot, stand u a 
.anal. value arq more tbaftll.lOl1C7 can or honorable reputaticm. 
It was atter a gradual. auboJ'd.1Mtlon of ~ COl'llIaOll IDIaD punnd. ts to I1D1'e 
ba810 purposea t-hat am 08Il8 b.Y Aristotle •• t1ma to the opin1on that. aU ~oode 
ot man IlU8t reduce to C)Qe or m1'e of the8e t.hr'H yslue8, pleU1JN, o:xoal.lGnce 
or character, lntelleotual deftlopmJDt.. Bach ot t.heae 18 __ how t1Dal.. 
"t:nJ~. pU.Ii'&8UI'8, 1ntell1geme, and __ lleDce in its various l'OJ'JD ... 
choo8e ~ to'!' tlwiz- own sake. Caince we should be glad to have each or .tt.a 
., 
410f• chapter IV ot this attld;y. pp. 83 -92, wbere the qtl88t1on of le181ll"e 
ACt.1n t.1_ 18 tnated at langt,b. 
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altl'1.OU.gh no extz'anaous advantage resulted from it •••• "48 Tbere 18 an 
1nt..I"iW!Jlc value in each of these states J t.be7 are not desired the -way a _ana 
soma f"urthor end 10 du1red. (In that case, t.he means would not be desired at 
all i£ the end could be ga1nod wi t.bout. 1 t. ) But pleuure, excollenco of 
character, .1Iltelli~~nc8 are desirable siap13 for what they are, thus are in a 
oertain aenae tl.nal. let. they are not f'1."1al in t"be stl'iot &enM in which 
Aristotle wtshea to 'W'K; \be terra. 
Happiness alone 18 t1nal in thie eense. It ie t1r1al at least 88 IItCh as 
the otd1er t.hree are f1nal., 1n :relard to all outnrd-3.00ldng p'Grau1 t8 j but 1n 
add1 u,on 1 t. bas a tinalrleaa of 1 ta om even 1n regard to these tbI'ee. by are 
des1l'ed tor t.ller.rtaelvaa, to be sure. ~t in eo. deeper sense they are desired. 
becaurte happ1naa. 1s desired, they are thl'ee bu1c apreaai0D8 of t.bat "urge to 
perfect ex1stenceQ whlcb Ar1atotl.e wUl d1ecuss in Bock '1:en.49 Th1s r.u.cal 
dea1re tor ?8f'teot1on 18 to be identified w1th the dea1rG for bapp1nea8. 
• r 
In spealdng ot degNe8 of f1nallt.y ... __ that a th1.n6 pursued as _ end 
in itself 1s 1K>X'e tinal tb .• n one p'tlI'8t1ed aa a aums to something elae, and 
that a tl11ng never cboaen as a meane to arqth1.ng alae 18 more t1nal than 
~097b2.'. ct. U7ba-8, 1Ibent Ar1atotle ~a~8 a llat of gooda of 
t1nal val'U8. 'lb... tao l1ataJ 81.. panll.el. (of. note 4;.) and contain t.he sam 
at ... exoapt, that the later l1at" tNata pleatU.'8 in quite a different ....,... 
"Also there aro lllalV t~8 1'Ihlob m;. ~houl.d 00 e~.r to poasess even if tbe7 
brought us no pleasure, tor instance, Bight, ~, !QlOWledge; Virtue. It IDIV 
be the ~ that the .. are ll8OEtaaar1l¥ attended by plea8'U.r9, but that makea no 
d1ttel"8Da<lt, tor .. ahould desire them even if no ple481.lh reaulted frog thal!l.n 
11mB .Aristotle subaU t:.utfls actLons ~ and ~ (M ropl"eaoot.atJ.w o1~ sense 
act!. vJ:t.7) in place of pleacrure, .cnJiii adaPts a language 111 accord with the 
new refi .. 1sm.rt. of his thought on pleasure as i 11 deYelop8 in Book ?Jall. 
49117SaJ.0.a8. 
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I thl.ngs chosen berth as ends in t..her1I8elves and as means to that thingJ and acoordi.ngly a thing chosen al~'1J as an end and ne'9'er as a means .. call 
absolutely final.. lfow happ1neaa abaft all else appeal'S to be ahsolutely 
t1nal in this sense .. since .. al~ choose it for its own sa1ca and lWf'V' 
as a nwana to sOJnl!tthlng elseJ 1Iihereas honour .. pleuure, intelllcenoe, a1d 
e:xcellenoe1n 1 ts various torma, _ ohoose 1Ddeed tor their tMn sake.. • • 
but _ also Choose tb;~m for the sake or happ1n8as, 1n the bel1af that t.be7 
w1U involve :Lt. But no om chooses happ1ne8s tor the sake ot honour, 
pleut:Ll'e, ete., nor u a _ana to anything whatever ot.hal' than .t tselt .50 
If th~ urp tor happ1nees is what ttl t.1mately moves am, the three b'lS1c 
(losiros in whioh this urge expresses 1 \.Selt are 'fk)rthy or at ta1.moont in801"ar as 
tlw}," are capable ot achieving happ1.nel!ls, just as all other values tU"e wortb,y ot 
atta1.mnent only 1naofar as they se~ in ooh1Ntt.ng one of these tl1ree. In tb1a 
kind of t'lnal1t.y t.h.e tl1l'ee oro on a par. ~J far as th ts finality is concorD8d 
ph'H18ure ia just as final .. &xoel.lcmae of character or int.ellie:ence. But eon-
slderAd in relation to the tinallt1' of bapplnau, Wh:Loh look8 to abIolut.e PB"-
teotJ.cm, they take on a relati'VVDNs of the1r own. TbDugb tb.ey are ~ 
valuable in one respect, 1n another-ln relation to the att.a.1nJl¥mt or perfect1 
....-.one ot them ~ be 11>1'8 valuable than \he othel'll if 1 ta looks to a h1.e!: 
level of .""rtection. 
For !!!ppiness !!..!:b!. 11leb!!t ~ in man. Arls tot19 goes on to ska tab out 
the 8t.epa by which 1t 1. detem1.nad what bumaft sct.1v1t7 approache8 closest to 
absolute PEtrteotlon..Sl But the chief part, ot th1a queat,lon he N~ tor BoO 
50].091 a30-b7 • 
~23-1098al.7 • The method will consist in an uam1nation of the 
vm1.01l8 typical forms of human 8C L1.v1t.y (with much of the Ethios devoted to a 
clarification of the norms pt'eSe!1 t 1n th-. acttvl ties at £Ii9Ir'''be8t) and 
t.1.Mlly a selection of the activ1ty or aotlv1t.1ea Which belJ't fulfil what 18 
lalown or. the oapac! tie. of hulrMm natA'lre. 
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ten, in wh10h he wtll discua. spec1t1c~ the aotlv1t¥ from aJIIOIl8 all buman 
aoUv1U •• that. constitutes ram'lJ happiness.52 
The .. two requ1a1.tea ot ulttmate bmtan value are what 18 1Mant. bt the two 
senses in lI'f":1.ch .e2rt!S!1i1op character!... happinelS. Bapp1.neas 1s final becau .. 
it is sought -.bIclute17 10'1: 1. ta 0'Wft sake and all elR tor happ1nu8' saloe. 
HappineSIJ 18 met excellent bMauae, as w1ll appear in the d1.acuaa1on of conteJD 
plat1on, 1t. oonet.tIt 1n all activ1.. that 1s aocol'<U.ng to t.he b1ghest. capac1ty 
ot man, tba capwlit7 that. .. lea to achieve in the Blst perfect wq \be moat 
perfect objeota. And 1t 11 We e:xoel.leftce that 1. the. reason tor its t1nal1t7 
4. Bapp1.ne.s as aa3o.rable. 
A JIII'l who apendtJ the s1gaU'1cet part ot his Ute in. such an act!."" 
pos_81on of the .,.t 110rtb7 objectil in the IIOst wortl:\y 'fIq, 1s bappJ' b7 tb1a 
.,.". fact. The det1n1.t.1on of ~ which .Aristot.le repeatedq giftS uader-
lJ.ne1 the identity of the state !l!R..,1Ma8 with the state ot perlect aot1'4tZ 
1. tseltJ and tor this reason theft 18 no qautJ.on or ha.pp1neaa t ar:S.a1Dg as 
result ot aot1:d. V or tII/:J:I' other relatiOll8MP' bet.wen the 1;.1IO.S3 Jl'JJrluantneea 
on the other htad 1s deeoribed as a propert7 ot 8UOh act1:f1 t7, ao-thlna alose~ 
neceuariq, oomaeoted wltJ11t, au a quaUtT lIOUldbe, 1naeparable, 18t. 
diat.1Dat and su~.SL PJ.euantneaa 18 attli'bu.\ed to aotlv1\7, .1_t as 
I • 1 , 
S2U16a.lo.l119833. Of. Ch.IV, no. 3. 
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goodneSS and tinenus are J but none ot these 'luaU. ties can be idant11'1ed wi tb 
activity. 
And further, the 11f. ot excellent activity is essentially pleasant. For 
the teeling ot pleasure is an experienoe of the soul, and a. thing gives a 
man pleasure in regard to which he is described as 'tond ot so-and-so' 
•••• CTJh1ngs pleasant by nature are pleasant to lovers of what is 
noble, and so alwqs are actions in oontormlty with virtue, so that they 
are pleasant essentially as 'Well as pleasant to lovers ot the noble. 
'.rberetore their 11f. has no need of pleasure as a sort ot orna:mental 
appendage, but contains its pleasure in 1 tsel£ •••• But if 80, actions 
in conform1ty with excellence must be essentially pleasant." 
Pleasure is so olosely connected with activity that a defiCiency of 
pleasure indicates a defioiency of act! vi ty, and absence of pleasure absence ot 
activity. A man that pertorms a certain action and does not take pleasure from 
so acting, is in fact only going through the motions of it. Since the activity 
is not congenial to him he is not genuinely disposed to it. But so tar as he 
lacks disposition or capacity tor an action, he is really unable to perform 
it • .$6 
"1099a7 .... 30. 
>6Cf• 1l04a27-ll05'b12, viz. pas sima "An index of our dispositions is 
atforded by the pleasure or pain that acoompanies our actions. A man is 
temperate it he abstains trom bodily pleasures and finds this abstinence itselt 
enjoyable, prorugate it he teels it irksome J he is brave if he faces danger 
nth pleasure or at all events without pain, cowardly if he does so with pain." 
tf Again, as we sa1.d betore, every formed disposi tion of the soul realize. 1 te 
f'ull nature in relation to and in dealing with that class of objects by which i 
1. its nature to be oorrupted or improwd." "We 'f.fJII:3' then take it as establl. 
that virtue has to do wi. th pleasures and pains, that the actions which produce 
it are those which increase it, and also, if differently pertonood, destroy it, 
and that the actions from which it was produced are also those in whioh it is 
exercised." "["AJcts done in conformity with the virtues are not done justly 
or temperately if they themselfts are of a certain sort .. but only if the agent 
also is in a certain state of mind when he does them) first he must act with 
knowledge J secondly he must deliberately choose the act and choose it for ita 
own Bake, and thirdly the act must spring from a fixed and permanent dlspositi 
of character." For an act does not consist merely in something the body goes 
3' 
pl&aaantlleea 1s an eesentlal qual1ty of the e:ellent activ1ty 1tho~e chiet 
cha.:ractorlstlc. Aristotle has been <1eacr1bing in the abstract throughout Book 
()le, and is con8Gquen't~ an esaent1al qual1ty of happiness, which 1s ldent1f1ad. 
with that excellent acUvlt,y. 
Thus the question aria •• how the two are di8tinguished and related, 
h!PpLneu" which Aristotle oonceives as the supra.m end of Ufe. and W?m!$;, 
ox' pleasu:r."\9 t wh1eh is co~ taken to _an much the sane as happiness. 
•• 
-
throUgh but lIS also, and more ImportantlT, an act:trl. ~ ot so_ faculty such as 
the f'a.cu1'tf'that .. t. moral charaoter. -In this sanse, then, a dishonest man 
may do something that would be conaldeNd an honest deed, but be is not acting 
with honor. For be baa no real dtspasl t10n toward doing honest daeda. But 
tb18 1s preciael¥ lIbat HoDol' 1,.. 
-
CHAPmR III 
Aristotle'. two treatisos ou pleuurol are to SOJ}J!t extent parallel.. The 
2 ' 
earlier pSS5agtll is ma!nly concerned wit.h refuting the arguments ot the AcadeDV' 
aga1nat pleasure and nth .stablish1.ng its 1ntl'1naic exoellenoe and even 
supreme oosirabill t¥. The later passage repeats this d~ren8e in br:teter form 
emphasizing its poSitive aspects, contrasts pleasure to imperfect st-a.tes, and 
introduces a sign1tlcantdist1nctlon between pleasure and the activity trom 
which pleasure takes ri... It represents a more aubtl3' developed view of the 
subject. than Aristotle's oarlier fOl"lllllatlou ot the relationship) the very 
I 
con'trut between the t1fO puts Aristotle's maturer intention 111 special rellet. 
The treatant- ot pleuure thus falls into two parts, fint, tJ1e defensive 
passages from Books Seven and Ten, which consider pleasure in itselt as a 
" 
, .' 
gem:d.ne good, second, the poSit-1ft pusages from Book Ten, which consider the 
origin of pleasure in act.lv1ty and the relationship bet_en the 1;110. 
luS2bl-ll$4b.31u U'{2al9-ll76a29. 
2." ,_ 
ef. teonard, especial...., Chapter III and Append1xIn on the chronologr ot 
Book Ten in relat10n to Book Seven and the reat ot the Corpu Ariatotellcua. 
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1. Pleasure it.self as a good 
To estabU8h that pleasu.re is a good Aria totle makes use ot a triple ap-
proach. He defends pleasure aga1nat accusation of the AcadeDV that it is an 
enl, next. he develops, dofends, and qualifie., the opposite view, RUdoxus's 
op1n1on that pleasure is the ohief good. After t.his he introduces pleasure '. 
relation to activity, and thus shows that pleasure derives f'.rom a perfection 1n 
the one who enjoys rathal" than an i.mperfeotion in h1a. This thIrd approach 
involves problema-not reoognized in the earller pusage-t.hua mald.ng it. 
neooaaary to close discussion of pleasure by itself and open dl80uasion of its 
rslation to activi~. 
. lIt1mbera of the A.oadeDV argue -a&1nst pleasure in any of three ways. Spau-
cippus holds that it is not good at all, tor it is only a process, the temperatA 
avoid it, the discreet do not, aeek 1t (rather, abaence of pain), it interterM 
with thought, it. 18 not the end ot t!I/q art., 1nterior beings Uke ohildren and 
animals Hek it.:3 bee "ar1ed re850M amount to an a:rgumemt agatnst pleuure 
because it lacks f1naUty. What 18 onl.1 tbt way to an end or is not itself the 
end of' something elae i. not itself desirable. What is deairable only to le8M 
beings, not to those whose praterenee oarries .ight, 18 at leut not pl'Operq 
desirable. Other l3IIBS'Ibel'8 ot the Aoademy argue that e"faf1 1f certain pleuuru 
are good, most are bad, swe 8CDa ot thea do haria and 80_ are admitted to be 
indecent. h The t.lrl.:rd argument, recalline' part of the fir8t, 18 that even 1f 
31052bl3-20. 
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all pleasuree are r:oOO a pleasure Mverthelss8 CamIOt be the chief good becaus8 
lt is only a proo .... ' 
'i'he chiat ~t. against pleasure, then, ls that it ls not to be des1.red 
at all slnoe one .}'Quld rather do witb:mt pleasure altogether than enjoy it by 
baing subject to the imporfect,1on 1 t ~l1e.. F~.pt tor ate .. prel1ad.na.ry 
8ideratlons Arlstotle poatponea disoua.1on at t.his diff1culty until the other 
argumants have been disposed ot. 'l'bese lesser arguments, that pleasure ls not 
the objeot ot reapectabl.e desire, and that lt sometimes happena that pleuure 
i8 harmf'ul or indeoent, Arlstotle 801ve. by di.t1ngt.Jish1ngthe _aning ot good. 
He nakee use ot t.'tWO distinctlons ot good. Firat, good 1s either &load Sl!t 
~ ~tlca.t1op or good !:!!. !. certa1n re.2!!~. 6 Second, good 1s 81 ther i222, 
.!!!,1t8el;f or lopfl 'bec.ause 2!.!2l!!. 9s,c.t.ance.1 Aristot18 does not consiaten 
appq t.hese dlst1nct.iona in the two defenses that tollow, but ~les flrst one, 
then the other, then both, depending on whether the general goodnus of 
pleasure is conceded or denied. 
It one grmts that all pleasures haft $Ome element of good in theta, it ls 
still pos"ible to stq that DlIID3' of them are not good without quallfication but 
need to be UHd properly (They could be used nth harm.tul effect even though 
they aN good), or are more su1table to one class 01" age the to another (they 
are not to be used by just .".one at all ewn though they are good). 
6U~~"1 ' , , ft - /.... \ '\., / i i 11 i -_.:I. id 
::,KoUCO 1_10I"'uw rap ",rrA&uS~ 10 oe TIVL ••• I 9P. c tar or seuu",u~ ~
1US2b34.~a'f~ ~/~~KOs i.e. E!!:. accidens, as would·be oontransted with 
pel !2.t or~a..e ea.u. TO. 
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'.l:he argumante that the temperate man avolds pleasure, and that t.be 
prudent man pursue. freedom from pain, and that an1m.als and ah1ldren 
pursue pleasure, are all met. by tb8 same reply. It, has been expla1nod 
how some pleasures are absolutely gOod~ an~ bow not all pleamtre8 are 
I'~d Cl ••• DDt wi.thout qual.1t1oat.ion • Bow lt is those pleasures 
which are not absolutely good t.hat be animals and oh11drun pursue, 
and 1. t is freedom from pa1n arls1ng from the want of those pleasurea 
t.hat the prudent man pursues. that ls, the pleasures that tnvolw de-
sire and pain, namely the bod:U¥ pleasures (tor iiboae arc of that 
nature), or t.heir excessive forms, in regard t.o which ProfUgacy is 
diapl.QN. That. is why the c~ate man avoids ~xoe.Sive ood1q plea-
surea. tor awn the temperate man bas plea.:rurea. 
Butt-he pleasures whioh the id.ee man values are more 1ntrinsicall;v valuable, tlvl t. 
1:;, approach closer to goodne .. \1'1thout qualUtoation. 
en the oth.er band, 1f one deni •• that oorta1n tunotions conaidft'ed 
pleasant. are real17 good, it 18 sUll poaalble to expla1n how thelr pau8Ilt-
nass ma-Y be the reault ot 80_ o~tance even though they are themselves not 
pleasant.. 'l11e pr1lB exaple of t.his is the pleuant.ness u.ociated 111 th varlO'll. 
processes of NatoratiOD, such 88 convalescence or eating. In the .. the 
pleasure belongs to tJl8 health or balance of nouriabmnt, that 1~1 raatontda ttl ~ 
proceeD of retlDhtng t.bat balance ia not It.Ml£ pleaaant-d.\ even inYOlves tlw 
" 
" 
pain ot def1clency....out. der1ws its pl.eaaant.ne •• b'om the $tate to be achiwed 
and t.rom the state ot other taault.lu not affected b.1 t.be defio1.anc.Y but 
capable ot ~ the tact of anticipated reatorat101l. In this wa:y even 
dtaagrne.ble mdiotnee or the discomforts ot heaUng are pieuant psr 4Caldena. ~ 
• 
BuS3a21-3S. 
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This same distinc tion may be applied to pleasures which do harm and to 
those wh1ch are indecent. A given function m.ay itself' be quite good and 
pleasant, yet do harm to other functions under certain cirClJ.mstances. The 
pleasure involved in 8lJ1" given activity does not interfere with that act1v1t;n 
the pleasure of thinking helps thinking, the pleasure of work, work. The fact 
that the pleasure of one activit,. interferes wi th another activity-say-, that 
of work, 'With thinking-is no argument against pleasure.10 This applies also 
to cases where a real loss is involved, not mere 1,. a temporary distraction: 
To argue that pleasures are bad because some pleasant things are de-
trimental to health is the sar.., as to argue that health is bad because 
some heal~ t.bings are bad for the pocket. Both pleasant things and 
heal tb1' things can be bad in a relati V6 sensEI.. but that does not malrs 
them refPY bad; even contemplation may- on occasion be injurious to 
health. 
Again, indecent pleasures need not, be simply evil because they involve 
evil. Here Aristotle makes use of both distinctions. In one view of t.he matte~ ~ 
the acts in which indecencies are involved are themselves good and pleasant; 
they are not good without qualification, though, and thus can be misused, for 
" 
example, b.Y being used to excess.12 This i~' the arg~lt that Aristotle 
follows in Book Seven. In Book Ten he argues more fully. It;. ecent pleasures 
may be considered not pleasant in themeelves, but enjoyable R.2!. accidens becaU8t 






be cOllsidered pleasant in tl'1eIIsalves but not des1Z"able 01" pleum'lt 1n the wider 
sonse since they have to be obt.a1.ned in ~1"8 that are unde8il'able.14 A tb1l'd 
attitude w:ruld consiat 1n 3udging the goodne8. or badness of aU pleasure by 
the goodneas or badne.8 of the aat.lon from wh10b 1 t proceeds.1, This solution 
1s perhaps the mat bulo because 1t grow. out ot Artatotle'a notion ot the 
relat,ion ot activit,- and pleasure. 
By this set ot distinction. Ar.letotle dHtend8 pleasure agalnat the 
ADadeIV"'s aocuaatJ.on at badDeas. i'be objectione brought up aga1nst ple.un 
not indicate that 1 t is bad, onq that certa1n pleasures are not. gcxxi in ever:! 
respect, 01' that they so_ti_s are detr1mantal to other goods OJ" imOlve 
actions that are bad. Before going on to consider the Acadelqf • .s.n arguMnt 
ap,ainst pleasure-that it cannot be a good because as a _re process it is not 
~ f'inal-Ariatotle pr~t8 a mIIlber of cOllsidel'ati.on to indioate the 
goodness of pleasure in a positl"" 111'&7. '1'heM 81"gUIIlMlts are from the heOOnis 
school ot E'tldox'aa, 1Ibo Wle. them to prove that pleuure 18 \he chief good. 
'l1le .,.t basic 1ndioatlon ot the goodnesa of pleasure is the tact that 
beings seek it by a natural tnst1not. 
Im'eover, that all an1male and all hwIum beings pursue pleas1U'8 18 
some tnd1catlon that it. 1.8 in a sense the SUprema Goods 
No l'U1IOJ' nailed abroad by mIIIll" peoples 




But they do not all pursue 'the same pleasure, since the natural state 
and t.he beat state neither is nor s ... to be the a .. for them allJ 
yet sUll they all pUl"8Ue plea.imre. Indeed 1 t 1s poseible that 1n reality 
they do not pursue the pleuUl"Q wh1Gh they tb1nk and would sl1i¥ they do, 
but aU the .1De ~uureJ tor nature bas implanted in all things 
someth1ng divine. 
'lbo members ot t.he AoadeIq do not accept tnl. reasOD1ng. Aristotle counter. 
their d1sagreelllmt only with a Wlre eXP+ici t application of the principle that 
nature al'W'Q'S seek8 the hut. 
Those on tho other hand who rlony that that which all creatures seek 
to obtain, 1s good, are 8we17 talld.ng noneenae. For what all think 
to be good, that, 'tie ... rt, 1s good, and he that subwrts our beller 
in the opin1on of all. f.II8Dld.nd, will hardly persuade us to bellew his 
own either. It only the irrational creature. atz'Ove to obta1.n what 18 
pleasant, theft would have been so. seDM in th1a oonten\lon. but 
1nasmch aB be1nga endowed D1 th lntelligence do so too.. how oan 1 t be 
right? And per~ evu the lower ani.mala poe .... aD inatiztGt superior 
to thJ.Y own natnNs, wb1cb seeks to obta1n the good appropriate to their 
Jd.nd. . 
A aeoond cODfd.derat.1oD taTor.I.ng the oonteDt4.on that pleasure is good 
dert" .. trom ple8lU1*8 t S opposition to pain as a good to an evil. The Jcadel\f 
rejecta l!~xua 'a op1nlon on the ~d that both pain and pleuure ..,. be • 
opposed 1n contrat.")" dil'OCt1ona to a mean ot .utral reeling. Arl.atotla ntuma 
to t.he rational. ohoices of man. 1nd1ca1liJlg the true nature ot p1euure and pa1D 
l6uSlb2S-32. Of. Book Ten, U72b9-l5, where the ... &rguI*lt 18 given. 
this t1me with a qual1f1catlon that it prons pauu.re a good. not neoelsar1l7 
the ohlet good. 
111173al-S. Of. alao MIt. lO72b), and Joachim, p. 2)8 and pp. 291-7. 
47 
It both pleasure and palo are in the clus of evUs, both 1IOUld be also 
of neoe.sity things to be avoided, and 1t in the elan of things neutral, 
neither ought. to be aolded, at} they ought to be avoided aU •• but as it 
1s .... 8M men avoid pain aa evil and cboe .. pleasure as good, it 18 thare-
tOI'8 as good and evU that they are oppoaed.18 
Mn'eover, pleuuJ'e 1& oona1dered a necea • ....,. 1ngredient in the Ut. ot a 
~ happy me. But U' pleasure 18 not a. good there 18 no reason 1IIb,y it 
shoUld be des1l'able at all. It 1s dea1rable because it enhances, and only what 
is good oan make scathing el.Ie bet.ter.19 tfCr.,Jbe addition of pleuure to 
an;y good-for 1.nst.aDce, jUlrli or temperate aonduot-make& that good 1IDl'e 
desirable I but ~ the good oan enbanoe the good. ,,20 
A'l'1at.otle amtiona abo an ~ ot EudoXWJ wb10h recalla his om view 
of pleU'U'e 01' pleasurable act.iY1't,7 as cme of the tJlree final goods. "CTJ'hG 
thing 1s .,.t desirable which .. chooae not. as a _ana to 01' toJ" the sake ot 
something elM J but auch ada1ttedq is pleaBI.ll"e' ... never ask a .. toJ.' what 
purpose be indulge. in pleaaura-we ......., 1 t. to be deatrable in 1 tself. 21 
The Aoadelqts main at'gUMnt aea1nst the good%Jeas of pleaa'tU"Ei 1,'1 that '-t 
lacks the f1nal1ty which the ~ noUon of ,good l.uwlve.. Pl.euunJ lacks tb18 
final1t,. bctcauee it 1s a proce8sJ and prooess itself 18 not good but only looks 
to the ~;ood whtah wUl have been produced when proces. has coat to an end. 
Ar1stotla t s anawr to this objection i. that it 18 qu1t.e rlght it pleasUN 1a a 
-






The tact t.hat. so. of the most t.ypical pleaau.res arise in the CO'tll'88 
of reatoratlve procesaes 11ke eating or recreation lends plaualb1Uq to this 
vie"" through a consideration of other pleuures 11lm &ell8at.1one of small or 
hear1.ng or intellectual. pleasures, none of wh1cb arises on the Ii 111ng-in of a 
detioi.fmOy J could at. once call the tbeoI'7 into question. 22 Tho'ugh :trequant.'q 
found in oOlJP8D7 wit.h process.a, pleuure 18 not itself. proce8s, but ows its 
ex1atenoe to activity, wh10h 1. a state of perfect.ian rather than a way to such 
a state. 
activ1V' 
Aga1n, it- dt:IeS not. tollow, U 80_ argue, that as tho end is bat.ter t.ba:n 
Ule process towards it, 80 tho" nI1$t be 60ln1:~thi.ng bet.te:a." than pleuUN. 
for pl.eU\11I'M are not really Pl"OO8Ue8, nor an they aU 1Dc:tdental to a 
prooea.. tJloy ;U"e acU..,lt.1es, and therelore an endS nor do t.bey result 
from the proaus of' a.cqu1.r1ng our faculties, but from their d8I'C18eJ nor 
haw they all of them some end other than themselves. thisitJ true only 
of the pleuurea ot progresa toward. the perfection of our nature. Hence 
it is not correct to Wino pleaBlll"e as a. 'conscious process' J the term 
should rather be 'act.lv1tf7 of our natural state', and tor 'cOI'l8CiOll8' _ 
must substi tuw fun1.mpoded'. sa. th1nkers hold that pleasure i. a 
pJ"ocea8 OIl the pound that, U. 18,Coad 1.n the tull.eat .. nee, bedause 1n 
their vieW an ~iJ.v1ty i6 a process; but really an activit)" 18 dlfterent 
£rom a prooe... J . . 
In tb1. flMII'lH, a pleU'Ul"Cl wUl be the &upI"eIl8 good. the DUpre. good of a maD, 
his abLer happ1Dess, w:Ul be the activ1ty ot hi. highest tacul1;', and pleasure 
18 the un1.mpeded act.1.v1tq ot a tacult7_ 
F' 
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S1Dce every faculty bas U,s um.D{leded actlY1t.y', tho actiVity of all 
the faculties, or of one ot them (whiohever oonatitutes Happiness), 
when ~, JIIWIt probab17 be the most dea1rable t.hi.ng the" 18, 
but an ~ded acUdt¥ is a pleastll"8J 80 that on this ~hovd.ng the 
SUp;r.e1l& Good will be a particular ld.nd of pleasure. • • • 4 
The paatsagOs in Book TeD which treat. this q.at1on base the di8t.1nctlon 
bat1men pleasure and proceas on a psychological exam1nat.1on of the character-
1at-los proper to each. EHential to the notlOl'l of proous or .,Uon 1s the in-
completene8s of fItf3 part ot 1t. Considerat.ion ot 8fl7 1IlOtant. or period in 1t 
discloau so_thing 1ntrinaloally 1ncouplete, a step on tbe war to something 
f'u.rther, a tr8gll8Dt of a'lhole. In a sense 8VeD the Whole ProceH is something 
incomplete wofar as 1t 18 oonaldered onl11n 1taelt nth aahi8'f8Mllt of the 
goal and end of the DCt.1ort-toward excl.u&td as ly1ng outaide the ;4'00e88 proper. 
No part ot a prooe18 make ... tIN unl.eaa seen 48 a step on t,be ...,. to aom&th1ng, 
nor does the serle8 ot stepa 'UlWt88 _n in the r1nal and ?X'OO88$-end1ng 
aoh1., .... t ot a purpose that. standa b7 ltHlt.2$ 
But plel.lflll"e d1t.ten fro. pZ'OCe88 in 1 t.a .. sent,tal oompletene_. Any gi 
tragmant ot p1euure 1.8 stlll pleasant taken, by itself. Sl!!. pleasant., it doe. 
not. ha."h to be Hen U a step on \be ,.. to sotaeth1ng ltHlt desirable. 
Durat.1.on ot a. pleasure """ be desirable, but 11117 Ja)IIIIlt of a pleuant duration 
po ... ases till the quaUt.at1Ye excellence that a long period would atford, so 
tbat the onl7 d1fterence between a long pleasure and • short. one 1s q'Ulllllt1 tati 
•• 
24us3blO-l.3. In Book Ten Aristotle revise I this equat.ton of pleasure and 
supreme aat.1v1ty. 
25U1lt.al9-b5. ct. Joachim, pp. 269-275, for a suromar.r of the Aristotelian 
thsOl')" ot change in ita various k1.nds, substant.1al change, process, and d1t ... 
terent mot.1onsJ and 275-279 for detailed appl1oatton ot this doctrine to the 
argurarmt at hand. 
not quaUtati"e. Prooesa, on the other hand, requires duration because its 
completeness or perfection is only something to be achieved, not so;oothtng 1n 
fact possessed. 
Now the act of slcht appears to be perfect at. any moment of ita 
duration, it does not require auything to su~rveM later in order to 
perf'oct its apecitic quality. But p1ea';ure also appears to be a thing 
of this nature. For it 18 a whole, and one cannot at w.ry moment put 
one's hand on a plOU'!ll'e wb1ch will only exhlb1t ita specU'ic quality 
perfect;J,;,it its duration be prolonged. • • • CIJve't'1 moment of pleasurable conaoiouenes. i. a pertect whole. 
These considerationa also ahow that it is a m1atalae to speak of 
pleuu.re as the result ot a mUon or ot a process of eenerat1on. For 
we cannot so delCl'ibe eft~ng, but only web thing. as are divided into 
parts and are not, whole •• 
Aristotle has solved the Aca.den\Yts ohief argument aga1nst pleasure b7 de-
1l¥lnetrattng pleasureta 1ntr.lnsio perfection, ita wholeness in active actualitYJ 
he has placed the IlI08t General Ol"iterion ot the excellence O'l' badness ot the 
various pleasures in the excellence or oadness of the act! vi ties from. whioh the 
proceed. Such considorati0D8 are helpful for evaluating pleUU1'esJ espeo~ 
they are useful in treating certain rather specific problema that arise in 
connection with them. To this purpose JrQst .pf the passages of Book$' Seven and 
Ten have been devoted. But the valld1t;y and larger worth of these 1ndl vidual 
s)lutions depend.s on some deeper view or the realities which these preble_ 
indireotly suggest. It 1. necessary for Aristotle to indica.te I'IlOI'e e:x:actl3 
structural relati0D8bip of pleasure to tho activity or actuallty which Ls ita 
Sl 
2. Pleasure and activ1ty 
Pleasure ari.ses from acti vU,,. and i8 inconcel vahle apart fi'om 1 t.. What ia 
the mean1.ng or th1.8 actlv1tl on which pleasure, u well., in an earlier 
context, happine.s, i3 sald to depend? Aristotle's doctr1.ne of activity or ac-
tivation as the fult1lDmt of a faculty is a special appl1cat.lon of his general 
doctrine of aotuaUtY......nd-PC88ibil1ty2"1 to certain reallt1es found exclusively 
1n aniwals and motu the apecial types of actualization which are sensation and 
intelleot1on. The principle ot aotual.1zation 18 applied 1n a number ot ways. 
firat, to any bo<tr at alWiv1ng or not-insofar as it has some torm. 
Thua, the esalble element i8 the _twr which 1. capable ot supporting thi8 or 
that tOJ'1l, the actual element is whaWVer de term1.natlon the matter comas to 
.T 
support. Tbe actual11rl is the fact or such _twr's supporting such a 
de termination. 
Again, the pr1nc1ple oan be appl1ed to &n.7 11v1ng body 1n ragarci to the 
mat basl0 tunctlon1ng ot cvthing that is alive, tho actuality ot nutrition. 
In this cue actuality ls lAOre than mare infQl"ld.ng ot a oertaln matter. Here 
21cr• a) Pbya. 189b3v..l9la22J 20l.a9-b15, Jlet. 1069b3-34. general applioa-
tion of the pr1ne1plB of :.?Ctuallty md possiotm'y to the theory of matter and 
torDlJ b) E!. An. 4l2al-41.;alO, 4l$.ll2-14. appUcat10n to t.heory of soul as the 
~r1nc1ple ot-rtteJ c) t8 An. 429aJ.0..432al3. applioation to intellection. ct. 
also Joaehi.na a) pp. I,a; 116-186, 2'/1-2"1$. b) )8, 39, 0) 2"9, 280, 288-291. 
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certain matter that belongs to it, its body, proceeds, without altering its 
first way of functioning, to a second f'unetion, that of adding to its body by 
assimilating to itself matter which has hitherto existed under other forms. 
1he third kind of actualization belongs to certain U v1ng beings by reason 
of cognitive faculties. Here the faculties of sensation and intellection are 
non-physical ways of actualizing in the soul the forms of beings distinct from 
it insofar as they are cogntzed. 28 
The activities of the various faculties are rooted in the Uving prinCiple 
"Which is i tsel! the actuality ot the body' that it 1nforms. 29 Each of the tune-
tionings ot the powers of lite is at once man1te8tat1onand further 
actualization ot the Uving body. The bare minimum of Ute is continued 
activation ot the power of vegetation, wi tbout at least this level ot actual-
ization beyond merelf informing a physical boqy lite is not pre8ent.30 Llte 
itself is none other than the total1ty ot such actualizations • 
.And lite i8 defined, in the ease of animals, by the capacity tor Mn-
8aUon; in the case of man, by' the capacity for sensation and tho'Ught.. 
But a capacity is reterred to ita activity, and in this its ruU 





real! ty consists. It ap~ar8 therefore that life in the tull sense 
is sensation or thought. 
ACcording to the powers of the body it actualizes, the living principle 
manifests itself in vegetation, sensation, intellection, and the various move-
ments proper to each of these three levels, for example, nourishment, rational 
or an1mal appetite, sensation of different ld.nds, movement in space, thought.32 
The being lives by activating the powers proper or most proper to itJ this i8 
what life meanl. activation of the various vital potentialities. 
Life is a torm of: activity, and each man exercises his activity upon 
those objeots and with those taoul ties Whioh he likes the BlOst. tor 
example, the llJU8ician exeroises his ~ense of heariDg upon musical 
tunes, the student his intellect upon problems of philosoph;T, and so 
on. And the pleasure of these aotivities perfects the activities, 
and therefore perfeots life, which all man seek. :ve·n have good reason 
31, _ , , ? -... 3 /1,. /7 7' ,.,,, 
-U70al.6-20. Of. alao, 1170aJ4t ",10 ra.p elVat ? CllcrC7aJ/ecrC7at ? J/OelY- • 
striCtly, Ari8totle dilftingu1shes a 'first' and a 'seoond' actuality in the in-
forming of a llving body by sottl. "Now the word aotuillty has two senses oar-
responding respective~ to the possession ot knowledge (tbs . . elCI-Offj/U? ) anti 
t.he actual e.rcise ot knowledge (ws TO eewpelv). It is obvious that the 
soul i8 actuality in the firat sense, viz. that oflcnowledge as pos,essed, for 
both sleeping and. waking presupp08e the existence of soul, and ot these wa1d.ng 
oorresponds to actual knowing. sleeping to knowledge posses8ed but not employed 
and, in the history of the individual. knowledge comes before its employJDllJDt or 
exercise." !!._ &!,_ 4l2423-27.· Again I UConsequently, whUe wa1d.ng is aotualit. 
in the sense oorresI!0nding to the cutting and the seeing ["i.e. to the second 
grade of actuali t"¥J. the soul is aotual1t,l 1n the sense corresponding to the • 
power of sight and the POWI' in the tool L i.e_ to the first grade of actuali~ ~ 
the body corresponds to what exists 1n potentiality! as the pupil ~~ the PoweA 
of sight constitutes the eye, so the soul El~ the body oonst1tute'i""'th'e animal. 
Ibid. 4l3al-3. Nevertheless in the view revealed by the passage from the Ethic~ 
CI'ted above, 1 t 1s not 1naccurate to speak of 11fe as conati tuted by actual 
exercise of the faculties of sensation, thought, etc. ror this is said to be 
true 'in the tull sense of the word (k"Up(l()SC 'preeminently'). Of. !let. 
10:)082-1.7, especiallys "For animals do not see in order that they mSy have 
.1g:ht, but they have sight that they may see." 
3~. An. 4!4a28-b$. 
tharetont to pursue Pleasure, sinoe 1 t perfects tor uach his llte, wb10h 
is a desirable th1ng:3' 
This 1s the sense in wh1ch pleasure belongs to activ1t7. It 18 preaent. when 
t.he activation of vital p()YIW reaches its natural ful.lneas. Since art:! act.ivity' 
of sensing or mo.1ng depends on the meeting ot 1. ts two principles, the raoul t.y 
a,."ld the object, it can be full only when the faculty is integral enough t.o be 
truly receptive and the object. strong ei'lO'tlgb to act on it.34 A _mt. Yf.ho8e 
organ has deteriorated cannot take in the ai.gnalllhich the object shauld set 
up J an object tJlat lacks def1ni ten... or ill too ter trtroy to lIet up a good 
aittnAl cannot produce much .ttect in even a healthy organ. 01 the other band, 
the higher the raoul. ty-the more wholly 1. t 1s recept.1:ve-and the higher the 
object-tbe more exact a form it hae-the better 1. the grade ot activatlon. 
The grade ot aoUv1:t.)I" follows on tho grade of 1. ta pr1nolp108, and pleasure 
f'ollowa on the grade of' activ1ty.'!> 
SO lorlst.heref'ore u both object i..ho'ught. ot or perceived, and subjeot 
, diSCel'n1ng or judaing, 81"8 such u they should be, there will be 
pleasure in the aot.lv1.W, since Wh1.ls both the pus1ve and ~, active 
part1u to a relat.1oDab1p remain the .. .-. in themselves ad unaltered 
~~ relation to one aIlOtbet, the 8ame nNmlt 18 na~ pro-
"U7Sall,...).7. 
34U7bb14-20. 
35U1Sa22-2SJ U76a3-9, 26-29. 
36u74b35-ll7Sa3. 
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A sign of pleasure'$ dependence on aotlv1tY' 1s found in the tact that p 
sure 1n an actlv1ty l •• sena 1fben tho act10n 18 prolonged. COnt1nuance ot 8lt1' 
activity COnBU1188 energy and 1'eaults 1n fatigue, fatigue in tum causes a rel_ 
ation of effort or attenUon, and thu8 A fall-ott 1n a.et1vity. 14osenod 
aotivitY' axpla1na l .. eened pleaaure:J7 
AnOther slgn ot lnterconnoctlon 1s the prom.otlw etfect that pleUU1'e has 
on tho activity proper to it (and oonftnely the hindering effect it has on 
alien act1nties). An ocoupatlon that carr1ea 1tselt along by' absorbing all 
subjectS· interut 18 a pleasant one. It. 1s pleuant because 1. t 1& intenH, 
and oan 00 intense because 1t. 18 pleuant. An unpleasant Job requiNe a 
constant effort to maintain 1t, and effort expended in maintat.n1ng it cannot 
also be spent 1n the act ltaelt. henco activit,y surfers and alSt evantualq be 
abandoned for fatigue sooner than it mut'It if l.ua effort wel"e requ.lred. Ql the 
other hand, one activity 18 dlatraoted b7 some pleasure coming in from alOther 
actlv1ty_ '1b.e tact one 18 appealed w by' the other activ1ty indicate. that be 
has a bent tor it and euily moves into exeJ'C1s1ng 1. t. '.the fact that be 
actually 1.8 en.1011.ng it to eOlDO degree indtcate8 that he is alread7 engapd in 
1t. to SOIDl'! degree. Without an expenditure of energy he cannot IU'dnta1n t.he 
acttnty be 18 lea. incl1.ned to when by natural bent he keeps entering into the 
other. He cannot en.107 both at once because he cannot. concentrate his .facult1e 
on two objeota at once.3S 
Pleasure and activity, then, run parallel. The very criterion of the 
excellence or badne,s of a pleasure is the quality of the act that belong, with 
1t.39 What conditions aotiv1ty conditions pleasure at the ,ame u.. They are 
inseparable. 
Thus the pleasure of a goad activity i8 morally good, that of a bad one 
IOOrally bad; for even desires for noble things are praised and desires 
for base things blamed. but the pleasure, contained in our activities 
are more intimately connected with them than the appetites whioh prompt 
them, for the appetite i, bath ,eparate in t.i.me and dist1net in its 
nature from the activity, whereas the pleasure is closely linked to the 
act1 v1 ty.. indeed so inseparable tram 1. t as to rftb" a doubt whether the 
activity is nat the SatOO thing as the pleasure. 
Aristotle.s treatment of pleasure in Book Seven identified pleasure and 
actlvity.h1 This emphasi38d that pleasure is something final, containing a 
certain completeness of meaning within itself Without reference to any end 
beyond it, and distinguished it fran any kind of process. If pleasure had to 
be either process 2!:. activity, it was clearly the latter because of its perfect 
ness. 
Here such an identification is abandoned though not formally repudiated. 
SOme have raised a doubt whether activity is not the same thing as pleasure. 
"However, we mnst not regard pleasure as really being a thought or a sensation 
indeed this is absurd, though because they are inseparable they seem to some 
people to be the same ... 42 
-
Aristotle does nat declare the reason for his inabill ty to "regard 
39U7Sb25-.28. 
4<>U75b28-'4. Cf. 1174b27-32. 
4lcf. p. 4B of the p:ntsent study. Cf. also .I.€onard" Ch. III, asp. 1 B. 
h2u7~b33-36. Italics added. 
pleasure as really being a thought or a sensation". The falseness of so 
regarding it is apparent,more or less Without dSll¥>nstration. It. did not sound 
Ula:aasonable to equate activity and pleasure; but to equate baing-pleased and 8 
specific activity such as thinkinC or hearing somehow reveals a lack of parity 
bet'1fEten the ttto terms. The distinction is necessary even if the exact gromd 0 ~ 
it is not expressible. Wi thout actually developing the impossihill ty of 
identifying pleasure and activity, Aristotle estabUshed the distinction bet1Rte ~ 
them in such a "'113' that proof does na:t need giving. 
It 1s the perfection or achlevedness of pleasure that raises it above 
process; it is by this characteristic that it is ASsociated wi th actiVity, si..mt 
activity itself is achievement of capacity. Pleasure indeed is made the very 
achievedneaa of activity. "Pol' each sense has a corresponding pleasure, as 
also htmt thought and specul.ation, and its activity is pleasantest wben it is 
most perfect, and most perfect when the organ is in good cond! tion and when it 
is directed to the lOOst excellent of its, objects) and the pleasure perfects the 
aetivity."4,) 
Ot.her elements also are said to con~ribute to the perfection of activity. 
The activation that constitutes sensation or intellection owes its completion 
to faculty and object, and derives its degree of perfection from each of them 
and their relation to each other. This has already been seen. But pleasure 
perfects activity in a ~ that is superior to this. ftThe pleasure does not 
however perfect the activity in the same way as the object perceived and the 
58 
sensory faculty, it good, perfect 1t, just as health and the pb,ys1cian are not 
1n the same W8'Q tho cause ot being healtby.uLh 'lbe analogy or health 1s not 
apt in every reepect. but 1. t suttLe.. to POint up the difference betll'een causes 
or conditions or a state, and tr.18 8'-&te itself in which other causes terminate. 
Pleasure and health are achievement J the organs that ex1st to makn sensation 
possible,the objeet.a themselves nhlch might aa well not exist if they are 
unknown, or 'the various _ana to health including the physician- all are pre-
jaoe.nt to achi.evemant tmd draw their _an1nge from i"t. 
c-/: ". 
Again., ditJJ)QS1tJ.on (es:, so ) 18 a perfection much closer to activation than 
e1 thor organ or object ls. ntapoa1.tton is more 1nt1mately' Cont:l8Cted ld. th the 
faculty than 18 the peroept1bla object, which alwa.ye rema1.na p!v'sically outside 
the perce1ftr. It 1s 'probably as a k1nd of d1.apoel tion or bent that the 
act1.va'tJ.ng aspect of m1.nd comJ"erts the marely senelble object into an 
intell.1g1ble.45 D1.8position is thus also auperlor to tacult7, which as such is 
cere passive capacity. nut. this superiority of clisposit.i.on is still prejaaent 
to the greater finality ot activation, which is the achievement of &aposition. 
!Ioreowr plea.,emre is called in a special sense a perfection even of activit)"_ 
And thts. even tbottt:)l Aristotle denies that pleasure itself is activity. 
It 18 as perfection or a different sort from all such contributing 
alemt~nta that pleU'\.lre cont.r1bute8 tc ~ already final perfection of aetivit7. 
Aristotle does not develop the queetion What 1. t is preataely that pleasure 
gt",.. to aatlY1tYJ at this pOint Jv,t 1s nJ)re a\llpstift t.han .xact.~ PleasUl"e i8 
b4U74b24-26. 
4S~. Aa- 430al.6. at. also pp. 71-73 or tho present study. 
r 
a Itsupervening perleoUon, l1ke the bloom of health in the young and 
vigorous" .46 This is annlogy alJoost become metaphor. But the psychological 
reality conveyed by the ~e of fresh ooloring and rea111ency47 is vAlid and 
would sel"VC 'i(ell w indica:te Aristotle's intQn t10n eycn in the absence of other 
ml"e philosophical. e:;q,lresslona. 
Plt1a8Ul:'e 1s something su~ (ent r'rv~ev6vn h it. doe. not 
enter into the oonstitution of the 8Jtl vation, is not necessal')" for the act-
1. vation to :..e what 1. t. i8, 1s really sonlet.hing extra awn t.bouch it, is 
:tnevitabl.,y present moo tho nctivation is 'l9'b.>1o. oofora" ",man demonstrating 
that plaaDure is not prooelS8, Ar"J.StO,.,i..e described actlvity in terms that 
aniJiclptl'i;.ed ttds d.i.stinction between What ,:~onotitut.es and wbat supervenes. 
"How the act of sight appears to be perfect at, ett:r:f f11OJl1Ilmt ot ita c.1uration. it 
does not require a.n.,rth1ng t,,:) supel"V"8lla la tar in oroor to perfect 11;.6 specific 
qual1ty.nh8 
- IF 
46117'.... :>"" / -1' ...:1 '" " c (.1 tl LW,33. ft •• • errtr'Tv9MevoY" r~ TlP.-cos,J OtOV 'fOtS a~aLotS' 1) wpa.~ 
410t. U54blO. Cf. alao Rl:ln. lJ89eO-bU, where Ar1st.otle t s description 
of the vigoJ' and puslonatenesiO'l the young suggests 801D8 ot the qU.llltles 
which the PI'seen t use or tJpCL ma.,y haVe implied for him. 
481174al4...a.tJ: "-6 elf t((J'repoV" rev§.M.eJ/cJj/ re~et~q-e,. The description 1. 
1ntroduoed as 1UU$trat1oo of wbat ie meant by the per.etton ot pleasUl"th The 
line that 1Bmad1at,e4t follows th1.a quotat1.on, ttBut plea.su.re altJo ~Jpearfl to be 
a thing ot We natrure", doe. not indicate that. pleasure poIJaemIU the __ 
of perfection as activit¥ poeaesses (tor plsasUl"8 itself is something 
supervening on aot.1vJ.~), onl.y that neither perteotlon regarded from its own 
character requires anything further to constitute it. Both &rEt in fact . 
aooompanted h7 other quaUtas (4C'blv1t1 by pl.eaaure, pleasure by duration), 1m 
these are only St.."Ptl.rvening on t.hem, not cOOMt1 tnting them in t.hesIIselvea. 
rr------------. 
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Again" A:r1atoUa deacrioos pleasure, in Uw ~& of nool~ Seven, as 
'un1.mpeded aotiv1tgrt.h9 This use of 'un1mpeded t suggests tho quaUtl.oe 
abunda.nce and eas1neee, and reoalls the conditions health 1n orean and rot-
abill ty of object, wb1eh he ~ are neoeaeary for the right activation ot a 
faculty. An actiV1ty 15 agreeable when 1t goes along as it should. If a 
maoh1ne or a f'acul.V operates lDXltbly, there is present to the operator a 
eerta1n 86Me ot wellbeing, an GXh1l.ar'ation that contributes to tho act soma 
indefinable and irntcmolble, somethirlg unexplainable in fAJl"mS .~ of tba 
operation. 
Passagea .from Book Nine .. in Aristotleta deacripti.on ot Ul«mea. as the 
foundat1on ot the h1gbest forma of t.r1endah1.p, help to expl.a1n th1s peeul1a1' 
now of pleuure-the 8OIBth1rte that 1t adda to the perteoUOIl of activ1t:r-in 
wnw ot Galt ............ or conaclousn_ (a:t1'6Iaved"tJcu). The Pfll88ages are 
.concerned w1~ other PJ'Oblela, so what teet1raorV'tl1eT gift 18 plaaeure 18 only 
i.nd1rectJ but" it 18 at least. au.gge8tlw.$O 
Trt1,.~ Monds are alJ.ke 1n excellence, thus the exoellance of a"f:r1end 1s 
much the same as one fa 01'111. FrUndsh1p orters one the chance ot regarding h1a 
om oxoel.lence lai.d 'out betore h1m 1n the penon ot another. Th1s 18 a better 
1fI1;f of' v:l.fn'I1ng 81.'('.f ~ than the iAtNapeotlw _tmd can atf'orcl, tor it 
pUts tM <luaU ty under v1ew 1n a sart of perapect1. ve. 
But 'WiV' 18 such attentJ.on to a Mend '8 excelle1lce pleasant? It 18 




ploasn.~t boaause the oxcolltmce that a b".i.en.d posseSSC;\ 1s 000 ts Q."n (t.he fri 
b,~lnG b"J ~,r1rtu.e of Ukon6ss another self) .. a.nd ~ .~uliAAtJ.211 ~ alfl ~ l.D. 
£,oosasaion 2f ! good !:! essentially ploasan~. "But, &$ we aatr, it. iu tbo 
consciousness of oncsfJlt as Coed that :t"lal<ea exlst+mco deaire.b:e, ar:(! {moh 
consciousooss 1s pleMoot 1n 1taell' • .,51 The passage sugge.ts that too quality 
which pleam.1I'O adds to acti vi t.y 1s oonsoiouane:Js of possession sclfJ t..hat 
wore possible) is tOO foot or volt a;l posoess.1.ng it. Another pasaa.:.:e see_ to 
Sa:! still more I ft C!Jn tholr awarer..eas (J£ [" POfl80SSUlgJ what 1s in. .1 walf 
It 10 not. clear tram t::Q context whethor ArlstCItle ~lfwould regard 
this as t.Im dtl'itingu.lsllinc 11000 or pleUl'lI'e. ''LT.JhO 001100 tha~ a thin~~ is 
0'.11' own is " •• ploasant. tt'3 .All that ,b, ... lstoUo s~"& in '~he~o P8.S0~tJS 
pr,:dioatus ;:11~}asa.nt.ness ot such BiilaI'entilOSJ uot:.h1ng statsB that selt'-aNaranea8 
the cause or oven neceSoa:r.y oondition of pleasure. '1'l18 only corl.ai.n mani.ng of 
the s~tomnt 1s that such con .. <Jc.iousooas of vosS88Si.n(; good is .in faCt 
agre.'1abla. Yet the pass4b"es :rnggo&t more tlw.rl they requ1.re. 
A similar amb1valenoe appears in a paaaago near t.h1B, 1n which Aristotle 
is d100usainc salf .... l~. lJera the POsseMJ.OO of a bood by it::JGl.f.' is made a 
•• 
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posttive factor in choice. "ff.JveryoM wishe. his own good. no one would 
CbOOH to 'POssess every good in the world on condition ot becoming somebody 
else ••• but only while rema1n1ng himself, whatewr he may be •••• ,,54 Ci1e 
finds hi. pleasure 1.n a thing because it is eomething exoetllentt ;yet, in a 
deeper consideration of the matter, this pleasantness involws another element 
in add! Uon to that ot excellence J 1 t inYolvea oneself enjoying it. $Ueh an 
object is exceUent whether or not it is being possessed, such an action 1s ot 
a certain pertection DO _twr who pertor. it. But it is pleasant to this 
person onq if' .!!! 18 the ODe that OO'HI.8 it or performs it .. and no other 
inatead ot hUl. Even the exoellence ot a friend brings his friend enjoyment. 
becauae' a friend 1s ... at'lO;;;.;..;the .  · ....... ! !!!£' so that a friend's ucellence is one's own 
excellence-to whatever degree th& sqing holds true. 
Ibreover, awareneas ot excellence as one's own fita well Ari.totle'a quill. 
fioat-ion of pleasure as an a<idit1onal. pertection supervening on the perfect 
activation of a taculty. Such awaren ... does tollow in over)" operation ot senaE 
or intellectS5 aftd 1s something at once one with the activity and diStinct from 
it. But granted his words are favorable to an identification of pleasure wi th 
awareness of excellence u one's own, Aristotle himself rt.O'W'h<.l'8 maleas this 
identIfication which would explain more clearl,. the nature of the phenomenon. 
The desoript,lon ot pleasure 4S "like the bloom ot health in the young and 
."s,goroustt 1s as mlloh as Aristotle elaborates his notAon ot what ult1mately 
oonsti tute8 t.he pleasant. 
In whateVer..., pleasure derives trom its proper act! vlty, wha'l:4ver 
peculiar quality it adds to that activity, the activity i8 the essential thing. 
thO ?lea:nqoe would not extet w1t..loJout the activ1ty tthich 18 its baa1a, bUt the 
activity would be jut what it is even 1f l2!£ i!J'g!slblft no pleasure attached tc 
it.56 The acttY1ty 10 primar;y. 
But from a tunhe!' __ nation, the aoUv1ty itself has somathing of the 
relatl. V0 about 1 t, at least 1n 80 far u it 1s !!S!!. 11 act1:V'1ty and not, anotbeJ'4 
The .,.t basic actlV1U, .. atUl, as seen befOfttS1, look to a totality beyvDli 
t.beDIelwa, to lite itself and What perfects life u Utel happinesse ~ry 
activity is .. way 1n which lite is act.uallzed, every act.1v1to' 1s des:tred 1..be<I:aua1tl 
it actual.1zea Ute. EYal7 being desires the further actiualiu.tion of ita lite, 
the -.r it baa of ex1.8t1Dg. ttltl_teq, every pleasure i8 deeirabla-i. 
enjoyable-booause it i.nd1oatea that one's exl.tence is being perfected. nIt 
might br3 held that all man aeek 1.0 obtain pleasure. because aU men des1ro Ute. 
We 10 Ii t?l'm ot act1:d.ty, and each man exercises his acUv1.t7 upon those 
objects and w1 th those faculties which be l1kea the met. • • • And the 
pleasure of these activities perfects the act111.t.1e., and therefore pertects 
ill., Vlhioh all Il8!l ..... $8 
They are 80 cloae17 1Dte1"related, the drift. to both of them ere 80 basic, 
Stlct. U14a4-8. also note 60. 
51 or. pp. 3 2 and 36 of the preNllt study. 
S8U1Sal..3-il1. 
t,hat some C81not tell wb1.ch is pri.Dtary1 "Men have good reason therefore to pur 
sve pleasure, since it perfects for each his life, which is a desirable thing. 
The question whether we desire life for the salaJ of pleasure or pleasure for tb 
sake of life, need not be raised for the present.nS9 In fact, Aristotle has 
already expressed his vie,.. that 11fe or perfection of life is primary and de-
sirable in i tsel£ even if unaccoq>anied with the extra perfection that pleasure 
is. "Also there are many things which we should be eager to possess even if 
they brought us no pleasure, for instance Sight, memory, 1m.owledge, virtue. It 
JD8IY be the case that these things are necessarily attended by pleasure" but tha: 
makes no difference J for we should desire them even if no pleasure resulted 
from them."6O 
Though Aristotle's treatment of the subject does not include an analysis 
of exactly what constitutes the essence of pleasure" it leaves little ambiguity 
about the relations of pleasure and activity. They are functionally inseparabl4, 
nevertheless distinct. Pleasure is a Bort of perfection of activity, activity, 
hOW8'V9r, as the actualization of existence is the more primary. 
low, the same relations that hold between pleasure and activity hold as 
well be _en pleasure and happiness" for happiness, as Aristotle has shown in 
Book ene, 1s in fact an activity, the JlX)st perfect activity. Happiness and 
pleasure, then, are closely related notions, yet they are radically distinot. 
This distinction between happiness and pleasure reveals itself in all the 
treatises of the Ethics, nowhere so much as in the treatise on the activity 
S9U75al7-19. 
6Ou74a4-8. Cf. Cb. V, no. 1 of the present stuctr. 
6S 
1fiu.ch 1.1 1n tho moat propel" sanae of the 1tOl"d haq>p1ne8S-...contemplaUon, whtch 
Aristotle d1scl.l8aea 1n the second part of Book Ten, in vtnuall;y the last pagea 
of the Ethica. 
I I 
Aristotle'. treatise on happ1neas in Book Ten1 beg1ns atter he baa stated 
the general rule that, the nom b.r wh1.oh the value of a pleasure 0811 be 
det.eftd..rled 1s the value ot tbs act.1vlty from 1fb1eh 1t, prooeeda. 'lha 
consideration leads natural.l..1 to a diaoussion ot the relatift values of the 
'Var1aua aat1:ntiea and of what activities or aot1v1ty 18 moat. proper to man. 
AM ... 1ng the queat.ion 1f1ll oOMlat 1naholfing what aot1v1V be8t conforms to 
the chal"acter1et.1ca of happ1ne.8wblch .Ar1stot,le out.l.1.r.18d 111 Book a.. 
AccOJ'd1ng to that ~i.a, happtneu 18 a nature! 8CtlY1:z that !! 2!!1!ct !!!d 
2 ea1~. The actlv1t1 wb1ch correaponda t..::> theM characteristics mat 
aactl¥ is conteJcllat4.on. 
1. CGntelllPlat.1on As ~. 
.' 
~le doe. not spend tt. 1n -tablJ.atd.ns ti. cbaracierl.at.1.c. ,.. 1t 
already atllu:Ut e_tabU.bed t.ha\ the ~o,yable .... of an act.1Y1tq 1_ plJ'&llel to 
ita perfection, and can be ayatematioaUy ranlatd with other pleatml'08 only 80 
tar as 1 ts CO:&TCt8ponding actlY1t.y can be nmkad 1n a h1eraraby ot 'Val ... 
I a 
1u1~79a32. Tho reaa.1ni.rlg chapter, U19a3)-U8l.:b24, devoted to a 
di8CU881oa of how tba values dewnd.ned 1n the course or. the Ethics can beat be 
put 1nto effect in the state as a whole .. MJ"f'e8 U .. tranaltlOii {OM the t...--~.€llt 
of the Politi •• 
~t. Oh. n, beg1nn1ng, of the preeent atud1'. 
('7 
- I 
Nevertheless, .conviotion that a e.l·tain activit)" 1s enj07able oan be bad 
through e>..-perlence. cne who has exercised h1mself sufficient.ly in an activity 
knowe whether he :rinds it agreeable. F',xper1ence in phUosophizing has shown 
Aristotle that its reault, Wisdom, 1s highly enjoyable in its own way. there 1. 
general agreement <at leut ,.,ng the men ot good character whose preferences 
serve as standard3) that Wisdom "contatns pleasures of m.a.rvalloua pnri ty and 
per.manance ... 4 This is certa:lnly true or the end-product of ph1l0e0pby even if 
the ach1evlng ot 1 t requires great ettort.S But this 1s something that will 
be k:nown only by exper!Anee. Qte can dispose another to try phUosophy, one 
oan introduoe him to 1t gradually, but realconvlction ct philosophy·s 
enjoyableness CODltS not from argument, but from practice. 
This understood, Aristotle can only repeat that the best guide toward the 
excellence of a pleaaure 1. the excellElnce ot the activity from which it st._ 
But among the pleuu:res considered reapeotable, wb10h C1U8 ot pleaaurea 
or which particular pleasure 1s w be deemed the distinctively bulan ple 
sure? Perhaps tb1s will be clear trom a consideration ot man t • activitie • 
For pleuurea correspond to the activiti.s to which they bel~J it 1a 
therefore that pleasure or those pleasures, by which the activit1, or the 
act.iviti .. , ot the pertfJOt and supremelJr happy man are perfected, that 
IIWIt be pronounced l'rw::Itaft in the fulle.t sense_ The other ple&8'U1'ee are 
80 onl11n a seconda17 01" lower degree, like t,he actl:rttie. to Which the,. 
belong.6 






reap<mt1S.Dc 8Ctti'V1V. For a pleasure does not lend itself to direct comparison 
vith other pleaauresJ an acttuty. on the other band, «088. 
2. Oontemplation.b Activity. 
'!'he 1a&nence and &etuaU. eharacteriatle ot actiT.l.iV at ita beet find. 
.. ~ expresaion in contemplaUon. 
Tb, activi:Z.2! ~ !! ~ itsel;t actuaUl&tion .2E ppUence. It 
reali-. in a 1d.nd ot tull.nea. what the eopitJ.ve faculti •• ot aenaaUon auaea 
onl.T in a priJdUft. 1JIperteot 'tIq. fhe theory ot intellection 18 one ot the 
highen appl.1cat.1ona which Ar.1et.oUe u.kea ot h18 general aetap)q'aieal prino1p1e 
ot actualiv md po&e1b1l1t7.1 
The various faculties ot sensation, cape.oit1 .. tound. onlT in the higher 
living be1np, aD'! the taoul. of intellection, tound only in mera, conais' 111 
the eoul's abll1t¥ to actualiae in itself w1\boub alteration ot it&t own plv's1oal 
constit.ution toru vh1eh are the actualitie. of other be1Dgs. '!'he dtJi/~/S 
htch a faculty repl"8Hnta 18 a oapaci. existing 1n the nbject. abow and 
beyond the various other areas ot poeaible an4 actual. d.teftd.na .... ·• wblob 
onatit-' ita basic make-\lp, eubat.anual, qualitative, qumtitatift. etc. fh:l.a 
special sort. ot capaoit.;r 1s open \0 a spMial sort ot evepyetQ.. , an activ11i7 
r acti fttion vh1ch consists 1n tbe actual det.eftd.nat,ion ot the capaalt7 bT a 
8 given fom. 
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In the case of sensation the organ of sensation, whether sight or hearing 
or any other, .18 a member of the physical body whose fUllction it is to remain 
open to being affected by o~rtain physical conditions. nIt is clear that what 
is sonsiti.ve is 80 only potentially" not aotually. The power of sense is 
parallel to 'I'lhat is combustible, for that never ignites itself spontaneousl;i', bui 
requires an agent which has the power of starting ignition; ot!1erwise it could 
have set ttself on fire, and would not have needed actual fire to set it 
ablaze"9 Insofar as a sense is a special area in the soul in a state of alert 
noutral readiness for activation, t ts "reality" is quite as dis tinct from that 
of th6 activation which takes pla.ce in it, as it is distinct from the physical 
object whosa.form determines the activation. 
From one viewpoint, the sensation which is pl'Qduced 01998 more to the sonse 
faculty, because it is as an activation of the sense faculty that the sensation 
BDe An. 42L.al8-231 "By a tSI~nset is ID98l1t what has the po-.er of receiving 
into itBeiftre sensible forms of things without the matter." Ibid. 429al2-171 
nI! thinldne is likA perceiving it must be either a process in"Wiiroh the soul 
is acted upon by what is oapable of being thought, or a process different trOll 
but analoGolls to that. The thinkinG part of the soul must therefore be, while 
impassible, oapable of reoeiving the form of an object, that is, Im18t be 
potentially identical in oharacter w'ith 1ts objeot without being the objeot. 
Vind BlUst be related to what 1s thinkable J as sense is to what is sensible. It 
Of. Ibid. 43l~24-291 ftKnowledge and sensation are divided to oorrespond with 
the reall ties, potential knowledge and sensation answering to potentiali ties, 
actual lmowledge and sensation to IlCtualities. Within the soul the faculties 01. 
lmowledge and sensation are potential.ly these objeots, the one what is knowable, 
the other what is sensible. They must be 'lither the things in themselves or 
their forms. The former altematJ.ve is of oourse impossible: it is not the 
stone wi.ich is present in the soul but its form." 
9Ibid. 417a6-9. 
10 
exists at allJlO from the other viewpoint, sensation owes 111)1"9 to tM object 
sonsed, because the foroallt1 which detarm1.nes the ctivation of the Sen8e 
belongs oonsti t.ut1onally to the object not to the HJlSe, Y1h1ch is open 
ind1tferently to an,y number or determinations.ll In tact, sensation depends on 
both elements and is a :reality distinct trom both. 
10 
. Ib1d. 424a25-bl9, viz. "The problem might be raiHd, Can what cannot 
smeU be si1d to be atfected b.1 a.11.s or what cannot see by oolours, amd so on~ 
It might be said t.hat a smell 1.a just. what oan be &melt, and it 1 t produces my 
effect 1t can o~ 00 80 as to Be 8OIIIIth1.ng .. U 11'., and 1t might be argued 
that what oannot soell cannot, be atteot.ed by 8mells and f'urther that wh4t can 
s.roell can be affected by it only in 80 tar as it. has 1n it. the poRI" to smell 
(s1m1larl¥ with the~roper objects of all the other senses)." 11ma, the preHoa 
in the body of a oapao1ty to sense 18 What turn .. a .... qr ptvalcal encounter ot 
two bodlee into lSODlBt.htng mora. the ~S8 1n one or them ot the preaence 
ot the other. Cf. alao lb1d. 426a2-lS. v.l.ZI tilt 18 t.rue that the mvu.n't, 
both the acting and t.be b8t'iig acted upon, is to be tomd in that which ls acted 
upQU, both the sound md the hear1ng so far u it i8 actual. must be found 1n 
that which has the faculty of hearlng; tor it 1s 1n the pusive factor that the 
actual1t1 ot t:'1G act1ve or mtive factor itl :reaUzed, that is wt\Y that which 
causes mvemant ..,. be at rest." 
l~d. 4l6b,,,. uSensat.1.on depende, u we bavu said, on a proceas of 
movement or affection trom without, for it 1s hold to be some sort ot change ot 
~t7.tI Al8o, ibid., 417&6-9, quoted 1n nO.te 9, Oh. IV. ct. Fr~o1fl Nuytma, ,.aee de ~1v.Cho1051.. d t £1atote, Par1a, 1948, pp. 283, 284, rta. "Ia 
... tuft n a pas· I.lle-mame i 'acta de connai tre I alle en a awl&men\ 
1& poas1bilite, 1a puissance. L'act;uation de cet;t;. pu1u8lCe est un mouvement, 
une altarati.on ( Id"'':j(I"Is"~ aA..ioLf.l.)crIS). Ce ou part.1oul1er u1:. dcmc 8OUIJd.s a 1& 
1cd. general. suivant laqueU. un ~nt, c • .....-d. un passage de putnanoe a 
acta, no peut ee produlN que 30\13 1.Wluence de quelque chose qui potlseda dej~ 
cot acta. PoaI' +.,<;rut r,.,:)~_nt 11 dolt '1' avoir quelque chose QUi 18 aubt t at 
q1.l01G!Je ahose qui 18 oause. • •• Ql voit ola1rement. 1& role usighs par l' 
a.Jteur aux objets sena1bi .. vu........,ns de la faculte sensitive. Les objets 
sEtnaibles, c.-a-d. lea chous 1nd1v1duelles aont le8 , leo cauSE ~ 
motrices ou etticientea de 14 connalaanctl 881l81ble. tt The whole of Ch. VIII, no 
51, emphasizes the passivity of mlnd. 
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'.\ S1d~ the actualities of the sensible object and of the sensitive faculty 
• ,one actuality in spite of the differenc~ betlteen their modes of beingl2 
~t~hearing and sounding appear and disappear from existence at one and 
rt.he :s&me moment, and so' actual savour and actual tasting, &c., while as 
pot$ltiali ti~s one of them may exist without the other. The earlier 
stu4ents of nature were mistaken in their view that without sight there was 
no ~ te ,or black, without taste no savour. This statement of theirs is 
par~ly true, partly false. 'sense' and 'the sensible object. are ambiguous 
terlJilS, i.e. !lU\Y denote either potentlalltls§ or actualities. the statement 
is ~ of the latter, false of the former.13 
'.r~ act qf sensation is the actuality in Which are fulfilled the capacity (for 
se1p.sing) /which is the sense faculty and the q'llB8i-capaci ty (for baing sens~) 
wh~ch isl'the formality manifested by the "aense objeot.14 
Thei case of intellection involves a function parallel to thisl5 f the actu-
al1.ty which constitutes it is the activation of a oapaoity for receiving in a 
collapletely non-material wa:y the form. or some objeet.16 As faculty open to IJ'lJ:T 
lhcr. Joachim, pp. 293, 294, a deve1~nt of the idea that tt~t we 
really have [in, say, an act of hearingJ is not two actualities in relation 
but a single actuality •••• ft 
15Ibid• 429&13-18, "It thinking is like perceiving, it must be either a 
process in whloh the soul is acted u:x>n by what is capable of being thought, or 
~ process ditterent tram but analogous to that. The th1nld.ng part of the soul 
nust therefore be, Tdlile impassible, capable of receiving the form of an object; 
r.hat 1s, must be potential.ly identical in character With its object without being 
",he objeot ('.'n>'C)u r"y- a,,(,.(J./,,,,b 7OUTl). ft 






determination whatsoever (since evar.y kind of reality is a possible object of 
thought), intelligence lacks ever.y deter.m1nation, "is, before it thinks, not 
ac tually any real thing. "11 This pure-receptiveness remains mind's chief char 
acteristic whether in its act of gaining new knowledge or in its recall and us. 
of knowledge alreaqy attained.18 
Actual intellection takes place only when this capacity is activated by 
some agency which possesses the actual! ty of which mind is capacity. Ql the 
sense level this function is performed by the sensible object. this supplies 
the determination that fulfils the sense capacity, Thus a meeting of the 
sensitive with the sensible issues in sensation. This would be paralleled on 
the intellectual level by a meeting of the intellective and the intelligible 
issuing in actual intellection.19 
The intelligible object, however, which would be the agency that 
actualizes the capacity of mind, is not found in nature as the sensible object 
is. (This would have to be some sort of free-floating idea or form which the 
• 
17 Ibid. 429al8-271 "Therefore, since everything is a possible object ot 
thought, mind in order, as Anaxagoru sqs, to dominate, that is, to know, must 
be pure from all admixture, tor the co-presence ot what is allen to its nature 
is a hindrance and a block. it tollon that it too" 11ke the sensitive part, 
can have no nature of ita own, other than that ot having a certain capacity. 
Thus that in the soul which is called mind (by aind I mean that whereby the soul 
thinkB and judges), is, before it thinks, not actuall1' any real thing. For this 
reuon it cannot reasonabl1' be regarded as blended with the body. it so, it 
would acquire some quality, e.g. warmth or cold, or even have an organ like the 
sensitive ta.cul.tyt as it is, it has none." 
18 Ibid. 429bS-9. 
-
19Ibid• '429al.3-18, (ct. note 15, where the passage has been quoted). For 
an explanation ot the problem raised by the parallel between sensation/sensible 
and intellection/intelligible, and of Aristotle's solution ot it by the 
doctrine of active and passive intellect, ct. Hamelin, pp. 16-22. Ct. also 
Nuyens, pp. 296-309, on the meaning ot vous TrOl'JllkOS ~ A!!.. III, 5. 
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mind would oome 1n ~()ntact with, juet as the sensIble object is matter-eCloodied 
form wh1c.'1 the senae organ oo_s into contact with. Yet Aristotle's polemic 
~a1nst the Platonic theorr of forms denies that any such frett-floating torms 
exist in nature.) The natural objeot, u suoh oapable of affecting other thing 
only pb¥sically, cannot act on mind or ac tl,alize its capacity, becanee mind 
unllke Sf',nae cannot be affeoted p!v'sicaJ..q. According t.o the Aristotelian 
solution ot lih1s difficult,., SOlIe at,"8ncy of intelligence bridges the gap 
between. the natural. object, as such not actually lntelUglble, and the 
intEtll1elble object which ach1. ...... t.he actuali •• tlon of the intellective 
oapaeit1.20 The exact. tunct10n of this agency, ita relat4.on to the intellect-
ive capacity of mind and to Id.nd itself', and to the actualltyof tnteUect1on, 
is not cle .. in Aristotle'. treat.mant and in taet ra1se. several. critical 
problema in his soience of man. 21 
2o..The problem tdgbt be suggeate<h 1f th1nking 1s a passive artectlon, 
then if m1nd 1 •• iJllplo and 1..mpusible and has noth1ng in common w1th" anyth1ng 
elae, aB AnaxagOras .~, bow can 1. t come to·- th1nk at all? For interacUOIl 
between two f'aotora is held to require a precedent c01lllDtl1t.y of aature between 
the factor •• - "Have not 1m alrea<f!.r disposed ot the difficulty about interact! 
1.nvolv1ng a COtam element, when .. said that mind ta in a aenee poterlt.iall¥ 
whatewr 1s thinkable, though aet.ual.q it 1. nothing untU U. has thought? 
What it th1nka IIl18t be 1n it Jut as oharacters .. be said to be on a wr1ting-
tablet on whioh as yet nothing stande wrltteru this 1s exactJ.T what bappe:na 
with mind." "S1nce in every clus of things, as in nature as a whole, ... f'1nd 
two factors involved, (1) a matwr wbioh 18 potentIalq all the :partIculars 
inoluded 1n the elus, (2) a cause which is ;>roductlve in the a"nee that it 
make. lih_ all (the latter standing to the former, as e.g. an art to its 
material), theae d18ti1nct elements must 11kl8w1 .. be found within U1e soul. And 
in fact mind as we have described it i. what. it 18 by virt.ue of becoming all 
thin{;8, whtle there is another which 1s -That it is by vir-t,ue of mak1ng all 
things I this 1s a sort. ot posit1_ state like lIght.) tor in Ii eMe light make 
potential colours into actual colours." Ibid. 4291)23-2$. 428b29-4)0a2 J 
43oalo-16. -
~r. 1U.Yen8. p. )00, ct. also Ch. V,. no 3, pp. 15"2 .. 153, "'f the present 




Despite this obscurit.y 1n the two prinoiples of intellect.ion, the 
actuality ot·lcnoW1ng in Whioh they issue is sttll sutfioiently distinguished 
from more oapaci ty ot knowing (.specially where the parallel with sensation 1s 
recall.ed) to put in pel'8peot.lve those passaps ot the Ethics where Aristotle 
oontrasts faculq- and acti'YatiGn of faoulty. 
Intellection i. t.bua the cbief way in whiob the human being finda actual1-
zation. The t\mctlon of nutr1t1on, even the cognit1ft tacult.,' of sensation, 
tnvolw8 mat.ter in U.s aotualit.7 and inasmuch. 1t 1nYolves utter it invol'ft8 
restriotion and 1.1Dd.tat1on of lt8 actuality. InteUeotlon hoIre'Yer does not ot 
its enena. involve matter, hence ita actualt.aaUon can extend to arty kind ot 
being at, all, even to the pure17 ialaterial J 1ndeed 1. t focuses on its objects 
just 1neotar &8 they can be .et free f'ltom material condit101l8. Aotivity par 
excellence, in whioh intellection 1. leut concerned with be1ngs in their 
material rutrlotlone ot place and t4_ and partial real1zation, 1. the 
actinty of oontemplat1on. The gruptng of tint prlnolplea and of the 
relat,lona of beings as independent of _ter1~ condi tions i. the subject.-
matter or 8}.1Goulatift wisdom. 
Bence it i8 clear that W1sdo!!l must be the most P<lrtect ot the modes ot 
knowledge. '.the wtae man there tore must not only lenoir the conclUSions 
that £011011' from hi~ first principles. but 8180 have a true conception 
of those pnnclples themselves. Hanee Wisdom must be a combination of 
Intelligence and SCient.iflo rledge: 1t muet. be a ~ted knowledge 




In this oonoentration on what i. 'UIlOhangeabla lies the supreme value as well as 
the supreme actual1ty of Wi8dom and the pursuit wh10h achieV88 1t, {)ewp(", 
philosophioal cODtaaplat1on.23 
~ontem2latlon 1!. !!!2 ::a !2!l,1mmanent 2!. art1 vt tie!,. 24 Thus Aristotle 
aBserts the relative independence of ohanging ctrcwutccee which philosophio 
aotd. vi ty uniquely enjoys. It 1s true, the philosopher need. the ordinary goode 
of nourtahDmt, bou81ng and oloth1ng, agreeable oiJ."CURItaloes, as much 88 aI'\Y 
other man. Aristotle in8i. ta on th1s. 2$ A breakdown 1n these c1rallmstanee. 
leads to 1U-bealth, diltract1ons, d18courIAgement. But t.m Wile lUll needs out.-
ward goods only 80 far u they enter into the general upkeep of his person,t.ha 
i8, 80 far as t.be7 are not really extrinsic to b1m. Beyond sucb a tunot.1on au 
ward good. act.ually are aupernuoUlJ concern 1d.t.h these, and 1t 1s hard not to 
be ooncerned with them when the,. are pre8ent, is more h1nd1"anoe than help.26 
The phi108opher's need of outward goods 18 l1ke that of other _n only in 
Ulia one l"8.pea\, t.he needs of hi. pereob. For other ways of 11fe, say, those 
ot the various a_ellenOM ot character 11ke .,justice and temperance and oourage 
2.3ot• pp.94-100 ot the present. study, where Al'1.atotle's desCription of the 
objects of contemplation i8 developed more at leng'iJ1 am related to p.arallel 
not.ions in the 1"I!!f!ll!!:c!.. 
2bcr. pp. 26-31 of the present study, wherfl Ar1stotle's relating ot the in 




cannot find activation except under circumstanoes where there ie the 
pOssibil1ty of their oontraries, of injustice, selt-1ndul.geme, cowardice. 1'ba 
man of good character oannot actual.l1' spend mach or his Ute exercising bis 
particular virtua even though he ma1nta1n8 his disposition to act by it when 
,-,ccuion arise •• 21 Ot,her excellences 1ika generosity actually require an 
abundance of wealth in order to reacb f'ull actual.iaaUon. 'l'be phill'sophlitr 1. 
under no weh need ot cil"CUllltan.cee to fulfil his disposition. ItC'rJbe nee 
man on the oontrary can also oOtltensplate by" hiJIHlf, and the !l¥)re so the wiser 
he 1s. • • • ,,28 Good actlona indeed do not alwa;ys require extraordinary 
c11"CUlllttances J exoelleno9 i. to be tound alao among porsoLs of moderate means. 2 
But tll! ph1loeq>her'. dependence on conditions 1s still of a different order. 
If' he needs out,ward goods it 1s only in his capaolt7 as mID and social being 
that he needs them, DOt as philosopher. 
Yet there 1s something about the tavorable concurrence of ci..rc'wltlstancss 
that enhances the philoaopber's good. It was M.nl0 that extras like beauty, 
tamUy, friends add to the happy 11 f8 mald.ng .,1 t blessed. Aristotle I\aa 
reterenae to this idea again when he stqfl that happiness as sllOh reqUires lltt 
27U /1 ~1-33; 117 Sa28-b3. 
28U77.:J4, 3S. 
29U79a4-l8 __ 
3OCt• pp. 13~6 of the present study. 
17 
J.n tho wq of outward goods.31 lfol'8over oontemplation proo"eds better w1th the 
aid of fellow-philosophers. In Book N~2 Aristotle has developed at length 
the good effects that the right kind of flolendahip has on higher actt vi. ty. 
quall tiea of character spread !'rom one friend to the other by' reason of the 
im1 taUon which triendship alwaya fosters,3,) one oo_a to understand hie own 
characteristics when be sees them objectified in his trienJ4 J the et1mulation 
and encouragement that &l'UJea from .. sociation in a COIllOn lnterea1i 1a a great. 
spur to e:mellence in IUJ'3' pursuit.)S But theae advantages are mattera of more 
and lesa. The;y malca .it poaaible for \he &etiv1t.;y to reach 1ts fullest develop-
I'J.'I8!1t and to con't.1nue longer. they foster certain acco~ pleasures, but 
do not toucb the act e888nttally. 
b question how Mceuary this condition la, 1a not altogether resolved 
1>7 AristotJ.e. Ql one hand, in the wtV'a emlJII8ratAtd, friendship 1s desirable 
becauae it enhance. the h1gher actJ.vit1ea, it ia de.irable 88 D1Cb as 8D7 
enhancetMnt 18 dea1rablA-oeo far u 1 t reall;y oontr1butea-i t 18 desirable but 
ia not neces"ary in :Lt.aelf. Ql the other hapd, 18 1t delirable beoa'tl8e t.he 
higher acUv1 ty would not be sat.lsfaotol7 w1 thout 1 t? toes the man who .. 








axperience of friendship? Aris totle eeelllS to hold he does I "But t.hat which 18 
desirable for him he ls bound to have, or else his oondi tieD will be incomplete 
in that ;.)artiaular. Therefore to he happy a man. needs virtuous friends. 1136 
This seems t.o mean that oontemplation, whose selr-euftlciency comprised an 
OSS6tl tial part ot 11;.s superiority to other goods, does attar all have to be 
supplemonted W1 t.h a good outside itself if t t is to be humanly sattsfying. Thi 
recalls the problem raised and discussed in Book ':he-the 6ssam;,laL"'less or 
unessent1alness of outward goods to a good whose whole DlDaning looks to what 1s 
within. The solution of both difficulties l1es in a contrast between an 
aotivitq integJ"alq complete, that. 18, postten1ng every' qual1ty that eould 
belong to it, and an acti'ri.t.y not 1ntAtgr~ complete but at leut esaentiall¥ 
complete. In other words, .Aristotle fe distinotion between l'-.app1ness and 
supreme bleasednGu.37 As before, the balanoe 18 80mewhat uncertain. 
This 'IlDcortalnty St1gge8ta another area of uneasy balance in Aristotle fS 
tho\18ht, the more fundamental question of what he holds on the unity of the 
human being. *1'he tlSUal Ariatotelian view, oontrasted With t.he PlatoAt.c, 1s tha 
of a 'IlDit composed ot body aDd soul, 'the bod,y is not the man, neither 18 the 
soul, only the 'un1t7 of the t.wo 18 actual.ly man.38 But Arl.etoUe himself orten 
speake differently, espeoiill7 when he is disc1l8nng the philosophio liret 
36u70bl6-lS 
31c£. pp. 28-31 of the present study'. cr. al80 pp. 59-60, where, 
especially in now 48, activit.y is oontrasted with pleasure, arld pleasure with 
duration, on the basis ot what. amounts to the SUB t.ype or distinctlon. 
lSer. Nuyens, asp. Cb. VI, no. 4), Pp. 239-243, where a ohronology of the 
Corpus Arlstotelicum i8 built ur on the basis of the historical development of 
theory of ent81echioal 'Ull1t.y out of an original position of Platonic muuisll. 
79 
here m1nd-d1stingulahed floom aU other powars of the soul, eYeD. lo...-e-is 8po 
of as too man, "the true 8alt of eaehu • 39 The senee in which such statemnta 
must be taken, hence the beat indication of the direct10n in which Aristotle's 
tb:>ught on tL1a probls D>W8, is found in the pages where Aristotle diseuaaea 
the relative -value. of the active and oontemplative lives, and in tiEUleral t.he 
f1nal1ty and perfeot,lon ot oontemplation. 
S. Contemplation All Perfect 
Cont,emplatlon is the activity that most. wholly tul!11c botl1 oon88S of the 
word 'perfect ,40. it 18 moat t1nal 1n that it ex1at8 tor its own sa.ke and not 
tor err other; it is lOst excellent in that aU other pursuits are concorned 
wi tb objects inferior to thoae of contemplation. In the covse of tnat.1ng the 
perfection of oontemplat.J.on Aristotle rai ... two probl8. whioh are of 
e.peoia11.mportance 'to an understanding of hi. poslt1on. These are tJle probl.ea 
of the active and contemplative 11£., and t.he prebl_ of the f1n.alJ.t7 of 
le1sure activiti ••• 
The active Ute accOl'd1.ng to excellenoe pf character "ls llappJ' 0b17 in a 
secondary degree.,,41 Up to this yo1nt AI1.etotle has not 8xpl1c1t~ sub-
·:)rd1.nated tl"..e 11fe of excellence of character. which he discusse. throughout 
moet or the length ot the Ethics, Books Two tbrough lli.ne, to .. he Ute of 
.39U78a2; U66al"lJ ll.68b)2-34. 




philosophioal contemplation. The t..hree 11 vas enumerated a L t.he beGinning of t 
"\:.l."oal.ise on happiness, and reoapitulated in clearer form in Book "Ienh2-the li~ 
of enjoyable use ot the senses, thr~ life ot honor, the lite of c()1'll.amplat.ion-
are only in these pages f1nally weighed one against. the other and one ot them 
ohosun as supr8:'::e. Hera Aristotle proceeds to show that the high level of 
excellenee which the lit. of honor represents nevertheless serves a D\ll'p088 
soz:show out,side it.self. 
The life of honor is dinUnotively a human lifa. It was seen" the actions 
JiJhat mankind agree1n call1.ng honorable all der! ve from man t s soci~u. or bod~ 
nature. Justioe, generosity, agreeableness, friendship come into their own 
b'10an8e ot the mutual needs and st.reas6s that exist among men. Temperance, con 
staney, ~Hllf-control, cour"" prudence serve to regulate tl".e drives and 
mootions that stem from man's physioal makeuP.h3 Had men no bodies, then soo1 
and emotional problems, thus the whole area of exeellancesconcerned with thea, 
would s1mply not ex:tst. "CNJ ow the virtues of ':>\11' composite nature en 
, P}ll'9:q humanJ so t.herefore aleo is t.he 11te that maniteata these v1.rtua., and 




intelleot 1s separate. • • • ,,41. 
Theae 'human' activities oannot be final without qualification. Hollbare 
doe. thia appear 1lOX'8 clearq than in the ab8urd1 t7 ot tr)1.ng to attribute such 
concern. to the gods. Virtue. Uke hone8t7, braw:r'7, ger.r08i tq, temperaDCe 
haW no meming tor baings exempt trom all trial, being. auppo •• d to po ... .. 
supreme b1eaeedne •• bT their T8I'7 nature. "If.. go through the 118\ ... shall 
find that aU torma ot v1.rtaous conduat ._ t.ritl1Dg and unwortbJ of the 
eod8.1t45 
But the ill. ot oont.eJnplatlon i8 another case altogether. 
St,lll, eftI"1Ol'l8 euppoaea tbat t.hct gods ltve and therefore that, they are 
active J '" oannot suppose t.ha to sleep "'Me Endymloa. low U JOU take 
~ from a 11Y1ng being actiOD, and atlll IIOre production, what i8 lett 
but contemplation? 'bref'ore the actl'91.t7 ot God, which surpasses all 
·1a4U78a21-23. ct • .nt Aa- 40,3_5-8. "It we cone1der the majority ot ['"the 
attect.1ou of 8oulJ, thire .... to be no cue in wblob the soul can act or be 
acted upon Without involving the body, e.g. anger, courage, appetite, and Mn8 
tlon generalq. '1'hln1d.ng .... the mat probable e.xoept1on •••• ft ~. 408b 
24-29. "Thus 1 t ia that in old age the aot1 Y1 tq of Jlind or inte1lectUir 
apprehension deol.SAe8 onq tbro'ugh the deCfq' ot some other inward organio part. 
mind 1 taelf 11 impa8sible. Th1nld.rlg, loving, and hat1ng are aftect10na not of 
mind, but of that wd.ch has m1nd, 80 tar as it has it. That 1. wby, When thia 
vehicle dec.,.., lDBmOl'1 and love cease, the,.. were actlvit18. not ot Dd.nd, but. ot 
the compoa1te which has perished, mind 18, no doubt, .omethlng more divine and 
impassible." Ibid. 4)0&22-25. ftJand 18 not at one t1me knowing and at another 
not. WheD ad.JJ18 Ht free from 1 ta present conditions it appears as jut what. 
it la and nothing 1IlOr9t thi8 alone 1s 1sDrtal and eternal <we do not, howewr 
remember 1ta tOl'ltlllr IIOt1'91.t7 because, Wb1le Id.nd 1n th18 sense i8 1IpU81b1e, 
mind aspuat" 1s destruct.ible), and ... \hout 1t nothing th1.nks." ct. Joacb1sa, 
pp. 288-2,1, vie. "ThevoUs....-the aot1Y1tT ot Jlo1;(,IS or6>el.f.}J>fa-ia independent ot, 
and unaftected by, abetract untY8J".aU.t,. ... 
4SU78bl1. 
others in bleaaed1'le8., m:t18t be COIltemplat1veJ and of human activ1tSa., 
therefore, t~ which 18 moat aldn to thi8 MUst be most of the nature 
ot happines.. • 
fl:)re I atta1.ning and •• curing goods has no _an1ng. What _t1ien lI1th the gods 
i8 t.hat they po.ses. their goods. Van differ from the gods in th1s at least, 
that they do not s1mpq po ... ss the goods they poe ... s, but tIIIl8t be concerned 
about. getting and keeping them. 'l'h1. 1. the lmman side or their existence, or 
rather the an1mal side. But. men are lION ak1n to gods thC'l to anlaal8 becatl.8 
t.hey share, however imperreot1;r, tbt experience ot happine.s, something which t 
beyond the scope ot brute •• 47 !bat human actions, workadq or heroio, look to 
something beyond t.hemselYea J they e.x1et onl1 w pronde access to the area 
where h1.1man actlv1:ty take. on qualities which would not be altogether UllW'Ol"tby 
ot the goda. 10 one can reaaonab1;r ala1m tha.t vlrt'UOUS actlyltie. ex1at .~ 
tor their OWl sakB. Yet happinH8. requires absolute t1naUty, t.he ve'1!!7 
character18tlc whloh oamnot be claimed tor t.heal. tr what the virtuous 
acti vi tie. exi.t to secure oould be atta1ned without them, they would engage no 
oneta eftorts at all.48 
46u78bl8-23. 
41U18b26. 
48compare U16b8-1O. aBut those actiViti. are de.irable in tJ1e .. elva8 
wb10h do not atm at any Nault beyond the mare exercise ot the aot1nty. Wow 
thia is tel t to be the natura ot actions 1n oonfoml ty with virtue J tor to do 
noble and virtuoua deeds 1s a t,hing desirable tor ita own sake." Thi. 
express10n ot virtue as a good in i lBelf J tJplcal as 1 t 1s ot the moat part ot 
the r;thics. seeme in direot disagreement w.L th t,be preHnt. aubordinat.ion ot the 
vlrtuea to so-called higher gooda which the virtue. exiat onq to .. (run ... 
'I'he shift of value whleh ranks the Ute ot virtue below the 11te of conte 
platlon corresponds to .A:ris1;oUe ts concept ot lUe lived 1n the midst ot the 
socio-oorporeal needs of tho human condit1on as contrasted nth 11te lived 
according to .1 t,s highest. capac1 tloB, 1Ibether theae are typical ot the human 
(Sondi tlon or not. In the tormer case moral vtrtue 1s supreme, in the lat,wr it 
r...------------. 
What they secure is leisure. The business man exerts himself' to gain 
wealth, and wealth exists to secure the goods and graces of an agreeable life. 
"We are busy that we ~ have leisure. • • ." There is no reason for war but t 
protect the life and property ot a citizenry in danger from without. States-
craft itself derives its meaning from the lives of the citizens which it sate-
-
guards and promtes. For all the anxiety, sacritice, honor, that attaches to 
such activities, they have a reference beyond themselves, the Good Life lI'hich 
they variously support.49 Prosperity,. peace, sooial order are the oonditions 0 
has importanoe only relative to its supporting a life of intelligenoe. As seen 
before (pp. 31-)S), both the life of honor and the life of pleasurable use of 
the senses and the lite of oontemplation are relative gcodas relative, that is 
to the ultimate good, whioh is happiness. If one of the three is taken to be 
supreme and the other two act! vi tie., supreme as they are in their own lines, 
are subordinated to it, such can happen only beoause this is oonsidered the one 
which is intrinsioally' the most conducive to happiness. It may be that the 
philosopher is under more of an obligation to achieve vtrtue than to achieve 
philosophical wisdom; but this is not because virtue is better in itself-for 
wisdom is better in itself-but because virtue is better and more neoessary" for 
him situated as he is in the human oondition, 
The life of the mind holds :first plae6. in Aristotle's scheme on the solid 
ground of its intrinsic superiority. His CJlltinuous concern for the ·'aotual pr 
tice of Ufe as it has to be lived, and his UDmtstakable regard for the 
qualities of soul which ma1lD the man of honor, hold the superiority of the 
con templati ve lite in full respect. 
49U11b4-18. ct. Josef Pieper's essays ''lIus8a undkulttt and "Was Haiset 
Philosophieren?", llunich. 1948, (Inglish translation ol~th in one volwue, 
leisure the Basis ot Culture, New York, 1952), tor an extended application ot 
.AristoieiI'8n and p1'itonic notions of leisure to a ChristilUl philosop!V' of 
culture. . 
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man's spending if only so brief a time in the pursuits that he values for them-
selves. 
The meaning w:lich leisure has for AristoUe reveals the hierarchy in which 
he places the various human faculties and their activities. Iaisure in its 
basic sense, and the way that Aristotle is accustomed to use it, is contrasted 
with busyness (t:f";z'o.i-,) and~U-,(o£~). There is no indication that Aristotle 
uses it in the narrowed sense which it was later to receive, that of time 
devoted to formal study.50 Navertheless, in the present. context philosophical 
contemplation is the only activity that is named as a leisure activity. This 
omission of other activities is not by itself enough to restrict leisure to 
intellectual pursui ta J a page earlier howevexSl there has been discussion of 
what Aristotle calls tagreeable afIlU8ements' ('7"'tCV"rraLJ{&3V'"a,~ QdeL'a.l), and the 
I'ank that he assigns them strongly suggests such a restriction of the notion of 
leisure. 
Common acceptance of the word leisure includes a number of activities 
besides the purely intellectual. Games of various sorts would have their place 
thereJ sports, notably truntingJ receiving company- and vi.iting, and the 
banqueting and drinking that belong to themJ conversation aild discussion, 
entertainments of all sorts, comedy and drama; the enjoyment of dancing and 
pl¢ng 1IlU8ic, or of watching others perform. . 
But such activities as these Aristotle at. least implicitly calls amuae-
ments not leisure, moreover he assigns them a purpose different from that ot 
leisure. He looks upon them. as body-centered and does not consider a:tJY, even 
5Ocf. Bonitz, p. '741, b, 20-50. 
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the highest at them, 1n their spiritual aspeots. They are things that appeal to 
the low standards of animals, slaves, children, and profligates, and thus can 
hardly have muoh special worth. 52 
But agreeable amusements are Bought tor their own sake, not as means to 
ot.her ends. Indeed the preferenoe that men show them is often of greater dis-
advantage than usefulness since it oauses negleot of duties, whioh are more 
necessary but 18SS enjo.yable. In this they answer to the desoription Aristotle 
gives of leisure pursuits. that ments workaday activities exist to support 
them.5) 
This preeminence however is 'W'1deaerved by amusements. The rich and influ-
ential persons whose pursuit of such pleasures is thought to be their best re-
oommendation need not be the best judge~ of what is good, any more than are 
slaves or ohildren. The man of quality and character, the serious man, is the 
real standard of worth54, and his interest does not foous on amusements. It is 
not for amusements that men spend their days in toil J even though many seem to 
521117&6-10; b12-24. "Also anybody can enjoy the pleasures of the body, a 
slave no leS8 than the noblest of mankind; but no one allows a slave any 
measure of happiness, any more than a life of his own. Therefore happiness doe! 
not oensist in pastimes and amusements. • • ." Cf. also, 1176bl7-24. "But 
perhaps princes and potentates are not good evidence. Virtue and intelligence, 
whioh are the sources of man's higher activities, do not depend on the 
possession of power J and it these persons, having no taste for pure and liberal 
pleas1ll'8, have reoourse to the pleasures of the body, we must not on that accou; .. 
suppose that bodiq pleasure. are the more desirable. Children imagine that the 
things they theJD8el veS value are ac tualq the best J it is not surprising there-
fore that, as children and grown men have different standards of value, so also 
should the worthless and the Virtuous." 
531176blo-12. 
S4rhe (j'1t"'OU.~a.LOS J.V?P as measure of all values, of N. E. 1166&13. also 
Bantu, p. 696,b, 5,-697, a,57. 
r, .... -----------. 
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think so. A.mU.8ement is useful where it serves to refresh men for work again; 
but if work itself is for the sake of amusement, the reeult is a Circular 
argument that arriws nowhere. 
Indeed it would be strange that amusement should be om' End-that .e shoul 
toil and moil all our life long in order that _ 1'IW\1 amuse ourselves ••• ['"T 70 make amus81Jl8nt the object of our serious pursuits and our work see 
foollsh and childish to excess. Ana.charsis' s IOOtto, Play in order that 
f!1Il¥ work, is felt to be t.he right rule. For amusement is a form of rest; 
but we need rest because we are not able to go on working without a break, 
and thet:~fore 1 t is not an end, since we take it as a means to further ac-
tivity.55 
Certainly, then, amusements do not hold the privileged place of leisure, of 
which Aristotle has said, "We are busy that we may have leisure. • • ." 
The true scale of value is rather. amusement for the sake of continued 
activity, continued actiVity for the sake of leisure, leisure for the sake of 
pursuits that most deserve ments attention. But this passage has not explicitl 
named the activi.ties that fall into the class of agreeable amusements. Possib 
the amusements that .A:r1stotle here subordinates to work are only the strictly 
bodily ones. Meanwhile, what should be the rank of activities that lie half-
'. 
'"" between the extremes of philosophy and of banqueting-the area of oultural 
values like musio, arts, poetry, the drama-is not indicated in the course of 
the Ethics. 
I 
Book Eight of the Politics56 is more explicit about these higher activitie , 
at least about those whioh come under the broad olassification of lIlWJic. The 





notion of leisured activities, and at the same time they reveal an inconsistenc 
of standard that may result trom a stress between Aristotle ts philosophic prin-
ciples and his acceptance of enlightened human experience as a norm.57 
Amusement as such maintains its position subordinate to more serious acti-
vi ties; i't must be engaged in only at sui table times, be used only with profi t, 
sinoe it exists to retresh on for activity.,8 Play exists for activity; every 
type of action entails its own fa.tigue and needs re.t'reshment. leisure, however 
is distinguished from amusement inasmuch as tithe first principle of all action 
is leisure. Both action and leisure are required, but leisure is better than 
occupat.1.on and is its end. • • • "59 In leisure men are able to pursue the acti 
vi ty which they value above all else. If amusement exists only that tiresome 
occupations of business and sta.tecraft m81 be carried. on without ~~cessive 
fatigue; if these tiresome oocupations exist in their turn only to provide the 
,7 Cf. Jaeger, Ch. X, ssp. pp. 282.., (also Ross, pp. 19 and 235, 6) in 
whioh the composit.ion of this book is sboWti to coincide with the oo~sitlon ot 
the Eu<iemian Ethios, hence to preoede the related passages of the N. E. by a 
number ot years. For this reason, the. passage in quest.ion need nQ;. represent 
Aristotlo.s final view of the matter, thus need not indioate a final inoon-
sistency in his thought about leisure. But it is the only available indication 
of what his opinion was, and is not inoonsistent with the tew references of the 
later passage. 
. 58Po1• 1337h3-42. "Cw"7hat ought we to do when at leisure? Clearly we 
ought n'Ot""to be amusing ourselves, for then amusement would be the end ot life. 
But if this is inconceivable, and amusement is needed more amid serious 
oooupations than at other times (for he lIho 1s hard at work has need of 
relaxation) and amusement gives relaxation whereas occupation is alw~ 
accomp81ied with exertion anJ effort, we should introduce amusements only at 
snit able times, and they should be our medicines, for the emotion which they 
oreate in the soul is a relaxation, and trom the pleasure lie obtain rest." 
88 
l'!eans a.nd leisure for engagwp, in finer activities, the refined aetivities whic 
fill t.he leisure of a gentlm~.an, on the oLher hand, tend of their na,\':ure to 
give ifpl.,al:mra and happiness and enjoyment Df life" by the very fact that tr.ey 
exist for themsalvfts and are not only steps on the way to fFlmething y~t to be 
, 60 
attained. 
Beyond the kind of leisure ti1at tht:: intellectual engages in6l , -w."'e chief 
t:)9 gentlamaT.;ts leisure, not because it cannot be dO;:la lIithout, not 1)Bca'iJS9 It 
pro'''ides some 11seful service, the way a.hility to write helps b'llsines, or 
s>.:ercise improves physical 1'1 tness or experience in drawulg makes for uetter 
62 taste Ln home decorations. Music is admitted for a higher ld.nd of excellence 
far "intellectual enjoyment", and this is something fine in itself and be-
fi ttine a f'ree man. It. needs no further excuse. "'l'o oe al~'s seeking after 
the useful does not beoome :treo and exalted souls • .,6) 
1I\18io may be consldeI'ed in respect to any of three good affeots whioh it 
W"orl{s C1) thoSQ _·ho lis ten to iii. It provides some of the bes·t amusement. and 
l'elaxat.ion. This function is 1ll8rely a s'ubordinate one; like sleep or drink or 
'--_.--
60 Ibid. l338al-$. 
-
(;lro1d. l338a9-11u "It. is clear then that there a:ro branohes of learnint; 
::t.r:d edveatron which we lIIU.st study mzr~ly with a view to leisure spent In 
iHtelleotual aotivity, C£r.d these al'e to be valued for their own sake; ~~1ereas 
tho:::e kinds of knowledge mlict! are ils~f"l tn bU6j nOIHl are tD be deeF./SI) nOC9SS 







dancing, it is valued not for what it is in itself-sleep and drink are not the -
selves lIfOrth anything-but for its "making care to cease".64 This restorative 
function of music recalls the purposes Which Aristotle assigns to amusements 
here as well as in the Ethics. 6$ But in the case of music, other functions are 
present besides that of restoration, and they are the more characteristic. 
For dxample, this incidental lower service is distinguished from the 
second effect of music: the main reason why men introduce it into their 
leisure is the embellishment it lends to life and social gatherings by its mere 
presence-its llberal oharacter. 
CIJntellectual enjoyment66 is universally acknowledged to contain an 
element not only of the noble but of the pleasant, for happiness is made u 
of both •••• Hence and with good reason it is introduced lnto social 
gatherings and entertainments, because lt makes the hearts of men glad. s 
64Ibid• 1339416-20. 
-
6$And in the Poetics 1449b27 (Cf. Pol. l341b39,40, for the only other re-
ference to this theor,y in Aristotle's extant works), where Aristotle's 
explanation of the effec: of tragedy approaches this medical view. "Tragedy 
produces a purgation (kaea..prrls ) of emotion in the spectator: and art-
ificial arousal of the emotions of pity and fear results in working them--at 
least any excess of them-out ot the system. Cf. also Pol. 1347&8-16 for the 
parallel to this process in the area ot music itself. -
66The term ~('ctr(Dr6, "pastime", is idiomatlcally used of tm pursuits of 
cultured leisure_erlous conversation, music, the drama. (Rackham, note 4 to 
Pol. VIII, iv.) This term is distinguished in 1339blb from educational 
p;1rsuits (rra.LoeCa...) and from amusements (lralt:Ju1. h ln N. E. 1177alO lt cover 
actions of a lower kind aewall, 'pastimes' in a less serious Elenee 
approxiaating 'amusements t. 
that on this ground alone we may assume that the yomg ought to be trained 
in it. For innocent pleasures are not only in69armony with the perfect 
end of 11fe, but they also provide relaxation. 
The precise nature of this effect is not clear. It is distinot frolU the first 
effect, "alleviation of past tOilM68, by the fact that men seek it even when 
they are not tired, so supposedly' because it is agreeable to them on its own 
account. 69 But at the same time its pleasantness seems to derive from the tact 
that a relaxation has been effected. ItAJIuaement is for the sake of relaxation, 
and relaxation i8 of neoe8si ty sweet, for it 1s the remedy of pain caused by 
toil J and intellectual enjoyment is universally acknowledged to contain an 
element not only' of the noble but of the pleasant, for happiness is lIlS.de up of 
both.,,70 Thus the two effeots are felt to be distinct, the one desirable as 
remedy, the other desirable for itself-liberal-though in Aristotle's brief 
description of them the remedial aspect intrudes into both effects and is 
probably predominant. 
A third, educative, effect of DlUsic7l is the training of character and 
by formation of good diaposi tiona. Aristotle asks whether music dOGS not 







7l'Educative t in the theoretioal sense of rral deta, that is, referring to 




In addition to this common pleasure, telt and shared in by all (for the 
pleasure given by music is natural, and therefore adapted to all ages and 
characters), ~ it not have also some influence over the character and t~ 
soul? It must have such an influence if charae ters are affected by it. 
And that they are so affected is proved in many ways.72 
Some types of music affect the movements of character, shaping in them resolute 
ness; some develop sympathetic capacities, value standards, qualities of temper 
some, sensitivity.13 This third set of effects is hig~ esteemed by 
Aristotle. Its purpose merges with that of the liberal etfect. Whereas it 
would seem possible to di.stinguish the educative aspect of music-its etfect on 
character and personality--from its liberal aspect-the pure worthwhileness of 
passing leisure time in intellectUal pursuits--such a distinction does not 
appear in .Aristotle's treatment. Indeed, these two functions ot musiC, 
educati01l of personality and 'intellectual enjoyment', are only two aspects, 
emotional and intellectual, of the same effect of refinement to which mq be 
given the generic name 'liberality.. Thus it mq not be necessary to determine 
whether spending time in speculation is 'more liberal' than developitng refine-
ment of personality through the fine art8, hence more fundamental to the meaniru 
of leisure. Both functions of music are fundamentall1 leisured, and in their 
liberality transcend &n1 restorative functions ot music, And this, despite 
the tact that in his psychological explanations ot why the liberal arts are 





enjoyable Aristotle seems to rely heavily on an amusement-therapy theory such 
as that of purgation in tragedy. 
In short. Aristotle haa not made his standard clear or has not applied it 
consistently in those activities which lie somewhere between the physically-
refreshing and the intellectual1y-challenglng. It may be that there are a tew 
forms of entertainment which possess value irrespective ot purposes outside 
themselves; iv may be that all entertainments, ~ven the higher arts are l"edue-
-
ible to the amusemant-therap,y tunotion. 
But the place that Aristotle uigns to the purely intellectual pursuits 
which make up philosophy' cannot be mistaken. These are final without 
~alification because they occupy an area in lite which the rest of life's 
activities exist in the last analysis only to sup!>ort and enrich" and because 
they are valued simply tor what they are in themselves without providing any 
other servicea uLCJontemplation may be held to be the only activity that is 
loved tor its own sake: it produces no result beyond the actual act of contem-
plation, wherea.s from practical pursuits we .look to seoure some advanta.ge,great-
er or smaller, beyond the actlon itself.n14 This asoendancy over other 
activities once granted, it is easy to see how contemplation fits the character· 
istic of perfectness which Aristotle required ot human happiness in Book One. 
Contemplation and happiness are in tact to be identified t "Happiness therefore 
14u11bl-4. 
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is ooextensive in its range with oontemplation. the more a olass of beings 
possesses the :faculty ot oontemplation, the more it enjoys happiness, not as 
--
accidental oonoomi tant 2!. con templation ~ !!. inherent !!l 1-1, since 
con1;.emplation is valuable in i tsel!. It tollows that happiness is some 
contemplation. ft7S 
The liberal oharacter of Wisdom is fundamental in the Aristotelian view 0 
man and human actl vitles I 
That CWlsdDa,J ls not a soienoe of prod\Jotion· is clear even from the 
history of the earlielt philosophera. For 1 t is owing to their wonder 
that men both now begin and at firs t began to philosophize; ••• since 
they philosophized in ord~r to escape from ignoranoe, evidently they were 
pursuing science in order to knoW', and not tor arrr utili tarlan end. And 
this is coni'il'J'ded by the factsJ for it was when almost all 1~ necessities 
of ille and the things that make for eo;nf'ort ar.d recreation had been 
secured, that such knowledge began to be sought. Evident.ly then we do no 
seek it for the sake of any other advantage J but as the man i8 free, we 
say, who exists tor his own sake and not for another's, so we Plf'isue this 
as the only free science, for it alone exists tor its own sake. 
But why doee the intellectual life alone of all human activities have this 
ascendency, that is, this unqualified finality of value? 
1>U78b29-32 (italics added), i.e. "ou Ka;ra. cru;«;Sej3T}lCosJa.£ kar~ ~v 
fJewp{av q. Cf. 1114814-16 (also note 17, Ch. II of the present study), where 
the perfection of an act1 vi tT is described in much the same terms J and 1114b3.3, 
where pleasure is described in 1;.erma conSistent with this cri wrion. 
760f• Tredenniok's translation. "for speculation ot this kind began With 
a view to recreation and pastime, at a time When practically all the necessitie 
of life were already supplied." The Greek admits either interpretation. viz. 
11..-4 ..... ' , '" • " .....:J ;'. , \ c: ;' <.Ix.e~ov rap ,n-a'{Twv ~7Tap,(ov-r;U)v rCl);~var~'U)v ~t Trf>0s Pfl(rr4,)v?y 
k'a.t. oUlT""r1JV t; Tol.a.u r~ i;6povorrls Dr J aro J'7Te«rO"t::lt.(.'. 
77 )let. 982bll-26. 
-
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Because contemplation!!.!2.!1 excell8!lt. This answer concluded discussio 
of the inferior forms of activity and introduces the passages in which 
Aristotle shows that the activity of intellect is the highest way- of com-
prehending the highest objects. 
But if happiness consists in activity in accordance with excellence, it i 
reasonable that it should be activity in accordance with the highest 
excellence; and this dll be the excellence of the best part of us. 
Whether then this be the intellect, or whatever else it be that is though 
tc rule and lead us by nature, and to have cognizance of what is noble an 
divine, either as being itself also actually divine, or as being 
relatively the divinest part of us, it is the activity of this J:Jlrt of us 
in accordance with the excellence proper to it that Will constitute 
perfect happiness J and it haS been stated already that this acti.1 t7 is 
actlrlty of contemplation. 76 
The lntelieot is t~t part of man which is thought "by nature to be ruler and 
leading power in bimlt J it is the inteUect that has "cognizance of what is 
noble and divine", this because it is "itself actua.l.l1 divine" or"the divinest 
part of us".79 
Intellect is highest in man ()ecause of all his faculties it is capable of 
activation with the least possible admixture of material conditioning. 
" 
ldent1t7 between two is never perfect where both involve matter. Hence, 
because mind involves no matter in its constitution, it is capable of 
reproducing in i teelf arq determination whatever and is not limited by depend-
ing on the disposition of its matter to receive this or that determination. 
It is capable of being determined by the forms even of objeets that contain no 
781177&12_18. 
79 t/,/ It..,.)\ \' \ v ....,),,., 'f}? " T.e. ,eire O'eLOV- 01/ ka.l a.UTo eire T"C<JV eV'!)4A-It/ TO elo 7"arov • 
r..-----------. 
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matter at all. Indeed, a thing can beoome objeot at mind only 80 tar as ito 
be divested of matter and the limitations due to matter. Intelleot is the hig 
est wa,y of aotualization beoause its very essenoe exoluded the oonditioning 
prinoiple whioh is matter.BO 
Intelleot (t.he perfection at which in man is Wisdom) is man fS highest 
capacity 'beoause its objects are the highest of all beings in thd universe. 
BDef. De An. 429al3-28I ltIf'thinking is lik3 perceiving, it must be 
either a prOe'eSi in which the soul is aoted upon by what is oapable of being 
thought, or a process different from but. analogous to that. The thinking part 
of the soul JIlU.8t therefore be, while impassible, oapable ot reoeiving the form 
of an objeot; that is, flUSt be potentially identioal in character with its 
object without being the object. Mind mst be related to what is thinkable, 
sense is to what is sensible. 
''Therefore, sinoe everything ls a possible objeot ot thought, mind in or 
as Anaxagoras said, to dominate, that is, to know, must be pure from all 
admixture; for the co-presenoe of what is alien to its nature is a hindranoe 
and a blocks it follows that it too, llke the sensitive part, can have no 
nature of its own, other than that of having a oertain oapacity. Thus that in 
the soul which is called mind (by mind I mean that whereby the soul thinks and 
judges) ls, before lt thinks, not actually any real thing. For this reason it 
cannot reasonably be regarded as blended wlth the body: if so, it would 
aoquire some quality, e.g. warmt.h or eold, or even have an organ l1ke the 
sensitive faculty. as it is, it has none. It was a good idea to oall the so 
'the place at forms t. • • • It 
De. An. 430&2-19. "Mind is itself thinkable in exactly the same wa:y as 
its ob'jeo'G' are. For in the case of objeots which involve no matter, what 
thinks and what ls thought are identioal. (~mind is not always thinking we 
must oonsider later.) In the oase of those which oontain matter each of the 
objects of thought 1s only potential.l.y present. It follows that while they 
will not have mind in them (for mind is a potentiality of them only insofar as 
they are oapable of being disengaged trom matter) mind may yet be thinkable. 
nSince in every class of thing, as in nature as a whole, we find two 
factors involwd, (1) a matter whioh is potentially all the particulars 
included in the class, (2) a cause which 1s productive in the sense ~at it 
makes them all (the latter standing to the tormer, as e.g. an art to its 
materia.l), these distinct elements must likewise be found wi thin the soul. 
, 
'these are the realities that underlie the whole of being, the ultimate 
principles and causes of all that exists.81 Wisdom is "intuitive reason 
combined with scientific knowledge--scientific knowledge of the highest object 
which has received as it were its proper completion. "82 The perfection of man 
lies, then, in the objects of philosophic contemplation. But what does their 
excellence consist in? 
And understanding and lcnowledge pursued for their ovm sake are found moat 
in the knowledge of that which is most knowable ••• and the first prin-
ciples and the causes are moat knowable; for by reason of these, and from 
these, all other things come to be mown, and not these by means of the 
things subordinate to them. And the science whioh mows to what end each 
thing must be done is the most authoritative of the sciences, and more au 
thoritative than any ancillary science) and this and i8 the gO~~ of that 
thing, and in general the supreme good in the whole of nature. 
The value of the objects of philosophic contemplation lies in their 
universality and necessity, and these qualities entitle it to the name of 
theoloSl, the divine Bcience. For, traditionally, the divine attributes are 
eternity, immovability, separation from all conditioning.B4 These qualities 






84of. )let. 1026&10-32, viz. "Now all causes must be eternal, but 
especially t'ii9se Ci.e the principles of things that exist separate from matte 
and motioEV. for they are the causes that operate on BO much of the divine as 
appears to us Ci.e. the heavenly bodies 7. There must, then, be three 
theoretical philosophies, mathematics, pnysics, and what we may call theology, 
since it is obvious that if the divine is present anywhere, it is present in 
things of this sort." 
Also, !bid. 1013&3-12. "It is clear then from what has been said that 
there is a substance which is eternal and unmovable and seoarate from sensible 
things. It has been shown also that this 8ubstance cannot have any magnitude, 




other of oven the liberal studies has claim to such qualities. 
But if there is something which is eternal and immovable and separable, 
clearly the knowledge of it belongs to a theoretical science-not, how-
ever, to physics (tor physics deals ·d th certain movable things) nor to 
mathematics, but to a science prior to bot.h. For physics deals wit.h thin 
which crist separately but are not immovable, and some parts of math-
ematics deal with things which are immovable but. presumably do not exist. 
separately, but as embodied in matter; while the first science deals With 
t.hings which both exist separately and are immovable. Now all causes 
be eternal, but especially those; for they are t.he causes tllat operat.e on 
so much of the divine the heavenly bodies as appears to us. ts.5 
time, and nothing fint to has infinite power, and, while every magnitude is 
either intini te or fin1te, it cannot, for the above reason, have finite 
magnitude, and it cannot have infinite magnitude because these is not infinite 
magnitude at all). But it has also been shown that it is impassive and un-
alterableJ tor all the other ohanges are posterior to change of place." 
Ibid. 1073a24-28: "The first principle or priJJ1U'7 being is not movable 
ai thar in i taelf or acciden tally, but produces the primary eternal and single 
movement. But. • • that which is moved D1U8t be moved by something, and the 
first mover must be in i teel! Ull.IOOvable, and eternal movement must be produced 
by something eternal and a single movement by a single thing. • • ." 
Ibid. l074bl-10t "Our forefathers in the most remote ages have handed 
down to their posterity a tradition, in the form of a myth, that theBe bodies 
Li.e. the starsJ are gods and that the divine encloses the whole of nature. 
The rest of the tradition has been added later in mythioal form. • • • • But if 
one ware to separate the .first point from these additions and take it alone-
that they thought the first sub.tances to be .. gods, one must regard this as an 
inspired utterance. • • ." 
6~t. 1026&10-18. Cf. ibid. 1026&29-311 LB 7ut if there is an 
imroovable substance, the science ,of this must be prlor and must be first (' 
I... ... ,r/J c/ '/' philosophy, and lmiversal in this way, becanse it is first VIa, kaBtM.Ou, OUT4JS OTI 
1(~n).1t 
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In having these realities as its subjeot oontemplation transcends all that is 
merely incidental or oontingent or material. There is nothing in the Universe 
which could be higher. For the living actuality which is God Himself is 
precisely the wholeness of thought--object of thought comprehended completely 
by thought, thought completely actualized by what it thinks.86 Wisdom has as 
ita focus the perfection of God, perfeotion that is without shade of 
oonditioning. 
Contemplation, whioh is manls exercise or Wisdom, is to be considered the 
perfect activity for man because it is final (sought f:;r its own sake) and is 
86 . 
Met. 1012bl-29. Aristotle 1s discussion of the eXistence of God 
proceeds from the fact of oontingent motions to the fact of a final cause of 
all motions which is not itself IIlOved but mows the first moved by being 
desired by them. The unmovedness of this first mover, his necessity, is the 
principle from which all other motion oo.s. for it is in itself pure actual-
ity, and actuality is wbat all else seeks as term of its getting into motion. 
This actuality is seen to be good since it is universally deSired. All that i 
desired is deSired as a good. For example, thinking is desired because it is 
good, or, in other words, beoause it is an instanoeof actualization. (Of. Ch 
V, note 6h of the present study.) " 
-In this way Aristotle introduces the reality of thought into his 
description of the first mover, and it is apparently becallse God is pure 
actuali ty that he is pure thought. 'Xhe other chief characteristios of God-
life and eternaUty-are mentioned atter hiB contemplation, and receive less 
attention) they do not seem clearly derived from his attribute of intelligence 
though; God's intelligence, not his actuality, seems the more immediate 
occasion of positing life in bimt • And life also belongs to GodJ tor the 
aetualityof thought 1s life, and God is that actuality; and God's self-
dependent actuality is life most good and eternal. 11 It is easier to see that 
all the qualities converge in one being than that each of th9m follows from 
some other quality nreYiollsly established. 
Cf. also, Joachiln, pp. 291-3, 296, according to which God !!. t:ae !.2!:. is 
reached in one reasoning process, and!! pure intelligence i8 reac in 
another, neither attribute derived exactly from the other. Cf. Jaeger, Ch. X , 
"The Revision of the Theory of the Prime }lover", for a discussion of the 
composition-time of passages pertinent to this explanation, and of the doctr 
itselt. 
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excellent; its finality derives from its excellence. Thus the criterion on 
which Aristotle has based his judgment that certain activities exist only for 
the sake of others (whether dis clSsing what actin ties the gods could be 
conceived as engaged in, or whether discussing the serious worth of various 
leisure-time act,ivities) is ultimately an excellence-eriterion. But, excellence 
means for Aristotle everything that is typified in the tradi tionaJ. non ... 
anthropomorphic notion of the divine. If, then, the objects of div~r;.e aetivity 
have already been determined acoording to a standard of excellence, the 
reasoning seems to be circular. 
--There is in faot a convertibility between the divine and the excellent. 
Eternity, immovabill ty, separation from all conditioning are of thft essence of 
the divine and are of the essence of the excellent. They are so, because they 
are fullness of actuality. Here, in actuality wholly free of possible 
( '''' )/ \ ./ :\ conditioning @vepfi?ta alleu ou//tJAewS" is the tundamental notion of the divine 
or of excellence in its absolute sense. 81 Ever)" other reality, inoluding all 
67Cf'. Vet. 1049b4-10$la21, on the priority of' ~vlpyeL~ , in which the 
various quamies here attributed to the divine and to the objects of' Wisdom 
are traced to their basis in pure actuality; viz. passim "Obviously, therefore, 
the substance or form is actuality. According to this argu;DJl!mt, then, it is 
obvious that actuality is prior in substantial being to potency; and as we hav. 
Said, one actuality alw.rs precedes another in time right back to the actua1it. 
of the eternal prime mover." "But aotuality is prior in a strioter sense also 
for eternal things are prior in substance to perishable things, and no eternal 
thing exists potentially." "Nothine~ 'then, whioh is in the full sense 
imperishable is in the full sense potentially existent ••• all imperishable 
things, then exist actually. )for oan anything which is of neceseitz exist 
potentially; y..::t these things are primary; for if these did not exist, nothing 
would exist. Nor does eternal movement, if there be such, exist potentially; 
and, if there is an eternal mobile. it is not in motion in virtua of a 
potentiality, except in respect of' 'whence' and 'whither' •••• And 80 the sun 
and the stars and the whole heaven are ever active, and there is no fear that 
they may sometime stand still, as the natural philosophers fear they may. Nor 
An t.hAV ti'M in this activit.Y; f::)r movement is not for them, as it is for 
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the activities of men, have excellence just in so far 88 they approach this 
unqualified state of actualitl by activating the various areas (.;f possibility 
which are inherent in their natures. In this way man, always with a heavy 
admixture of unrealized or unrealizable capacity in them, achieve whet is 
theirs to achieve of what exists in its wholeness only in the d1 vine. 
The aim of human effort is a perfection which is essentially proper to the 
divine alone. 
4. Contemplation As According to Nature 
Aristotle's notion of human happiness is oriented tv the divine. "This is 
plain from the previOUS considerations and from his explicit statement88 J more 
over, he recognizes the paradoxical character of his conclusion and proceeds 
perishable things, connected with the potentiality for opposites, 80 that the 
continuity of the movement should be laborious; for it is that kind of substanc 
which is matter and potenQ1, not actuality, that causes this. Imperishable 
things are imt tated by those that are involved in change, e.g. earth and fire. 
For these Cheavenly bodiesJ are also ever active •••• tt "Cbviousl.y, then, 
actuality is prior both to potancl and to everr principle of change." That 
the actuality is also better and more valuab~. than the good potenc;y"1s evident, 
• • •• Ever,.thing of which we say that it can do something, is alike 
. capable of contraries •••• The capacity for contraries, then, is present at 
the same time, and the actualities also cannot be present at the same time, 
e.g. health and sickness. Therefore, while the good IIlU8t be one of them, the 
capacity is both alike, or neither; the actuality, then, is better." "And 
therefore we may also say that in the things which are trom the beginning, 
i.e. in eternal things, there is nothing bad, nothing defective, nothing 
perverted •••• " 
881177&15-17J 1178b2SJ 1179&25-31. 
r~--------------------~ 
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t.o emphasize it. 
Such a life as this however will be higher than the human level: not in 
virtue of hie humanity will a man achieve it, but in virtue of 80mething 
wi. thin him that is divine J and by as much as this something is superior to 
his composite nature, by 80 much is its activity superior to the exercise 
of the other forms of virtue. If then the intelleot is something divine 
in comparison with man, so is the life of the intellect divine in compari 
80n with human life. Nor ought we to obey those who enjoin that a man 
Rhould have man t s thoughts and a mortal the thoughts of mortality, but .. 
ought so far as possible to achieve immortality, and do all that man may 
to live in accord with the highest thing in him; for thoug~9 this be small 
in bulk, in power and value it far surpasses all the rest. 
7' • ("/ ~ 1,/ 
For mortal man "so far as possible to achieve immortality" (€sP OQ'ov evaeye-
Tat. Wa.va.-r!Sew)a this is the sharpest statement of the paradox and at once 
its resolution. There can be in Aristotle no questlon of one fS accomplishing 
something which lies beyond his capacity_ (Such would be a contradiction of 
the basic notion which the principle of actualization of possibility expresses ) 
Man therefore is to deal in imm:>rtal things so far as lies in his power_ 
--
Wherever there is in him an opening to such objects, he is to do his most to 
fill it. That opening 1s his intellectual capacity. So far as a man's mind 
becomes the "all things" which it is essentially capable of becomtng90, the 
has become divine by leaving behind limitation in time, space, matter. 
But to leave behind limitation in time, space, matter is something 
man is capable of except in an attenuated fashlon. What is most properly the 
function of the thinker does not require bodily goods. As man, though, the 
philosopher continues to require certain outward and personal goods (not so 
III&I\Y as others require, but still not a few); and as good man he cannot remain 
891177b27-l178al. 
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indifferent to the needs and troubles of others. Thus it is inevitable the 
needs and duties of his human Ufe continually withdraw his mind from a state 0 
unconditioned attention to the objects of Wisdom. In his life as human being, 
a man, even a philosopher, can give little time to the free play of his 
intellect. Contemplation can hardly be called in accord with human nature. 
tI SUch a life as this however will be higher than the human level. not in 
virtue of his humanity will a man achieve it •••• ft A man achieves the good 
proper to him when he learns to contemplate. This goOd is not a good proper 
his human nature, though) for most of what belongs to human nature is 
indifferent to contemplation or wi.thdraws trom it. The man ts perfection is 
contemplating, yet his nature is scarcely favorable to it. The conclusion tha 
must be drawn trom such considerations is plain s human _na_t_u_re .... !!.!l2.l ~ 
determines .!:h!. !!!!!!! e!rfection, but 2&r,t of human nature is the determining 
factor. The good of the intellect is what is a man's perfection. And i! a 
human being is not all of him intellect: then man's good is the good of a par 
of him. 
Yet it would be strange if the good that perfects a man really is a good 
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that perfects something other than himself. Even granted that the 'somethin 
91ct• U78a,3,41 "It would be strange, then, if he were to choose not the 
life of his self but that of something else." Again, 1166&19-228 tt["EJach 
man wishes himself what is good, While no one choose. to posses8 the whole 
world if he has first to become someone else (for that matter, even now God 
possesses the good but this does not matter to all the others that are not 
God), he wishes for this only on condition of being wha~eV8r he is •••• ft 
b t :1 .. t/ '::1'(' ,f.\, .a_~ / ~ 11 '" / .... , ~/ / ~ ., \" C .., IfloOSS, r.J .e.elC"aPToS" o ea:u:,.'Z' t-"'''' lLerat TaTafY""~rev9"'!evOS" 0 aA,A,OS CTUoeef a.'pe,rai 
, ./ :1...... '" ,.,... \ C f') \ ~ L7 J :1 ~ /~"' ~ " , '" .. TraItT ).r~/jI" eKelVo r.evr-'evov- eire" ret.pk'al Vuv 0 ()ff!OS 7't::tf4O'OV-a/lIC.. 4WOTI. Tfl)T eUi,V'. 
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other' is part of him, and that it is the highest part of him-nevertheless, 
-
what is only a part of himself is not strictly himself. Contemplation is the 
mind's good, and the mind is not the man. 
Aristotle's response to t!'is implicit dif£iculty is to declare that the 
-
intellect is the man's true 8el£.92 Hence in choosing the good of his int.elle ";;';;;'';'';;';;0;;;;;__ _ __ .............. _ 
a man is by tha.t very fact choosing the good of his own self. Here the line 0 
Aristotle's reasoning reaches its focus. Not in virtue of his total make-up-
as rational being and as animal-is man ultimately to be measured. The 
measure of man is that element in him by which he can rise to contact with the 
eternal, universal, necessary aspects of reality. The measure of man is his 
mind. The rest is altogether, or "for the most part", incidental to this one 
essential operation. 
According to this vi",w of true self-hood, the significance of the individ 
nal man seems to lie in his being at least in part a mind. Where there is min 
the.re is the capacity for intellection. Intellectual capacity, however, has 
intrinsic value inasmuch as it is an area in which the highest kind of actuali 
zation can take place. 
The goal of human life with the element of mind that belongs to it is, 
92117882-41 "It may even be held that this is the true self of each, ina -
JlUch as it is the dominant and better part. n (" dbfete ?>'av ka.! elva/. ekd.Cf"7l>S 
roaro ri.e. the intellectual elementJeiTrt:p TOktiPIOV' Kal. tt;uelJ/(!)Y' .") 
1166al7';l.81 "CVnd he does so [seek his goo§7 for his own sake (for he does 
it on account of the intellectua part of himself, and this appears to be a 
man's real self). tt ,~,~ ~ 
( .., .... ~" "" \. 'Ii: ......" ('~ c, ~ ( " ) ItK/!t.l e~7""oz.c. eVeka. -71:>U rdp otaJ/o1J'rIlCl>u ;raJ>w,; oTTep ekad"'77>S elvat (JoKel. • 
Finally J 1166&2) t ft : Vnd it would appear that the thinking part is the real 
selt, or is 80 more than anything else. tl ('tO~e o';1v TO J,lOOUV %karrrtJs eival ? tU~tC Lrrrtk .") Cf. also Ch. V of the prl)sent study, especially pp. 124-12 , 
in which these passages from Aristotle's treatise on friendship in Book Nina 
are discussed in relation to the value of self-identity. 
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finally, to be an ins tance of that high activity as far as it is capable of 
being. Not~hat. any individual who instances this actualization in himself 
will fail to find enjoymen t in doing 80: pleasure, it was seen93, the agree-
able awareness of self as possessor, always and necessarily accompanies the 
presence of the good activity. But the excellence and desirability' of the 
activity is something distinct (though not separate) from the agreeableness 
of its being-one's-own, and is independent of it. For the exoellenoe of the 
activity consists precisely in ita being a high degree of actualization, some-
what like the unoonditioned aotuality that, is the essence of divinity itself. 
930r_ Ch. III, no. 2, pp_ 55-57, of the present stuqy. 
It is time to draw to a point of focus the main 11nes of Aristotle's 
notion ot happiness which have been examined in the course of this study. 
In Chapter One the objectives ot the stUdy were establishedl tirst, to 
tormulate the standard on which Aristotle based his philosophical account ot 
the :tull human lite; second, to sound the deeper lD3taphysical implications of 
such a standard. Chapter Two presented a general view ot the direction and 
characteristics ot Aristotle IS treatment ot happiness, most notably its 
dependence on the .Aristotelian theories of activity and finality. Chapter 
Three was devoted to a consideration of enjoyment, its origin in activity, thUi 
its inseparableness from the activity which constitutes happiness, yet, 
tinally, its radical distincti:less tram happiness. Chapter 'our turned to 
happiness in 1 ts concrete and oompletest possible realization in the activity 
of the retlective life. Here the two chief ourrents in Aristotle's treatment 
of happiness were seen to converge in his identification of happiness and 
philosophio reflection on the ground that through knowledge man give place in 
himself to actualities of the highest level--etemal, unconditioned and 
universal, unchanging fona. 
1. Happiness As Presence of' the Ideal 




is in contact with actuality in its highest sense. For thus a man approaches 
closest to what is the essence of the divine. This is happiness in the full 
Aristotelian sense ot the word. If any other qualities are also to be found 
the hapPY' man's st.ate, they will be there as result, accompaniment, 
embellishment ot a happiness that already exists in him in its essence. Thus 
the presence of excellenoe in a man's activity, whioh is what constitutes the 
happiness of his life, has as its first efflorescence in his person his 
consciousness of this presence. Suoh a reality corresponds to Aristotle's 
notion of enjoyment. Other joys too may come to him from other areas of hie 
life and the activities that belong to them. There is no question that such 
joys add to the fineness of his life; but they come as extras, to fill out a 
life that is essentially complete Without them (for a happy life 1s already a 
complete life). Such is the meaning of blessedness in .Aristotle's use of the 
term. Yet remove all the abundance of goods which embellish the happy man t s 
lite; discount also (for it cannot be removed) the unique state of pleasure 
within him at his consciousness of existing at the highest point posjible to 
him a deeper than both lies what ultimately constitutes his happiness, the 
actual prasence in him of the eternal, unchangeable, unconditioned and univers 
forms that are Ear excellence the actual! ty of mind. 
The implications of smh a standard ot human happiness deserve special ex 
m1nation, tor an understanding at them 1s an understanding of the basic 
direction of Aristotle's philosophy. Despi te their importance, however, they 
rece! ve no explicit attention in the philosophy of man as Aristotle developed 
it. Arrr formulations of the., then, and conclusions based on them are apt to 
seem forced, especlal.ly in light of the fact that Aristotle himself newr came 
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to draw them together in suoh a way. Nevertheless, let this qualification 
stand, and it is still possible, on the ground of what the examination 
conducted in the last three chapters has uno overed in Aristotle's handling ot 
fu.uBan values, to come to a few definite conclusions about the tendency of his 
thought. 
Insofar as the Aristotelian universe has a unity, that unity depends on 
the subordination of all partieular and specific movements to the great and 
general movement of the outer spheres and in tum. the 8ubordin&tion-by-desire 
of these to the unmoved actuallty of God.1 Thus the state of complete 
aotuality (~vepre/.~ (£veu dl.(,v~eUJr) is the ultimately meaningful 
reality in Aristotle's system, and implicitly at least the standard of every 
evaluation that has plaoe in it. What is the meaning of actuality? The notion 
does not lend itself very readily to analysis and formulation, but the general 
sansa of it can be seen in the meaning that is cODlllOn to its various uses 
throughout the oorpus(for example in the Ehlsics by the theory of matter and 
form, in the ;Pychology by the explanation of intelleotion through the mental 
presence of forms, in the Ethics by the determination of happiness as the 
~ ,/ 
ac'tivit7 of intellec'tion). The meaning of el/epret~ common to such places 
is that of actual form. 2 
----
1af. Oh. I, note 1, as well as Ch. V, note 4. 
2Tha following exposi'tion of Aristotle's general doctrine of form is based 
in large part on the doctrines of activity in intellection as treated in IV, 2 
(esp. nows 1.3-20 and the text that they accompany). Cf. Joachim, pp. 16$-7, 
on the ultimate identity of knower and known in the activity of knOwing, and 
293-5, on immateriality as the ground of perfect identity. Cf. also Hamelln, 
pp. 4-6, 11-13, and 87 on Aristotelian act-potency in knowledge, with 
pertinent passages. 
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At first seemingly quite divsrse, the physical form that combines with 
matter to constitute an individual thing and the mental form that is the 
immaterial representation by which knowledge takes place do not in fact differ 
insofar as they are form. In itself the form (or formali V or pattern) which 
gives matter a determinate existence is exactly the same form that determines 
one.s act of knowing. The difference between a man existing in the flesh and 
an idea of man existing in the mind pf a thinker is the different subjects 
into which the same form has been received. In the tormer case the form man 
is received into matter, and this matter is disposee this way or that, better 
or worse, to admit the form. But in the latter case the form is received into 
mind) and be1ng iaate:tial, mind. is open to whatever form wUl come to tt, and 
will not limit form in BlV' w&7. 
This reality that Aristotle's formulations point to in the physical order 
and in the order of knowledge is not a substance or an idea as such, but the 
formality, the determination, which makes any substance or idea to be the kind. 
it is. A thing is actual in the order of nat:ure because a form has been 
received in some matter; an act of knowledge actually occurs because a form haa 
become pftJHnt to a mind. In this world there is no such thing as a form that 
is not informing something whether matter or mind. Yet the reality of a form 
is not in virtue of its informing something, but in virtue of its being form. 
Form that is present in knowledge is more excellent that form present in 
nature, but this is only because in knowledge form. is not limited and can 
therefore be more truly form. 
And this is lby it 18 more excellent. Form is of i teel! intrinSically 
excellent, and when it is free of the intermittence and conditioning ot 
r 
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existence in matter, when it is found unoonditioned and universal, it is found 
more like itself. It approaches what may be oalled here the Ideal • .3 
.3This particular term Ideal used as a noun with the lD!aning of goal, acme, 
value, maximum is an apt one to refer to the notion of unoondi tioned torm 
whioh the present discussion has come to tormulate as the Aristotelian standar 
of ultimate value. It has the advantage ot being a modern term in common use 
tor a realitY' llke that intended here, and has the etymological overtone d 
notional which re-relates it to the context of Aristotelian psyohology-, and of 
excel1ent which recalls the value-sc:tl1ngs ot the Ethics and J4etaphysios and 
their focus on the divine. SUch a use of the term to ~esignate the reatity 
under discussion need not indicate Iny correspondence to PlatOnic use of the 
term idea, such a relationship is arguable but is not the issue here. (ot. 
Hamel~pp. 87, 88.) 
~ 1 ~ ()l Aristotle's use of the word loea- see Bonltz, pp. 3.38bl2-339a6, where 
there are given numerous examples of the expression in Aristotle'$ own 
systAmatic exposition of doctrine (as synonym of ?of>P~~ A.6roS";, tpuq-/s ) as well 
as in his criticisms of the Platonic theo17. Cf. a.lso Jaeger. Index, p. 464, 
at idea. also pp. 4S, 46, on Aristotle's doctrine of soul as torm (De An. 
4l2limjJ and pp. 340, 341, also 40.3, on the development of Ar18totl8Tsdoctrine 
of idea as imma.ttered form, and on the primary importance of the notion of form 
through Aristotle. 
Stewart, II. 361 (comment.ing on 1166a22) indicates the main point of 
contact between mants noetic capacitY' for the unconditioned and universal ~d 
his other capacities for excellence and nobility, "Reason is the Form oretoos 
of man. This Form the good ml;\.~ preserves pure amid the UA.~ of circumstances, 
as plants and animals preserve their various etl>y) from generation to generation, 
realising .. TO GeLotl" ka..' TO ae{ in the peI'll\Sllence of the race-type~' It is as 
corresponding with his whole environment, and not merely as exercisLng his 
'intellectual faculties' that man is identified with ReasCll in this and 
similar passages. • • • thollilh man is not, like God, pure e.1oos , but a 
o-~vu.iotl'or an evu.iov e1 ~05 ." 
Again, II, 249, Stenrt describes what is meant by happiness as an inmatte -
ing of idea in man: !:If Chappines!7 be regarded as an evu.,(,ol/ e'tc>os 
--as a lite concretely realised, it presents itself as the harmoniouB p~ of 
all human :functions, intellectual, moral and bodily-as the expression, in rna.ny 
wa;rs, of the concrete unity--m.ens sana in corpore sane. But since such a 
concrete result cannot be produced or miI'ntained without S ewpL.Q.. or the 
organising and regulative agency of Reason-is in fact nothiru! but tb:l material 
" ' , "./ <~"} ." ";\ '7\ manifestat,ion of oewp'Q. which is its Form, Law, ou,<rta- aVeu u"t.1']s or TI. 1)11'" e'-
vaL I and since the Form or the ... Law .!! the thing, philosophically considered. • 
it follows that eu..da.YU0v-Ia" considered formally or philosophically, is 
identified with €rewp{Q; its Form or Law. It is especially in E.N. x that 
el(:oa.,,~ovr~ is so identified." -
If t e co.m.mentat.or's at least apparent limitation of the notion of rJewp(Q; 
to the regulation of things merely human is overlooked, this passage helps 
r~--------------~ 
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In the argument of the Metaphysics actuality in i"ts purity is God, the 
First Mover. He is simply the Ideal, form Without any conditioning, the full-
ness of what every actuality is in its own degree. It is possible from the 
viewpoint of form in its greater or lesser degree of purity to trace a line of 
gradually asoending value in form-greater actuality in it and greater 
excellence-as form is the actuality of a non-living substance, of a plant, of 
an animal, of a man; or, Within man, as it is "the actuality of his composite 
being, of his somehow supra-material sense powers, and again of his completely 
un-mrterial intellectual "capacity for all things"; or, beyond the level of 
sublunary beings, as it is actuality of the celestial intelligences. And 
according to this line of inoreasing purity of form and freedom from admixture 
of matter and potentiality, God 11'1.11 appear 8S the totality which all 
approach and never on their levels of actuality achieve. The unique 
actuality and excellenoe of God will consist in this that he is in totality 
and constancy what all others are only partially and intermittently. He i8 
to show how the Ar1atotelian theQry of actuality as encountered in this 
sphere of knowl~dge is, mutatis mutandiS, applicable also to the sphere of 
human actions, though these are not activities in the same strict sense in 
which the operations of faculties are. 
r 
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the summit which all beings aim at in the various degrees of aotuality.4 
In this sense, actuality (eveprecQJ ) is a value-is, according tD its 
degree value itself. 
4The theology of Aristotle is certainly a disputed area, not only for the 
sketchiness of its various appearances throughout the extant works, but 
especially for its relations to the rest of Aristotle's doctrineS, particular 
his latest. 
Sse Ross, pp. 179-186, a concise disc1lssion of the main tenets and 
problems of the doctrine, its purity of conception, its dependence on an 
ascending order of purity of form, its lack of a notion of creation, 
providence, divine interest. Joachim (PP. 291-7> gives a more imaginative 
reconstlouction of the place of God in the uniVerse from the aspect of evt!pre/"~ 
either as arising out of OUII~/f or as self-identical. Both these commentator 
consider the doctrin~ apart from its historical relationship to the rest of 
Aristotle fS developing, changing views. 
Jaeger, on the other hand, brings out the relative earllness and Platonic 
character ot the Aristotelian theology as it exists in its most developed form, 
in BeokA ot the Metaphysics (ppe 219-22) as well as its earliest origins 
(pp. 1,6-66). He further shows traces of a theological and PlatOnic 
orientation throughout its extensive development even though ita attention cam 
to focus 1001'9 and more on the order and realities and knowledge-worthiness of 
the empirical 'IfClrld, which is notior ~.22.!:. Cf. pp. 38$-8. Cf. 3~l-5 for 
a synthetic view of this theological-teleological orientation, esp. 38~ I "In 
Aristotlets teleology substance and end are one, and the highest end is the 
most determinate reality there is. This substantial thought possesses at one 
and the sam time the highest ideality as conceived by Plato and the"nch 
determinateness of the individual, and hence life and everlasting blessedness. 
God is one with the world not by penetrating it, nor by maintaining the 
totality of its ferms a.s an intelligible world within himself, but beca.use the 
world 'hangs' Cr7'Pl'}T'a.c.) on hllllJ he is its unity, although not in it. As 
each thing strives to realize its own fOrm, it realizes for its part that 
infini te perfection which as a whole is God." 
The reality of the Aristotelian God (as real is opposed to abstract or 
merely formal) is a question worthy of thorough examination, as Is &lso the 
qnestion of what the term ou,C1'{a, means in its primary sense, whether an 
existent or a formal principle of existence. It is perhaps impossibleto sta 
With certainty the meaning of' tfii re81Ity ot kl/e.preLQ. which plays such a 
leading role in the Ethios, it the meaning of this still more basic concept 
remains in 1 ts ambiguous suspension between real and formal. Cf. Ross, pp. 24 
156, 157. on the meanings ot substance, its primacYJ PP. 157-9. the existenc 
q,f universals, intelligences, God; pp. 161-18: on matter and form, 
individuation, priority and eternity of torm. 
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en such a basis as this, it is not hard to see why the Ufe of 
philosophical reflection is the highest that Aristotle can conceive for man. 
Whether the philosopher considers the racurring patterns of tile "lOrld of 
animals and plants, or the cons tan t laws of human thought, or the eternal 
cyoles of the heavens, it is tmder the aspeot of their uni versali ty that he 
oonsiders them. And it is in this universality and tmchangeableness of theirs, 
not in their particularity and variation, that these experienced actualities 
a:-e like the pure actuality of the divine. The philosopher aohieves happiness 
as he reaches the Ideal. 
The philosopher himself is a man and an lndi vidual IIWl, and is stlbjec t. to 
all the conditions of time, place, disposition. All these influenoe his 
activity, and oan even hinder it or keep it from taking place :tn him. But to 
whatever degree he transoends these 11m! ts and aotual.ly exercises his power of 
thought he is happy. To this degree only. The Test-embellishtnents of life 
and even the enjoyment that is his as an individual well ocoupied-is not 
preoisely what makes him happy. Happiness is presenoe of the Ideal." The Ideal 
however, is never present in a man by virtue ot his indiVidualitY', this 
embodiment of human form rather than that, but because the mind he has is in 
some small degree a power to bypass indiViduality." So tar asa man seeks 
>rrue, in the sublunar world men are the only'beings with intelligence; 
and these are only individual men, not man-in-general free of all conditioning 
and disposed perfectly to reaoh the uncondi t1oned. The existence of individual 
men is just as necessary for the achievement of actual intellection in the 
sublunar world as enjoyment J in its own way, is inseparable trom such actual 
intelleotion. "What is to be noted here, is not that happiness can'be had with-
molt en,joyJllmt or that happiness oan be had except in indiVidual men, but that 
happiness as such is not a matter of either individuality or of enjoyment. It 
is essentially distinct from such faotors tor all its dependenoe on them and 
actual connection wi. th them. 
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happiness he is seeking the Ideal, which is of valuo not by reason of its 
particularity but by reason of its universality and transcendence of the 
individual. 
A man who lives up to this notion of happiness completely, Aristotle's 
<T'rro~da.C:oS av6p , will not be conoerned nth enjoyment of life, but with 
making his person open to the presence of the Ideal. <b the other hand, a 
lesser kind of man is ooncerned wi th enjoyment; he ignores the pure values 
which the man of excellence esteems, and pursues instead objects that he knows 
Yd.ll bring him a sense of satisfaotion. Both are taken up with some sort of 
activity and with the objects with which this aotivity is associated. Where 
the two men differ, though, is in the relative quality of their activities. 
The lower type does not much care what the activity is just so long as he gets 
satisfaction from it; if he has preferences it will be because experience has 
accustomed him to certain ways and left him unaware more or less of others. 
His purSuits are not likely to extend to very arduous goals-not because they 
would not be even mre rel'fardlng, but simply: because he is not one to search 
then what mows already is good enough. But the man of excellence has another 
aim in life. His life is a deeply satisfYing one even when it requires great 
effort of him; it carmot help being. But enjoyment is not primarily his 
concernJ exoellence is his concern--wherever it may be found, and especially 
where it ~ be found most in its purity. The serious man is serious about one 
thing. that unoonditioned actuality may have as large a place as possible in 
his life. If enjoyment, his own acquiescenoe in an agreeable and satisfying 
life, were his concern, he might be content, as is the other man, in a lower 




'1'he conclusion, strange as it may seem to Aristotellan terminology, 1s 
I 
that happiness means nothing lot~r tpan this presence of unconditioned 
I \ 
I, ii \ 
actuali ty. The joys of a Pl'ospei'ouslife add to the fullness of happiness if 
/' i I 
/', f " 
they' are present; but they ~e qot nepessary for it. And enjoyment cannot help 
I 
accompanying such happiness. But. hawinas8 in i t8 deepest sense is something 
ft i I . 
beyond these conoa,r~ of the se~t. Th~\ Aristotelian notion of happiness is 1-' 1/ : I t 
that of an un-selt-concerned openness t<) value for its own sake. The self is 
of significance ~.~ insofar as lit is a (JOntainar of the Ideal. 
I ,/ j " 
This princ!.ple accords with Aristotle.'s finally achieved standard of hap-
piness, as well/ as Wi tb a broad part of his psychological and metaphysical 
, / 
doctrines, and Ut. fact helps til> illuminate and unify them: but it is plainly 
II I 
not Aristotl~s lown way of 8pe~g. The subordination of self to the ideal 
, , . 
l) 
actuality lfhiq'h rself comes to ,ont.ain, implicit as it is in Aristotle'8 philo-
:, i 
sophy of man~i d~s not exist in explicit statement there, if only because the 
philosophical distinction of salf and non-self has not been elaborated until 
I 
.1 
relatively JtJodern times. The strangeness ot these principles may go still 
deeper, t;hJ~h. Not only may Aristotle'S' way of speaking have been more 
! .' 
/' 'J 
adapte~ to !the self -interest mode of presentation found in ordinary language 
than;!~ DkJ~ern terJJinology, but his own thought may well have contained 
i I : 
/J \ ' 
elct.lll8nts that were inoonsistent with the diSinterest-tendency ot his 
I 
I 
;fhilO'OP(~al direction. It is not reasonable to expect in real life self-
. o~nca~n to give way entirely to un-selfconcern even if such un-selfconcern 
I .'1 
.uld lbe the logical conolusion of s 1rrender to the Ideal. 
! i ~hus,,:\th. appearance of seltconcern as a way of speaking or even as a 
/1 j 









serious question the fact that his notion of human happiness tends to concen-
trate on impersonal and universal excellence somewhat to the overlooking of the 
self. 
2. Selfconcern and the Ideal 
Nevertheless it 1s reasonable to expeot that the standard of value whioh 
has been shown to lie at the heart of the Aristotelian fina.l1 ty and shape the 
general discussion of happiness will also hold true in more speoific problems, 
where more immediate realities are in question than in the statement of broad 
principles. It is to be expected the foroe of the Ideal Will be at work in all 
such questions, most of all in those areas where there is question of self in 
relation to others. Here three passages of the Nioomaehean Ethics are 
especially pertinent. discussions of friendship and of self-loft in Book Nine, 
and in Book Four a discussion of the virtue of pride. 
!!!! Ideal !e yriendsh1E. 
In ona of the earliest ohapters of his extensive treatment of triendship6, 
.AX'istotle carefully distinguishes friendship in the truest sense fr~m a number 
6The discussion of friendship, Books Eight and Nine, nearly one-fifth of 
the whole Ethics, consists of a general introduction to the problems, kinds, 
stages ot li'ien(lship (VIII, ch. 1-6); a discussion of the reciprooity required 
in it (ch. 7,8), and of reciprocity ir. the various forms of societys state, 
fami11', companionship (ch. 9-12); next a series of discussions which Ross terms 
"Casuistr,y of Friendshlp" (oh. 13, 14; IX, ch. 1-3). then a sat of consider-
ations which establish the internal nature of friendship (ch. 4-8) and its 
importance in life (ch. 9-12). 
Book Nine, ohapt~~ n:ne, "Why does the' happy man need friends?", oonsists 
of four lines of argument, the first Urea of which are (1) a number of 
'popular considerations in favor of friendship, (2) the notion that one can 
regard virtue better in another person than in oneself, thus appreciate it 
better, (3) certain advantages that derive from having associates in practice 
of virtue. The fourth argument, which is the most tully developed and which 
Aristotle characteriZes as more penetrating the nature of things 
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of relationships that bear the same name of friendship but really fall short of 
it. Here he shows there are three types of friendship, each based on a form 
of reciprocity, yet only one of them based on a form good without qualification 
Thus triends whose affection is based on utility do not love each other in 
themselves, but in so far as Bome benefit accrues to them .from each other, 
And similarly with those whose friendship is based on pleasure: for 
instance, we enjoy the society of witty people not because of what they ar 
in themselves, but because they are agreeable to us. Hence in a friend-
ship based on utility or on pleasure men love their friend for their own 
good or their 01111 pleasure, and not as being the person loved, but as use-
fUl or agreeable. And therefore these friendships are based on an 
accident, Since the friend is not loved for being What
7
he is, but as 
affording some benefit or pleasure as the case may be. 
If Aristotle's happy man needs friendship in his life it will not be on the 
foregoing bases. It may well happen he will maintain associations of tlus 
kind, for even the great man is a man and needs the supports, relaxations, 
encouragements that come to him as a social being8; but these are necessary 
(cp/A..cT"II<4>Tepov) than the other arguments, will supply the structure of 
this examination of Aristotlets notion of the good involved in friendship. The 
argument will be supplemented with selections from VIII, .3 "Three corresponding 
ld.nds ot friendship", IX, .3 "Occasions of br~aJd.ng otf friendship", tt, 4 
"Friendship is based on self-love", IX, 7 "The pleasure of benificence", and 
from other places in the two bookl!. 
7l156all-19. 
8This function of supporting the activity of the reflective 11fe seems to 
be the ultimate purpose of the tht'ee oarlier arguments in IX, 9. See 1169b9-
1170alJ I Friendship is thus considered (1) lithe greatest of external goods" J a 
man needs intimates on whom to confer benef! ts J "man is a social being" and it 
is better for one to associate with Persons familiar to him than with 
strangers. (2) It is an aid to the contemplation of virtue to look on the good 
of one whose good is also one fS own. (3) Congenial friends make contemplation 
easier and more continuous, and, further, subtly influence one another toward 
improvement. 
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and helpful in a somewhat extrinsic sense, and so do not directly have place 1 
his happiness. 
()l the other hand, the true form of friendship is something intrinsic and 
not merely incidental, thus exists because of a good that does not come and go 
but has a certain absolute excellence. Such stability of good and such excel-
lence are verified only' in the characters of really good men, and this is why 
true friendship can exlst only among them. nThe perfect form of friendship is 
that between the good, and those who resemble each other in excellence. For 
these friends wish each alike the other's good in respect of their goodness, 
and thay are good in themselves; but it is those who wish the good of the 
friends for their friends' sake who are friends in the fullest sense, since 
they- love each other for themselves and not aocidentally.n9 Because excellenc 
is the buis of their union such a union is essentially more noble than a 
liaison for sake of pleasure or advantage. And because virtue does not easily 
shift in the wq advantage or "CaSte in enjoyment do, such a union is more 
stable .10 The shared excellence is thus the .. foundation of friendship in the 
chief sense in which Aristotle wishes it to be taken. It is apparently the 
intrinsic excellence which a certain person possesses that one looks to in 
loving that person for himself. In this Sense excellence is not something 
incidental to a person but deeply his own. 
9 \ I ( \ , c/ 2/ "'" ~'~A!1. I 




But such oxcellence can hardly be intended as intrinsic in the sense that 
it belongs tJ t,he person and cannot be alienated from him as long as he is a 
person. For Aristotle later discusses whether true friendship can continue if 
one of the parties becomes bad, or even if one of the parties grows into a 
hit~her degree of Bxcellence and leaves his friend behind on the lower level 
which they once shared. The negative answer which haa already been suggested 
by his statement that friendship lasts !! lon~ as the excellence lasts, is 
there confirmed explicitly. HFerhaps it is impossible to do so, since only 
what is good 1.s lovable; and also wrong, for we ought not to be lovers of evil 
nor let ourselves become llke what is worthless; and, as has been said above, 
like is the friend of like. • •• They will no longer even enjoy each other's 
SOCiety; butwlthout this, intercourse and therefore friendship, are as we saw 
11 impossible." One will not break off trom a triend for any superficial reaso , 
of course, because the friendship was founded on a sharing of an intrinsic 
good; nor need the good friend break off from his friend as soon as he notices 
a fault in him, for a true friend will look more deeply intc the case and try 
help his friend regain his footing. But where it becomes clear that the good-
ness once shared is shared no longer, the basis of the friendship has vanished 
:md that is that. 
T:'is as!)9ct of friendship's stability reveals the value which friendship 
a.'3 slJch ultimately is concerned with t the excellence which each person 
11l16SbI-31. Of. also l158b29-ll59a5, where dis pari ty in excellence or 
vice is shown to be an impediment to the sharing (k'OLVU) v (0.- ) proper to 
friendship_ 
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possesses, and no t precisely the pe rson that possesses it. For "virtlee and th 
-virtuous man seem to be the standard in everything. ,,12 A person can be loved 
only insofar as he possesses some virtue. "Thus a bad man appears to be devol 
even of atfection for himself, because he has nothing lovable in his nature. lfl 
Furthermore, tile excellence on which friendship is based is substantially 
the same as that on which the excellence of happiness is based, namely its ac-
ti veness J and {,his .is not anything personal. Iluch the sane language is used 0 
both friendship and happiness. 
It is wi th friendship as it is with the other excellences; men are called 
eood in t~u s~nses, either as ha-ving an excellent disposition or as 
realizing excellence in action, and similarly friends when in each otherts 
company derive pleasure from and confer benefits on each other, whereas 
friends who are asleep or parted are not actively friendly, yet have the 
disposition to be so. For separation does not destroy friendship 
absolutely, though it prevents its active exercise.l4 
MOreover it is possible to conceive of an act of lova without a return of love, 
even if this is not the usual way of things. The love of mothers is an eX3.lllpl 
of this and shows that the essence of love lies "more in giving than in 
receiving affection- Hl5 This is why a persop. who does a favor out or love 
reveals more affection than the person who receives the favor. It would seem 
121166a8-l0. Of. 1157b25-3? 
131166b26. Also U66b2-29; ll59b2,3c "Amity consists in equality and 





at first sight the one who stands to gain should show more love. But his 
interest springs from a need, and insofar as a need is filled the person who 
been in need no longer feels the pangs of his need and thus loses interest. 
part in the favor is passive, while his benefactor has exercised a power. The 
recei ver sees the favor as a matter of 'lsetulness or pleasure to h1m, while the 
giver sees the liberality of his act. There is a parallel between the 
benefactor and the artist. "C'EJvery artist loves his own handiwork more than 
that handiwork if it were to come to life would love him. If This example points 
to a profounder tact. 
The reason of this is that all things desire and love existence, but we 
exist in activity, since we exist by living and doing, and in a sense one 
who has made something ensta aetively, and so he loves his handiwork 
because he loves existence. This is in fact a fundamental prinCiple ot 
nature. what a thing is potentially, that its work reveals in actuality.l 
Aristotle fS most serious and developed discussion of the true basis of 
friendship incorporates this notion of the activeness of friendship as the root 
of its values. At the end of this argument Aristotle summarizes it thus a "It 
then (1) to the supremely happy man existence is desirable in i teelt, being goo 
and pleasant essentially, and if (2) his friend's existence is almost equally 
desirable to him, it follon that en a friend is one of the things to be 
1"- 6 1 U68a2 _J:.. t'\ (' I '" l ' -, '" )/ 
'J.l 1b 7- 7, esp. ~I no ya..p errr, ouva,..,uel. roU.ro €vepret.9- Toe 
rov fo'?y-u.et. ." Notice here that the artist loves his work because ereatin& haa 
actualized something in him, he exi.sts more because he has created. The handi-
work is regarded not as the expression of an excellence existing already in the 
artist, but as the occasion of the artistts coming to exist more. lfence the 
artist ta person is viewed rather as an area open to further perfection than as I' i 
fullness of perfection flOwing out into manifestations of itself. 
I'li 
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desired. 017 Aristotle thus makes his conclusion de; end on the affirmation ot 
two propositiona, that a man desires his own existence and that the existence 
a friend is much the same to one as one's own existence, or, as the latter 
17 U 70b14-l6. (Numerals added.) See the whole complicated passage as Ar 
stotle develops it, 1170al4-b12. n Again, if we examine the matter more funda-
mentally , it appears that a virtuous friend is eS88ntial..ly desirable for a 
virtuous man. For as has been said above, that which is essentially good is 
good and pleasing in. itself to the virtuous man. And life i. defined, in the 
case of animals, by the capacity for sensation; in the case of man, by the 
capacity for sensation and thought. But a capacity is referred to its activit 
and in this its full reality consists. It appears therefore that life in the 
full sense is sensation or thought. But life is a thing good and pleasant in 
itself, for it is definite, and definiteness is a part of the essence of good-
ness, and what is essentially good is good for the good man, and hence appears 
to be pleasant to all man •••• But if life itself is good and pleasant (as i 
appears to be, because all men desire it, and virtuous and supremel1' happy men 
most of all, since their way of life i8 mst desirable and their existence the 
most blissful); and if one who sees is conscious that he sees, one who hears 
that he hears, one who walks that he walks, and similarly for all the other 
human activities there is a faculty that is conscious of their exercise, so th 
whenever we perceive, we are conscious that we perceive, and whenever we think, 
we are conscious that we think, and to be conscious that we are perceiving or 
th.ink1.ng is to be conscious that we exist (for existence, as we saw, is sense-
perception or thought) J and if to be conscious one is alive i8 a pleasant thing 
in t tselt (for life is a thing essentially good, and to be conscious that one 
possesses a good thing is pleasant). and if life is deSirable, and e8pecially s 
for good men, because existence is good for them, and so pleasant (because they 
are pleased by the perception of what is intrinsicall1' good), and if the 
virtuous man teels towards his friend in the same wq as he feels towards him-
self (tor his triend is a second self)-then, just as a man's own existence 
is destrable for him., so, or nearly so, is his friends' existence also desirab • 
But, as we saw, it is the consciousness of oneself as good that m.alc8s existence 
desirable, and such consciousness is pleasant in itself. Therefore a man ought 
also to share his friend's consciousness of his existence, and this ia attained 
by their living together and by conversing and communicating their thoughts to 
each other. • • ." 
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notion is often expressed, "a friend is another self." 
To establish the first of these notions, that man desires existence, Ari-
stotle develops the two ways in which this desire shows i uelt) a man (here as 
in the rest of the discussion it is the good man) desires his existence because 
it is good and enjoyable. Here existence-lite-amounts to activity, tor lite 
is defined by the actions for 'Which it is the capaci tYI th'U8 in man life is 
sensation and thought, though of course chiefly thought.18 And it is this that 
is good and enjoyable. ~ is it 80? 
First, it is good, because it is definite; and we know this to be the case 
because the good man chooses it tor this reason. These are t.he chief reasons 
that Aristotle gives and almost the only reasons. "CIJt is definite, and def 
ni ten.ss is a part ot the essence ot goodness, and what is essentially good is 
good for the good man •••• n Again, this view of the human good is consistent 
with the value soheme that has been pointed out in the other Aristotelian con-
texts. A good Ufe is one that manifests in itself a senae of f'ona and 
direotion, an order that lives ill-lived dO,.not possesS) it partakel of some of 
the unoondi tionedne8s and stability which thought discovers in the regularities 
of nature and the heavens.19 Aristotle does not further develop this aspect of 
existence, its intrinsio worth. perhaps he considers it sufficiently indioated 
in these fn remarks, perhaps he merely takes the fact for granted, and indeed 
such a view is the climate of the Ethios. 
18ef• II, 2, beginning, and III, esp. note 31, of the present paper. 
198M 1l06b29, on the necessary defini teness of the good. ef. also note :3 
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The intrinsic enjoyableness of life is another fact that all seem to agree 
on; but this aspect of the question Aristotle chooses to treat more at length. 
ttfe 1s not something carried on without the living person's awareness of it. 
For every one of the activities that make 11te into the thing it is, is accom-
panied with a consciousness20 that such activity is present. Now consclousnes 
of the activities that make up life amounts to an awareness of existence itself 
Existence, as was seen betore, is good because it is actuality. Thus one is 
conscious in living activity of a good that is present in him. This awareness 
is precisely what is meant by pleasure or enjoyment: ft["Vife is a thing 
essentially good, and to be conscious that one possesses a good thing is 
pleasant. • • • ,,21 
The second propos! tion, that a :friend is another self, is really the 
pivotal point ot the whole argument. For whatever may be true ot the 
desirability or existence, of life and activity, clearly this has nothing to do 
wi th triendship.-unless 1 t is also true that the existence proper to another 
" 
person is yet somehow one's own existence too because he is a friend. There c 
be no question of Aristotle's opinion in this matter; 1t is essential to the 
20Al<rfi~veq'{)aL ,sentire, as the activity of an interior faculty-what woul 
seem to amount to a sort of sensorium commune, a basic or central perceptive 
capacity which unifies the percepts of the other faculties is aware of them, 
etc. 
21 "1'1\ / "~I\ \ r;' \ ,~ 11 \ r" ;} c 1'\;) ~" II It / 
- .,.,"q"el rap aral;lov J&u!J ~ 7"0 0 ara(7oV' U1tCl.f>A'Ov ev edUT'f at (f"()Ialle(f()lal /4,. 
Later in the same paragraph Aristotle expresses it somewhat differently," IJ 
is the consciousness of oneself as good that makes existence desirable, and 
l it':>' -;- -S' < , ..,., " such consciousness is pleasant in i tee t. Viz. n To (J €!II/at. 1')'" atpeTr>V ala. TO 
) c:.~ 61· .. ~, _J:2 ..., "" ".\.' " ~ .i'1 (' \... ~_.o'~_ "It It i a.Lcr~l/ecr ~t aU7""Ou, at w.vOl.(. OI/TOr.? 1)014 TOl'll-tT? Cllq"l71,}d"'IS !)oeta k"av c;:aUTl)Y", . s 
perhaps not unreasonable to see in this double wrq of speald.ng the outlines of 
a distinction between good .m!! good-thus, the definite as good-and good So':! 
object-ot-choiee,a.~peToV" -enjoyable as well as definite. 
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conclusion he wishes to reach, moreover he enunciates the principle in several 
different forms in the present context. "fiJhe virtuous man feels towards hi. 
friend in the same wtr¥ as he feels tow-arcs himself (for his friend .1.s a second 
self) •••• " The friend's exis~nce is ttalmost eq'...lally desirahle to him. tt In 
the conclusion of Book Nine this same principle is expressed again. "For 
friendship is essential.ly a partnership. And a man stands in the sarre relation 
to a friend as to himself •••• 1122 But it is one thing to hold a principle 
and another to establish it. In the present disoussion Aristotle seems simply 
to tam it for granted, since he is oontent to refer to it, especial.l.y in its 
popular maxim-form without ever actually attempting its justification • 
.An earlier ohapter23 amounts to the closest Aristotle has come to treating 
this relation. of self-love to love of others. It is an extended parallel 
betwaen the qual! ties of a person's regard tor himself and of his regard tor an 
lntim.a.te friend. True love expresses itself in these five ways. (1) by wish-
ing and promoting the good of the one loved, (2) by wishing the existence and 
:preservation of that person tor his own sake., (:3) by liktng to be wtth him (4) 
by loyalty to Lls state of mind, and (5) by sensi tivi ty to his joys and sorrows 
Aristotle shows first how these quail ties are to be tomd in friendship at its 
beat. Next he shows how each of them is verified in the good man's feeling 
toward hlmsel£ (and not verified in the corrupt man's)-the consistency and 
, :2U 7lb.3.3 : "KOlI/WVl a. rap 1.7 cpu{{a,. Kat 4;S JrPOf eau:rol/ 9'et., oUrco kat \ : 
lOY fPl.,(oV." 
23u66al-b29. The first in a series of three in which friendship is dis-
tinguished from self-love, then from mere good-wlll, finally from the kind ot 
agreement that exists among fellow citizens. 
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order of his state of mind (4») his contentment even in soli tude because of the 
good things that are his to think about <':3), his keen awarenesa of what pleases 
and hurts him (5). 
But especially doea he show his love of self in the way he wishes himself 
what is trul;r good and seeks to secure it by his acti vi V, and in the way he de 
sires his own existence. 
Also he wishes his own good, real as well as apparent, and seeks it by 
action (for it is a mark of a good man to exert himself actively for the 
good) J and he does so for his own sake (for he does it on account of the 
intellectual part of himself, and this appears to be a mants real self). 
Also he desires his own life and security, and especially that of his 
rational part. For existence is good for the man of excellence; and ever;y~ 
one wishes his om good. no one would choose to possess ever)" good in the 
world on cornii tlon of becoming somebody else (for God possessee the good 
even as it is), but only while remaining himself, lIbatever he DlI(f' be; and 
it would appear that the thlnldng part is the real self, or is eo more the ~ . 
anything elae. 
It is in this passage that Aristotle comes cloaeat to really describing the 
driving self-concern that each person experience. in his own attitude toward 
himself. True, there is present the tendency of Aristotle to see in. the self 
11 ttle mre than a capacity for acts. But 'the opposite of this attitude shows 
itself too. 
Even if Aristotle give. this emerging aspect of the fact none of the 
special attention which it seems to call for, the passage is never1iheless at 
least suggestive of oore than the self-equals-capacity view of Ufe. II/J.Jvery .. 
one wishes his own good t no one would choose to possess every good in the 
world on condition of becoming somebody else. II Here the value of an 
individuality as such seems to be the issue. If this passage intends what it 
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seems to say and is indeed Aristotle's then even on the supposition that one 
might become possessed of great goods, divinity not excepted, such goods would 
still not be acceptable it they entailed a loss of selt-identi ty. '!hus the 
self appears to have a significance distinct from the values found in it. This 
notion accords well with the parallel passage which descr1bes friendshipt u A. 
friend is one who wishes the existence and preservation of his friend for the 
fr1end fS sake. (rus is the teeling of mothers toward their children, and ot 
friends who are at odds. ) .. 25 For even when there is no return of love or the 
24rhe passage hae been rejected by some ot the commentators, mainly becaus 
of a difficulty in fitting the parenthet1cal remark into the line ot argument. 
Cf. Stewart, II, 357-61, for an extended treatment of the various views of the 
text's genuinity and its place in an Aristotelian context. Comparing this te 
with llS9a9-l3, where Aristotle discusses friendship between unequala ("If t 
it was rightly said above that a true friend wishes his friend's good for that 
friendts own sake, the triend would have to remain hiJDBelt, whatever that mq J 
so that he wUl rea.l.l1' wish him only' the greatest goods compatible with his re 
maining a human being."), Stewart accepts it, and COllll81lts t "In the light of 
the above passage I 'WOuld explain the seC{j.on before us as follows-'Every man 
wishes good things for hillaelt, that 1s, tor himself as remaining the same 
person. no man desires to beco_ another being, and let that other being posse 
all good tbinga-thus, no man desire. to become God, in order to ~s .. s the 
absolute good which God possesses now and for ever in virtue of being what He 
i •• ' God's WSH.siop of the good depends on His selt-identity. the good man' 
wish tor his own good oannot overpass the llmi ts of his self-identi ty-he can-
not wish good for himself as having beco_ God. u The Paraphrast, whoa stewart 
. also quotes.. interprets the passage acoording to the vieW' of the rational part 
as true selt and irrational part as not true self, hence as the fother' that 
one would become. 
2Sut6a5-7. ('l'r. J.D.) 
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exchange of usefulness and enjoyment and community of mind has been lost through 
a falling-out, there still exists in the person who loves an esteem for the 
other which oan be only for the person. 
In suoh passages as these the author seems to approach the need of discus-
sing good-of-aelf from the an~le of the self rather than from the usual angle of 
the good. For it is the person as such that the text. foous on and not so much 
some good .... fo_un ......... d .!!! the person. Jeftrthel.ess Aristotle reveals a tendency toward 
his ,uma! way of speaking in the passage parallel to these where he speaks of 
the corrupt :man's love of himself. "eV.Jen who have committed a number of 
orimes, and are hated for their wickedness, actually flee from life and make 
away with thamselves.n26 Here Aristotle oould very well have referred to the 
far more n1llllerous instance. in whioh the degraded, no less than the virtuous, 
hold on to life and resist every inroad of death, eftn with great pain, despite 
the fact that their Ufe is good to them in no .Aristotelian sense ot the word, 
sinoe they bave no interest in heroio virtue and lack J¥)reover all hopes of 
battering their lot. Suoh a parallel would bear out the tone ot the "other 
passages. Instead, Ari.stotle·s example is that of a person who no longer desirE I 
life once it has oeased to have a value, for onoe excellence and enjoyment are 
absent trom life he prefers not to exist at all. 
If Aristotle does recognise something naturally ot significance in self-




knowledge, for t.he Ideal-he is closer to uncovering it here than in other pas 
sages of his Ethics. Instead, however, he bases the rest of his discussion on 
the usual standard and does not come so close again to reexamining it. Thus 0 
the whole, in his t.reatml!lnt of friendship Aristotle does not reveal an attitud 
toward self radical.l.y different from that in his treatment ot happiness. The 
Ideal remains the focus of his attention even in an area like friendship where 
the riohness of the author's own experience oould easil,y have led him to a 
fuller recognition of the personal elements of human destre. 27 
27Ross fails sutfieien~ to distinguish the warmth ot Aristotle's feelin 
for friendship, as it is revealed in the present passages, from the essentiall 
non-personal. standard that he brings to his philosophical discussion of it. 
Thus in the introduction to his summary of the doctrine on friendship 
(Ari.totle, p. 230) Ross makes the .AJ'istotelian view of friendship take on an 
altruistic tone which does not, philosophically at least, belong to it (if 
alt.ru:Lam is taken in the sense ot an interest in the other erson and not mere 
as an interest in Bome value other than oneself). "The discuss on 1s a 
valuable corrective to an impression which the rest of the Ethios tends to mak 
For the mfrlj part Aristotle·s moral syetem 1s decidedly self-centered. It is 
at his own euoa.!,M-ov/a, we are told, that man aims and should aim. In the 
account of justioe there is an implicit recognition of the rights ot others. 
But in the wmle of the EthiCf outside the b()Oks on friendsh1.p very 'Uttle is 
said to suggest that men can and should. take a warm personal int.erest. in other 
people J altruism is alJl108t completeq absent. Traces of an egoistic view are 
present even in the account of friendship, as they should be, for friendship 
is not mere benevolence but demands a retum. But justice 1s done to the 
altruistic element; loving is said to be more essential to friendship than bei 
loved, a man wishes well to his friend for his triend's sake, not as a means to 
his own happiness." 
Jaeger (p. 24h) on the other hand is truer to the tone of the PUSag8S, 
though in the light of what has already appeared in Aristotle's attitude toward 
the selt I his use of the word personal has to be interpreted to mean concrete, 
or embodied in the individual, rather than something more to do with selt. 
t~lstotle retiins-the kernel of Plato's notion-the basing of friendship on the 
ethical principle of the Good-but makes the Good a concrete moral value 
developing wi thin the character of the man himllelf. The suprapersonal ground 
of the value of the human relationship no longer diverts attention from the 
personality of the friend; on the contrary, it is concentrated and incarnated 
therein. Aristotle's idea is therefore not just another way of referring all 
social values to the general problem of value; its aim is rather to establish 
the independent worth of the moral personality, and in the last resort 
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The chief concern of friendship, then, is not the se1fhood of the friend, 
but the excellence whioh is to be found in his character making him a good man 
and worthy of esteem. If altruism means the kind of love that values a person 
in his own distinct, llllcomunicated individuality and prescinds from his 
worthiness or unworthiness, Aristotelian friendship cannot be called altruistio 
It ms;y or may not be that egoism is the only alternative to altruism. If it 
is, then Aristotelian friendship is egoistic, not altruistio. Indeed, this is 
the usual way Aristotle refers to it, inasmuch as he insists that love of 
. 26 
others i8 based on love of self, as well as resembles it. 
Q1e of the queationa which Aristotle treats toward the end of the books on 
friendship is what self-love ('flA4ur/a-) really means. It 1s by far the 
commonest way of 8pea1d.ng, to condemn the man who is taken up with himself • 
• 
of human morality in general, as opposed to the cosme Good that 1s based on 
the idea of Ood.u Thus Aristotle's distinct contribution is the re-re1ation of 
this human value to the beings that generate. it rather than to some 'Universal 
principle whioh logically subsumes it. But such an advanced preCision in the 
. understanding of friendship does not of i taelf constitute any more deeply 
personal view than haa been shown to be the cue. 
28 Of. the whole of IX, 4, in which the parallel between self-love and love 
of others has already been described by Aristotle, and IX, 8 J the ohapter from 
which the following discussion is drawn. 
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We censure those who put themselves first, and 'lover of self' is used as 
a term of reproach. And it is thought that a bad man considers hi.m8elf 
in all he does, and the more so the worse he is. • .whereas a good man 
acts trom a sense of what is noble, and the better he is the more h~ so 
aots, and he considers his friend's interest, disregarding his own. 9 
'Ib this viewpoint Aristotle opposes another way of spea1d.ng whioh people reoog-
nize tha~ every man 101e8 himself best and oannot help doing so. His own long 
demonstration, for example, that all the qual! ties of friendship are verified 
also of selt-l0ve. Or: the popular maxims that 't\'I) friends share one soul'. ane 
''iVhat's mine is thine', whioh amount to figurative ways of saying that friend .... 
ship overlooks otherness} or 'charity beeins at home', whioh states that love 
for others begins with love for what is one f S own.3° tove is not altruistic. 
Aristotle solves the inconsistency of these views by ascertaining what eacl 
side means by self-love. 
Those then who make ita term of reproach call lOOn lovers of self when the, 
assign to themselves the larger share of money, honours, or bodily plea-
sures J since these are the things which most .-n desire and set their 
hearts on as being the greatest goods, and which according~ they oompete 
with each to obtain •••• Acoordingly the use of the term 'lover of self' 
as a reproach has arisen from the fact that self-love of the ordinary kind 
is ~ad. Hence self-love is rightly censured in those Who are lOvers of 
self in this sense. • • • LB7ut if a man were always bent on outdoing 
everybody else in acting just)i or temperately or in displa;r1ng artf other 
of the virtues, and in general were always trying to secure lor himself 
moral nobillt.,.., no one will charge him with love or self nor find an:r 
fault with him. Yet as a matter of facj1such a man might be held to be a 
lover of selt in an exceptional degree. 
291168829-35. 
301168bl-l0. I.e. i«{Q. ?,,,{?,or "kOIVa. ra.. fJJfdwv"or "r~vu KI/?;u'lS lfr,ovn 
3lU68b15-29. 
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This new sense of self-love is of course not a familiar one, and so Aristotle 
sete out to show in the passa;:'e immediately following that it is not onl¥ 
justified but is actually a truer way of speaking _ The argument is a simple 
one. A person can be said to love his capacities for intellectual and moral 
excellence beeause he seeks their good, that is, t.heir dewlopment and tul-
filment. Now this capacity of his for intellectual and moral excellence is 
what we mean by his self_Therefore in seeking the tultilment of his 
-
intellectual and moral capacity' he is seeking the f'ulfiJ..nt. of his very sell-
and in seeldng the fulfilment of his very self he is by that fact loving it. 
"Therefore in all spheres of praiseworthy' conduct is 1 t manifest that the good 
man takes the larger share or moral nobill ty for himaelf'. In this sense, then, 
as we said above, it is right to be a lover ot self, though self-love of the 
ordinar.1 sort is wrong_ n32 
It stands clear, then, what sort of goods they are that 1IOst befit the 
capacity of man for nobility_ "CIJt is the most dominant part of himself 
that he indulges and obeys in all things."3~ Whether the Ideal is eonceived 
in terms of moral excellence in the manner of the earlier-oomposed parts of the 
Ethics. or in terms of leisured reflectlon on the structures of the universe 
in the manner of Aristotle t s .ore developed doctrine-it is much the same 
32U69a3)-b2. This is the paragraph by which Aristotle sumarizes the 
whole argument of the chapter, and is the most succinct statement of his notion 
ot selt-love, though it lacks his usual emphasis that this also the most pr~~ 
sense ot selt-love. 
33U68b31. 
132 
reality in either case, namely, the presence of an order in human life that 
lifts it beyond itself toward the uncondi tionedness of di vini ty. This has been 
established in other parts of the Ethics, and does not call for special enlarge 
ment at this point. Instead, Aristotle's concern is to establish the important 
second term of his argument., that a man's true self is this aapaeity of his tor 
excellence. 
He does so by showing how attention to this capacity and devotedness to 
developing it is really a triumph of selfhood. First, because it is the domi-
nant part of the compos! te which is man, reason may rightly be called the man, 
that is, the chie!' part JJJq be taken tor the whole, just as the ruling body of 
a state is properly taken for the state itself. Next, Aristotle finds the 
dominion of mind in the man who is praised for being self-controlled.34 
-BeSides, a man is called self-controlled or lacking in self-control depending 
on whether his reason is in control or not--w:L th the implication that reason is 
the man. n3S Finally, Aristotle turns to the fact that it. is the acts which men 
perform in conformity to reason that they ccmsider most truly' their"awn, not 
those which have as it were just happened or happened despite their better judg 
men~6 In this sense it is only those actions Which arise from our effort and 
are tree and are reasonable which ... claim tor our 01111. Because of this, 
3~e 'WOrd erl<pa.-n)s and its privative a..kpa:rr)5 lack in Greek the explic t 
reference to self that their English equivalents have. 
3SU68b44. (Tr. J.D.) 
361169al,2. 
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certain actions which arise from our effort and are free, thus ful1'il the 
usual. condi tiol18 for responsibl11 ty, are still not claimed for our own in the 
same way as those which have the turther quall ty of reasonableness. 37 
From each of these viewpoints, then, it is the domination of the man by 
his highest powers that consti tui;es his real. loyalty to himselt. Aristotle 
could go on to a consideration of what the selt-love is that is manifested in 
the ambition and self-seeking of a corrupt man-what the self is when it is not 
-
one's reasonableness and nevertheless 1s something; what it is when in fact 1 t 
is the base of values to a man who lacks a true sense of values. But, as 
happens, Aristotle does not undertake to consider this aspect of experience, 
and concentrates instead on the selt whioh is the center of true value.. Thus 
-
he can speak of a self-love that is wrong, and in the same context insist that 
real self-love is al .... ays right. Clear:q, self does not mean the same thing in 
both statements. But in last analysis it is only' the second sense of the word 
37 There appears somewhat of a diaerepancy with Aristotle's USl%al theory 
of moral actiOns, but see St.ewart., II, 3791 ' "The acts of the rational agent 
represen t a consistent and single personall ty to which we always refer them, 
whereas the acts of the b.lCpa.nJ$ represent merely the prevalence for the time of 
certain ernf:)u;u{o.." , and are regretted and as it were dLsowned, by the man 
twben he comes to himself' again. Ckl this ground the acts of the rational 
agent are spoken of here as volunt!tl in a higher sense than those of the 
b.l<pa.r6f. But it must be remembered t.hat the doctrine of the 'lbird Book (and 
we have no reason to suppose that Aristotle wishes to modify it here) makes no 
eractical difference between acts done K4ra.A6yoVj and those done C>t'emBI1M(a,v 
~ bL4. Bu,.u..t5v , .Sl!! voluntary. U our good act. are voluntary 80 are also our 
bad acts. • • • We may say perhaps that ••• the statement is made in the 
spirit of the 'metaplv8ic of Ethic8~1t 
that Aristotle has seen fit to examine. True self is the capacity for the 
Ideal. 
By way of closinG the discussion of true self-love Aristotle sketches out 
a number of paradoxical s1 tuations in the life of the man of excellence in whicl 
he seems to relinquish his claim to goods which would contribute to his state o~ 
excellence. But this forgoing of excellence i8 only an apparent ona. For ther. 
is only one thing for which the man of excellence may be said t..':> have greed, 
and that is excellence itself: 
But it is also true that the excellent man's conduct is otten guided by th. 
interests of his friends and of his count17, and that he will if necessary 
181' down his life in their behalf. For he will surrender wealth and power 
and all the goods that men struggle to win, if he can secure nobility tor 
himself, since he would prefer an hour of rapture to a long period of a 
mild enjoyment, a year of noble life to l1l8D1' years of ordinary existence, 
one great and glorious exploit to many small succeSBes. And this is 
doubtless the case with those who give their lives for othersJ thus they 
choose great nobility for themselves. Also the excellence man is ready 
to forgo money if by that means his friends may gain more money, for thus, 
though his friend gets money, he himself achieves nobility, and so he 
assigns the greater good to his own share. And he behaves in the same 
manner as regards honours and offices alsol all these things he will 
relinquish to his friend, for this is noble and praiseworthy fo.r himself. 
He is naturally therefore thought to be· virtuous, as he chooses moral 
nobility in preference to all other things. It may even happen that he w1l '" 
surrender to his friend the performance of some achievement, and that it 
may be nobler for him to be the cause of his friend's performing it than 
to perform it himself. 
Therefore in all spheres of praisewor~ conduct it is man1fel~ that 
the good man ta~s the larger share of moral nobility for himself.J 
This series of ~)aradox1ca1 statements brings out in relief the nature of 
Aristotelian virtue. The good man focuses all actions (even acts which few 
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would scruple to call highly altruistic) on the development of his own 
perfection. 
SUch a focus has an egocentric tone which it is hard not to notice. BoW' 
egocentrism is not easily reconciled with an outlook of un-selfconcern. Hence 
the question of Aristotle IS egocentrism is directly pertinent to the present 
discussion and calls for examination. It is in Book Four, in his long chapter 
on the virtue of pride, that Aristotle BIOst fully t.reats this aspect of human 
desire. 
In passing, it is especially interesting to take notice of the tirst in 
Aristotle's list of those goods which the man of excellence is wiling to relin-
quish for the sake of greater nobill ty. This willingness of a man to give up 
life itself because of an Ideal at once remarkably transcends the quasi-egoistic 
context in which it 1s found, and nonethelass unmistakably belongs to it. The 
series of paradoxes centers its most strildng reality in this particular 
instance. The same situation, moreover, 1s to be found as conclusion in the 
l1ne of argument which arises in discussion of the meaning of the virtue of 
human pri de. 
The Ideal in Pride 
- --
Pride (rera,{otpux/a,) is the quality of a man wbo possesses excellence 
and knowa that he does and cherishes that excellence. The proud man ts attitude 
toward himself is best expressed by Aristotle's brief description of him: "He 
he high self-esteem and his estimate is right.n39 High self-esteem of this 
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kind would be offensive in the extreme if it were not based on truth, for 
Aristotelian pride knows nothing of self-depreCiation. 40 It is true insofar as 
the esteem whioh the proud .man has tor himself is esteem for an excellence 
4'1:xeept (U24b3l) in an ,)ccasional ironic tone and turn of ph:oase with 
inferior persms. Otherwise, it is the opposite of what;. is oommonly meant by' 
humility. Ct. Raokham, IV, iii, 1, notel ~rdLopu;rta, ~imitas, means 
lofty pride and self-esteem rather than magnanimity or high-l'l&ss (in the 
.,dern senSe of the word).1t Thus Aristotle marks out for praise a quality W'hic 
is more commonly looked upon as a fault, with preferenoe shown lnstead to sel£'-
depreciation, a tendency to cover up one's excellence even to a point of being 
unaware of it o~e8elf. 
Yet pride is not arroganoe. Aristotle characterizes arrogance as a false 
torm of pride that i8 found in men haughtT and insolent--urrep01l'"raL and 
rJ{3pL(f''ra( - who have an abundance of goods like birth, position, power, but 
lack the necessary quality of moral excellence, thus despise others and treat 
them rudely in order to give themselves a specious superiority (112ha2'-b1). 
Nor is pride equivalent to vanity t this fault is the characteristio of persona 
who want to be thought more than they are, thus it falls short of pride, which 
claims respect for excellence truly possessed (1l23b9, 112$&28-33). 
Again, if the desoription given still seems extreme, it is to be remember. 
both that Aristotle himself admitted this ton. while nevertheless maintaining 
that it 1s an extreme that. stays within the bounds of virtue and does not err b 
exoess or falsity as its related vices do (1123bl3-l,), and that the pioture is 
of an ideal man who can be as perfect as the example requires him to be, while 
all aetual men are leS8 exoellent and, being honest With themselves, will feel 
themselves acoordingly les8 entitled to sel.t'~steem. Cf. Stewart's '(I, 335-7) 
remarks on the abstractness of the descnption: "This spirit in a real man 
would be intolerable. But Aristotle'~erc:f'(6~UXos is not a real man. He is an 
ideal oreation in philosophy, a8 Philcctetes or Antigone is in tragedy. He is 
Aristotle's concrete presentation of that {)ewp{ a, which is easential to human 
excellence. He 'contemplates- thek~oS" or beautiful harmoD7 of his OVll natur , 
and allows nothings external to it to dominate his thought or conduct. He thus 
realises a:?t.rt5.p/C"e/A or autonoDU, and 'poss88ses all the virtues' in a iuller 
sense than other virtuous men, who are oonsoious ot the moral law merely throng 
theirtpDllrJtf'lf, or prl'.otical insight and selt-knowledge. Th~era,(6p"'X0S' is a 
man of the highest ~cuta~ive power •••• The desoription of the~era~~~(OS 
in tm F.t.hics ls ra er tho iiiise en soene of Aristotle's doctrine of the a~ nfp-
KeLtN ot the eU'Oa.~//. in """the trfe ot Reason, than a portrat t-sketoh after 
the manner of 'rheophras tus • " 
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which he really does possess. There can be no such thing as rightf'ul pride 
aside from the presence of such excellenoe, the esteem is a good thing, a 
'Y1.rtue, because it recognizes a good for what it is. 
The exoellence reterred to here 1s not exactly specified. Suoh excellence 
is simply the possession of all the virtues, e.g. courage and fairness, for it 
is the quality ~hLch makes a man a good man (a~~~"s ).41 But pride is 
unthinkable without the excellence that it is an esteem for. 
Now the proud man, since he deserves JIIOst, JllUst be good in the highest 
degree; for the better man always deserves IJV:)re, and the best man most. 
Theretore the t:rul.y' proud man JIIWIt be good. And greatne.s 1.n e"17 virtue 
would seem to be characteristic of a proud man. And it would be most un-
bacoJli.ng for a proud man to tly from danger, swinging his 8l"lI8 by his 
Sides, or to wrong anotnerJ for-to what end should he do disgraoeful acts, 
he to whoa nothing is great? It we examine hill point b;y point, we shall 
see the utter absurdity of a proud man who is not good. Wor, again, would 
he be wortbT of honour it he were bad; for honour is the prize of virtue, 
and it is to the good that it is rendered. Pride, then, seems to be a 80 
ot crOWD. of tne virtues, for it mak&S them greater, and it is not found 
wi thou t thea. 42 
If there is a:nything that the proud man seeks it is honour. For honour is 
the outward recognition of excellence possessed, only an outward good, it is 
4lHere, as in most of the early books, the excellence present to the mind 
or t.he author is, as far as the writings themselves show, an excellence of 
character. Not until the last book of the Ethics is the excellence of 
refiection reestabllshed as the crowning excellenoe. Cf. the pr&aent study, IV 
3, first part; Ross, pp. 232-h, on Aristotle's subordination of moral to 
intellectual aetivi ties as contrasted with his great emphasis on the moral in 
the earlier part of the Ethios) and IBonard, ah. V, 2 n<ppo.vy)(n:r et Z-Opl.'f:N 
dans 1 'Ethique l Nicomaque·, 'or an extended development of the tenSion between 
tne two lives, their unity in the hierarchical unity of the person Who employs 
prudenoe in action to maintain the conditions requisite to wisdom. 
421123b28-1l24a2. (Tr. Ross.) 
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nevertheless the highest outward good. It is the only good, tor example, that 
one would seriously think of ottering to men of high station or to the goda-
tor these alreaQf have everything they need in the ~ ot other goods, 
espeoially the inner good whioh constitutes the excellence proper to them, and 
the only thing that can be possibly added to them is the admiration ot perSOll8 
who recognize their high excellence.43 But this admiration is atter all only 
an outward good, it takes its meaning from the excellence which it recognizes; 
let it come or go, it will not mace any intrinsic difference to that excellence 
It is an embellishmant and nothing more. ThUll the proud man is detached even 
toward honor. He enjoys the esteem of perBons whose opinions are worth some-
thing (the acclaim at the rabble means nothing to him at all), but i8 not at a 
loss without it, tor he has what is beyond price. He may be thought haughty" tOJ 
this detachment, yet he has reason for his attitude.44 
It is this cherishing of excellence that is most typical of hi.. It is the 
basis of his spirit of independence, of his calmness in the face at 
circumstances that would make others d1stur~d, of his reluctance to" commit him-
self to undertakings without serious reflection on their consequences, heree of 
his reserve and general tone of deliberateness and dignity.45 For this reason 
too he does not like to be under obligation to others tor tavors conterred on 
him; he preters to be on the giving-end in such transactions. 'lhus he considers 
-
431l23bl6-24. This recalls Aristotle's description at the activity which 




degrading any torm of subservience to persons who are in a position to benefit 
him, and is apt to be distant with them, while on the other hand he is well 
disposed to helping others. For b,y this attitude he keeps himself in mind of 
what the true value is and disposes himself to acts, suoh as generosities, that 
will inorease it. 46 He avoids boasting, rancor and meanness and spite, and 
compla1n1ng; tor the things that give rise to them are trifling matters llnwort 
, 
of his serious attention. 47 In outward possessions he is both independent and 
llberal.48 
The tocus ot the proud man ts attention, then, and the goal ot all his 
efforts, is to esteem and increase the deposit of excellences which he carries 
in his person. Such an atti tude as Aristotle outlines here may sound ego-
tistical and not virtuous. Indeed it is a point always open to question whethe 
IU11 given person with this high regard tor selt-pertection would ever be really 
more interested in the element of perfection than in the element of self_But 
if one should be wUling to forgo enjoyment ot perfection tor the sake of 
perfection in i taelt, the desire of selt-pertect1on need not in that' case at 
46u24bl0-2.3, m'al-.3. 
47112.5&.3-10. 
48uFor he does not care much even about honour, which is the ireatest of 
external goods C more than power and wealth, Which are means w iy_ • • J he 
therefore to whom even honour is a small thing will be indifferent to other 
things as well." Again, "He likes to own beautiful and useless things, rather 
than useful things that bring in a return, since the former show' his 
independence more." 1l24al7-19J 112,all-13. 
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least conceal selfishness. 
Now Aristotle's remarks on the good mants attitude toward danger and death 
suggest that it is excellence rather than the self's possession of excellence 
which commands his ultimate allegiance. "The great-soulod man does not run tnt 
danger for trifling l'easOIlB, and is not a lover of danger, becanse there are 
tew things he values, but he will face danger in a great cause, and when so 
doing will be ready to sacrifice his life, since he holds that Ufe is not 
lfOrth having at every Pricee n49 
This passing allusion in the discussion of pride recalls Aristotle's ex-
tended treatment of oourage in its own context in Book Three. Courage is a so 
of keeping one fS balance in the face of fear. There are Intany kinds of courage 
in this broad sense, as .III8l1Y as there are forms of evil that befall men; dis-
grace, for example, and poverty, disease, loneliness, pain, death. But in its 
strictest sense oourage has reference only to the last of these, death, which 
tar surpasses all the other evils in dreadfulness. And even here, .Aristotle is 
not willing to oall any and every form of death matter for courage: " 
rWJe do not oall a man courageous for facing death by' drowning or 
diseasee What torm ot death then is a test of Courage? Presumably that 
which is the noblest. Now the noblest form of death 1s death in battle, 
tor it is encountered in the midst ot the greatest and most noble ot 
dangers. Cc 70urage is sb:nl1 in dangers where a man can defend himselt 
by' valour or die nobl¥, but neither is possible in disasters like ship-
wreck. And this conclusion is borne out by the Princip~ on which public 
honours are bestowed in repubUcs and under monarchies. 
U9U 24b7-ge 
SOlllSa29-31; b4,5J a,32,33. (Italics added.) 
Death by drowning or b.1 disease is a death one accepts beoause nothing oan be 
done about it. But true courage faces a deat.h ifihlch it needn't face; true oour 
age faces death because un~er the circumstances that is the right and fitting 
thing to do. "A man ought not to be brave because he is oompelled to be, but 
because oourage 1s noble. lt51 Nobility is What counts oven more than life. 
The noble (-r-o k:'a"(6v) is frequently mentioned in the course of 
Aristotle's oonsideration of this Virtue, and is tightly bound up with his 
conception of it.52 And this quality is in turn bound up with activity as its 
form and its goal. The value of the one is the value of the others. 
For the courageous man feels and acts as the ciroumstanoes merit, and as 
principle l1l.8Y diotate. And every activity aims at the end that oorrespon 
to the disposition of which it is the manifestation •. So it i9 therefore 
with the activity of the courafS8oue ll'.an: his courage is noble; therefore 
its end is nobility" for a thing is derined by its end, therefore the 
51m6b3. Utility also 1s rejected as a motive-in the sense of the hired 
soldier's professional valor, i.e. the oalm of a person who is used to the so 
of danger and will retreat when real danger appears unless so_one forces him 
hold that line_ Cf. 1115b2,3J 1116a,30-23; lll7al0-22. 
52E•g • 1115b21-24; 1116al2-15J b); 1l17al1. J(a.,t6'v 1s the term most 
commonly in use with Aristotle to designate those qualities to whioh the presen 
study applies the more general term Ideal. See Rackham, note to I, lil, 21 
"k"".{o'v is a term ot admiration appUed to wbat is correct, especially (1) 
bodies wall shaped and works of art of handicraf't well made, and (2) aotions 
well done it thus means (1) beautitul, (2) morally right. 1t Cf. Bonltz, p. 360, 
b, 1-47, on Aristotle's uses ofkaMv, esp.17-20, its synonyms in desoriptions 
of' moral character._ ws ()eZ, WS 0 A6ros, opews J and 2!!l. Aa- 731b25, 
in forms of nature. 
courageous man endures the terrors and dares $~e deeds that manifest 
courage, for the sake ot that which is noble. 
Courage is noble because it is the form of one ot the peaks of human acti-
v1ty. It comes into existence where a man is exercising the deliberateness 
proper to him with a degree of intensity that is rare under less straitened 
conditions. 'Ibe high pitch ot dartger works on the man's natural spiritedness 
and rouses in him all the physical 8 iVJls of anger and tension. Animals, it is 
true, can show signs ot physical excitement too, but they are not properly 
bra'tre. In courage the element of deliberateness JllUst also be present and only 
men can have this. ItLTJhe form. of courage that i8 inspired' by spirit seems 
be the most natural, and when reinforced by deliberate choice !!!i purpose it 
appears to be true Courage. ltS4 For it requires a great straining of human 
powers to maintain oneself in the face of the greatest personal loss, the 105s 
of life itself'. "Now the JOOst terrible thing of all is death; tor it is the 
end, and when a man 1s dead, nothing, we think, either good or evil can betall 
531115b20-24. See Stewartts note, I, 288, on this pusaget "We see trom 
this passage what a 'positive' conception of Nature underlies Aristotle's 
'teleology t • Human nature is a bea.u tit'lll organism, and to be beautiful is its 
raison dtc$tre. So a plant or animal. is its own raison .st!:w:v it pertorms the 
functIons of i t8 nature for the sake of maintaining that nature in perfection 
•••• If 
Cf. ibid. II, 373, "The I<:a.'(tll" 1s the orderly work of YOU, or the active 
Reason. Bel'iig VOY)Tt..- it can be apprehended tor what. it is only by I/o;;'s , or the 
act! va Reason. An act. which, for the rational agent who has performed it., 
takes it due place as 1Ca.A.,sV' in an orderly system. of life, appears as an 
isolated and transitory occurrence to the person who is merely af'fected by 
it •••• It 
'~n7a4,5. (Italics added.) 
him art¥ more." 55 
It is paradoxical t.hat the action in Which the perfect form of cOUl"age is 
exercised is the ~ry action in which the subject of the activity will be hin-
dered from enjoymept of it by pain or anxiety or even be destroyed, and that it 
\ 
is the essenoe of his glory for him t.o "end\!l'e ,,,hinge -c.hat are terrible to a 
! 
human being and th"t Beem so to him.n56 The paradox is a hard one to resolve. 
, 
Henoe Courage! it-seli is attended by painJ and it is justly praised l 
beoause it isi harder to endure pain than to abstain from pleasure. Not 
Qut what it w~uld apP~8+ that the end oorresponding to the virtue of 
Courage is really pleasant, only its pleasantness is obscured by the 
attendan~ circumstances. 'lhis is illustrated by the case of athletio 
contestss to boxers l for example, their end--the object they box for, the 
Wl'Gath and the honours of viotory-is pleasant., bilt ,the bloW's they receive 
must hurt them, being men of flesh and blood, and also all the labour they 
undergo is painful. and these nainful incidentals are so numerous that the 
final object, being a small thing,appears not to c~ntain ~ pleasure at 
all. 
By this example .Aristotle at-tempts to show how the true enjoyment of an actlv1V 
may be overshadowed by the pains which it. involves in achievement, and is, 
nevertheless, the motive which draws the athlete to his effort. In the lines 
immediate~ following these Aristotle applies the example to the case of a man 
facing death. Ye,t the parallel is not. exact (for death is a loss greater than 
any pain and the man who dies does not 11 ve to enjoy any ld.nd of viotory even a 
diminished one) and Aristotle f s comparison falters: 
"1ll5a27,28. Of. the present study, Ch. II, no. 2, especially notes 3h-
36 and the texts they accompany. 
56U17al6. 
If 1;;hen the same is true of Courage, the death or wounds that it may bring 
will be painful to~he courageous man, and he :1111 suffer them unwilling-
ly; but he will endtlI'e tham because it is noble to do 50, or because it is 
base not to do so. And the more a Juan possesses all virtue, and the more 
happy he is, the more pain will death cause him; for to such a man life is 
1,orth l'OOst, and he s"ta.'1ds to lose the greatest goods, and knows that this 
is so, and this must be painful. But he is nom the less courageous on that 
account, perhaps indeed he is more so , bocause he orefors glory in war to 
the greatest prizes of life. 
It is not true therefore of 0ver;y· virt.ue that its acti¥~ exercise is 
essentially pleasant, save in so far as it attains its end.;11 
Here Aristotle might have maintained the parallel with the athlete's 
satisfaction in wreath and honors, by showing that the hero has a certain 
enjoyment in antioipating the glory that will be his though posthnunously. 
Instead, without exactly rejecting such an interpretation, he has ended the 
passage with an ambiguous statement which appears to constitute an exception to 
his general theory of enjoyment as a necessary accompaniment of activity. For 
t.aken literally, the stater:1ent 'WOuld suggest that Aristotle has envisaged at 
least the oossibillty of an activity unaccompanied by enjoyment on t.he part of 
its agent.58 
57 lU7a34-b16. 
,SThn qualification "in so far as it attains its end" seeme to call in 
question the fact that the activity has actually been achieved. For if every 
activity is accompanied b:, a pleasure proper to it, then the act of courage will 
have auleas'lre of its ownJ in this view, if pleasure is miSSing it is to be 
presumed the activity has not taken plac~ or has not been completed. Yet in the 
present oaee the activity has been oompleted, since what was intended was the 
act of faclng up to danger;-ri'ot safety, and the former was achieved if not the 
latter. The alternative to this interpretation would be that oourageous 
activity is an activity improperly so-called. (I.e. not a single evepretfk as 
such but a congeries of individual acts pleasant and painful, physioal and moral. 
under a single name of bravoq-the sum of which would be enjoyable because of 
the increased awareness and intensity which the danger and effort arouse, 
despite the fact that the last of them may end up in pain and death.) But 
Aristotle does not even consider it. 
In his commentar,y on the passage Joachim merely rephrases Aristotle's 
statement. then draws a conclusion from it which is inimical to Aristotle's 
An tntel"Pretatton or this sort would be highly problematical; moreover the 
amb1g'Uity of the passage in W'hioh the oooasion for it artses is Stlohthat 
another, le8s difficult interpretation is poa8tbl~, and for this reason 
preferable. Irl the usual Aristotelian vie .. of. aotivity, as it has a;-,peared in 
the oourS6 of the examlnation, every actlvity-.Yhether in tho striot sense of 
the operation ot some faculty, or tn the extended meaning or an act.ion-is 
.. 
41"IO'S accompani.ed by a pleasure oorrcspondlng to t t. If p1ea.-rure i8 viewed 
only in i t.8 narrower meaning one 15 hard-put to see any way in which the hero 
who '!ive8 his life in battle can be said to enjoy his etion. But U' it is 
viewed in its deeper meaning, a sense of well-being in the poS.88ion ot an 
excellence, it 1s just as applicable to t.he hero at h1s hour of death as it 1s 
gGneral theory of aotivity because it speaks of an aotivity that involves pain 
in Its axeroise without a oompensating pleasure once tho activity is under way. 
"Tb1s leads Aristotle to the general remark that, with regard to all the moral 
virtues, we MUst say that good action is pleuant only so far as the agent 
attains hie end t the actual aotivity will involve at least .frort and often 
pain. It (p. 121) " 
stewart (r, 3(3) gives more attention to the pa."fS&ee, but without 
resolving :1 ts dU'f1eulties. He quotes a passage from Orant ('fext and Commentar: 
on the Nlcomaohean Etbics, lDndon, 1885) wb10b amounts to an antiaipatiC-gI017 
Intei;retatloru "The <ieep moral pleasure which attaches to noble acts, 
Aristotle describes as trlwapbing over even the physieal pa1n and outward horro 
whieh lDIV' attend the exeretse of oourage. And he acknowledges that in many 
cues this mq be the only p1ea:.m1"e attending upon v1rtuons actions. tit Stewart 
hi_elf distincutshss the activity of !)I'aVeneS8 from other kinds of activity in 
that the others do inwl va enjoyment 1n their performance eftn U' sllch enjoymen 
is not spontaneous but ha~ to be learned, while actions fl /<Q.....,.a, 70va.vdpeCav 
however are not thus in themselves pleasant. They are 80 patnM that it 1s 
onq the man who has "the strongest interest in the cp.lef encl, who will bring 
himself to perform them. It 
No doubt the difrtcu.l ty is ultimately 'the unraoolvabla one of trying to 
apply Aristotl.ts theory of acta that are psyehopl\Ysioal to acts that are moral 
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to the wiseman in his lifelong reflection and to the gentleman decently enjoyi 
the good things of life. 
It is not a protracted enjoyment ot excellence, of course, since it ends 
almost as soon as it begins •. Thus it seems to lack the lastingness which Ari-
stotle earlier has required of happiness.59 But this moment of intense joy is 
not the only happiness and enjoyment that the hero has ever lmmm, for by sup-
position he has led his whole life in the pursuit and attainment of excellence. 
The lOOment of self-sacrifice, then, has to be seen in the context of the mants 
whole life-indeed, as its climax. lIhether the final awareness of moral excel-
lence is enjoyed by the hero (111is remains the more probable interpretation of 
Aristotle), or whether the pain and sorrow that attend loss of life cause the 
joy to be clouded over: this is not primarily what matters in Aristotle's 
-
understanding of heroic virtue, nor is it What occupies the hero's ai-nd. The 
element that matters is the achievement of excellence. When the primacy of thi 
oonsideration is grasped, the chief point of Aristotle's treatment of the 
problem has received the understanding it ca~ls for. 
The hero who faces death bas made of his pers en the container of an exeel-
lence of the highest order, a value--nobility--whioh deserves well of him and 
has received as it deserves) and his awareness of this presence is, if only for 
the briefest of moments, a joy that surpasses any other. This is the meaning 0 
the paradoxical statement which closed Ar1.stotle' s consideration of' selt-Iove t 
59"HapPiness, as we said, requires both complete goodness and a complete 
lifetime. tf 1100a5. Also, 1098418-20. 
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a concern with the Ideal so genuine, a man tlwill surrender all the goods that 
lOOn struggle to win, if he can secure nobill ty tor himself'1 since he would 
prefer an hour of rapture to a long period of mild enjoyment, a year of noble 
life to many years of ordinary existenc':l, one great and glorious exploit to 
many small succeases.,,60 Here the diverging lines of Ideal and self-concern 
meet. In his act of greatest un-selfconcern the hero has found his greatest 
joy.. a joy, it might be said, without personal reference t for at the moment 0 
sacrifice the self ceases to exist which alone could receive compensation for 
its loss. Despite this the hero has deliberately faced up to his loss, has in 
fact gone out to meet it; and i"t is only because of this that his act has the 
stature it has. It is possible to say, then, that to such a man the Ideal has 
meant more than his own selfhood. 
6011,69&21-24. See Stewart, II, 381,2, on this pMsage I "We see how far 
removed the q>,,iauTfa. of the good man is from ordinary self-seeldng. For the 
sake of the Kal.t5" the 9'tiauToswill lay down his life. He will not cast it 
carelessly away as inferior men, falsely called courageouS, do under the 
influence of anger or other exci t&ment, but will lay it down rationfllly for th 
sake of his ideal of Human Perfection. He knows that Human Perfection, unlike 
the Divine Perfection which is realised in One oternal Being, is realised in a 
succession of mortal beings. The mere prolongation, as such, of a mortal life 
he sees to be a matter of little moment, because Bm:nan Perfection is secured 
by the succession of lives. He cares only for Human Perfection, and if he 
finds that he can further it by doing something that can be done only at the 
cost of his own bodily life, he gladly lays down his life. Here &.11 the 
ordinary motives operating within the region of the sensibility are lett behin , 
and the agent rises into the sphere where aotion is determined b.Y 'reverence 
for law universal.' Thus the doctrine of fP,-iau.:r {4- I whioh in its highest fo 
amounts to 'self-sacrifice f I belongs to what JDlJ.Y' well be called 'the Metaphy'sl 
of Ethics'. That there is such a t}letaphyslc t is surely a great practical 
truth, attested by the fact that men are found thus read¥ tD lay down their 
lives." 
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3. Aristotle's Doctrine as Concern for the Ideal 
It would seem to be only Aristotle's occasional way of speaking that standi 
in the way of an unqualified affirmation of this conclusion. 
Admi ttedly, an author's 'If.al of speald.ng is not without ita own significancE. 
For a perceptive interpretation of the various more or le88 spontaneous turns 01 
expression that appear in an author will reveal facets of his personality which 
the author did not have in mind as his purpose in writing and which he may evan 
have been unmrax-e of. But this 1s a matter of interpreting his personality and 
not precisely of understand.tng his philosophy, biography not exegesis. 'lhe per-
son md the philosopher are the same man, of courso, and his person 1s truly tht 
matrix of his philosoplT'/J hence a batter appreciation ot the one can illuminate 
the other. But an understanding of Aristotle's philosophy basically consists it 
a grasp of his thought explicit and implicit; in other words, it seeks to know 
what notions .Aristotle actually developed in the course of his thinking, and 
what were the habits of thought which directed his thought-processes and would 
presumabl)- have directed his thought if he had taken up other problems or gone 
further along lines he had already entered. 
Something has already been said about the personality-reveali.ng turns of 
Aristotle's language in contrast with the apersonal orientation of his philo-
sopbicall7-developecl standards. For the present that is enough. low is it pos 
sible that the %OOre personal elements of Aristotle '8 experience would eventual!; 
have had an influx on his philosophical work which they did not have up to the 
time ot his latest writings? Such always remains a possibility. Yet, if the 
considerable development that Aristotlets philosophY underwent was toward a 
greater attention to the realities of direct human e~erience rather than tow~ 
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a more person-regarding standard,61 his later development of a personal orien-
tation is unlikely though not impossible. Meanwhile it is not with soma posslbJ e 
reversal of Aristotlets philosophioal direotion that the present st~ has been 
conoerned, but with the dootrines and attitudes whioh belong to the philosophi-
oal direction actually to be found in Aristotle's writings. 
Thus it has appeared that when Aristotle approaohes questions such as the 
meaning of human happiness, the relation of enjoyment and aoti'vit,., the finding 
of happiness in reflection, and in the areas of friendship, self-regard, honor-
he tends oOll8istently to focus his estimates of value on the Ideal whioh oon-
stitutes the exoellenoe of these states rather than the person in whom the 
Ideal is present. 
This examination, oarried on in the oontext of the Ethios, has thus been 
restrioted to one area of Aristotle ts thought, though a oentral one. It haa 
alao recognized the importanoe of further ascertaining the direction and devel-
opments of Aristotle's thought in a number of non-ethioal matters whioh touch 
'. questiOns t~ated in the Ethios, but has had ,to leave these attars to 
61 As appears to have been the oase, for example, in the developing orienta-
tion of hi~ ethical theory from the religious tone of the early ~latonism found 
in his primitive ethios and in 1Ietaphyaics to the world-eontemplative spirit 
of the latest period, that of the Nicomaohean Ethics and the introduotion to the 
Parts of Animals. As remarked before {note ~'l), the increasing personuness to 
WhIch Jaeger has referenoe amounts in fact to a greater concentration on the no-
tiora quoad p.os, but still with the individual viewed only from the aspeot of-
ita being a momentary embodi.men-t of "he Ideal. Of. also note 4, and Oh. I, 
note 2. 
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settlement in studies other than the present. 
(he suoh pertinent area 1s the Aristotelian theology. Besides the questio 
of how Aristotle arrives at his dootrine of God, the uniqueness of the First 
Mover, and the nature of his oausality throughout. the universe, is the question 
of what th~ Aristotelian God is in himself'. The author's expansi va description 
of certain aspects of God, notably the divine salf-knowledge and self-enjoyment 
is in contrast to an otherwise apersonal oharacter. For God moves the whole 
universe simply by being knOWf'. of, and this without having any active interest 
in the universe or even any If:oowledge of it. This view seems to grow system-
atioally out of the Aristotelian universe io its gradations of actuality and 
po'i;.entiallty, and is cOllsistent with Al'istotle 'a doctrines of final causality 
and of knowledge. The mre personal notion of' God is present in Aristotle's 
theology t.oo, though its pnusence is rendered enigmatical rather than clarityi 
because of the apersonal oontext in whioh it is found. It 1s part of 
Aristotle's tradH.lon-respeoting way of' speaking but is elaborated 
philosophioally as well. Whether or not it ,can b9 1.educed from the "systematio 
notion of God which predominates is a problem in itself. Also problematic a 
suggestion of' divine interest in human affalrs,62 and an inclusion of enjoym3nt 
62500 1179823-32, viz. "For if, as is generally believed, the gods 
exeroise sorre superintendence over human affairs, then it will be reasonable to 
suppose t.hat they take pleasure in that part of man whioh is best and most akin 
to the_elvea, namely the intellect, and that tIley recompan&e with their 
favours those men who esteem and honour thls most, because these care for the 
things dear to themselves, and act rightly and nobly." 
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among the divine characteristics,63 though the Aristotelian notion of &.~ 
implies a sort of distinction between excellence possessed and subject posseBS-
ing it. In short, it seems possible from the viewpoint of the Aristotelian 
notion of excellence (actuality) and possessor of excellence (capacity-
possibility) to see Aristotle's First Yover onlY as ~~e totality of excellence 
not as a PEss.ssor of excellence. For Aristotle's treatment of the possessor 
or subject of an activity always regards it only from the aspeot of its being a 
capaci ty for the activity to take place, and not from the aspect of i. ts being 
some kind of reality prior to its capacity-ness. Hence any notion of God as 
subject of ~tivity is self-contradictory,64 The question which ari8eB from 
63See 1154b25-28. flFor if any .man had a simple nature, the same activity 
would aftord him the greatest pleasure always. Hence God enJoys a single simple 
pleasure perpetually. It Also lIet. l072b14-16 f The life of God is "suoh as the 
best that we enjoy, and enjoYbut for a short time (for it is alwqs in this 
sta te, whi ch we canno t be J) since its ac tuall ty il3 also pleasure. It 
64 The distinction between perfection and ground-of-perfection in human acti· 
vity and unmixed perfection in divine activity is developed at lengtl\ by Jan Van 
dar Yeulan, Aristoteles: Die Mltte in Seinem Denken (Ileisenheim/Glan, 1951), . 
!who concludes from the argii'ii8'nt of ~~SiCS :;r that the full reality of the 
~istotelian God consists in his being t e totality ot determinateness, or 
~etiniteness, without however being anything determined, that is, without being 
Ia subject (p.283). Men, on the other hand, go beyond the determinateness which 
the lower animals and other beings possess and in their own ways develop, by 
"he special human characteristic of openness to higher values, by their capacity 
to become in soma lim1 ted degree (for they are bodily, and, even in their 
immaterial powers, potantialH.ies rather than actualities) all things, thus 
leave the restriction of determinedneBs-to-one-thing-alone behind. "In diesem 
~einem wirksam8l1 Sein 1st jegliches Seiende aut Gott als das reine Sein selbst 
bezogen, ja 8ein Sein ist nur dleser BeZllg, und sonst nichts." (p. 286) With 
~eterminateness as theUI'timate meanine of reality (oEia{Q.l1 cf. pp. 282, 31-
~6), the aspect of being something in which determination COABS to take place is 
~l tiJDateq or no significance and can be dispensed 'Wi. th in God. The problem ot 
~he primary sense of reality is the same question that underlies areas of 
~er1ous ambiguity elsewhere in Aristotle's doctrine as well. 
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these considerations, then, is whether the Aristotelian God fS good consists 
totally in his sheer ideal! ty, or also in his being a subject of existence. It 
cannot mean the latter if being a subject implies no more than a capacity for 
actualization. 
Again, the question of Aristotle's notion of the composition of the human 
being is important for an understanding of the value standard which he applies 
to human activities. The traditional difficulty of reconciling the lives of 
action and of reflection in the Ethics 1s due not so IIlUch to Aristotle's 
failing to subordinate one to the other (tor he accomplishes this in the last 
pages of Book Ten), as to the uncertainty of the basis on which he does so. 
The thinlci.ng part of man "is the man, or is so for the most part" and is the 
source in him of worth. But how man as a composite being and as a capacity for 
activity is related to the element by virtue of which thought actually takes 
place, is not clearly expressed in Aristotle, hence 1s a matter of dispute. 65 
Yet on this point hinges the ultimate value of the individual. whether the 
excellence of knowing originates in him as an individual or whether his 
--- ' .-
individuality is only a place in which the actuality of knowledge, originating 
in some other source outside him, may be poured as into a reoeptacle~ In the 
one case, the qualities of the Ideal, its excellence, eternaliq-, unchangeable-
ness, will find their ultimate reference in the subject, who reveals his own 
65(.b the problematic un1 ty of the soul as form of bodT and as immaterial 
source of thought, cf. Giacomo Soleri, L' Immortall tAl dell' Anima in Aristotele 
(Turin, 1952), esp. Ch. VII, "Il Probleis. aelt' Iiitellettott , ~int&; fIrst 
part of Ch. vnr, "Vete e Limite dell' Immortalita in Aristotele"; and in 
commen~ on the conclusions of this study, Augustin Mansion, "L' immortal1te 
~ , de 1 t ame et de 1 t intellect d t apres Aristote" I Revue ,Philosophigue 2!. 
IDuv&1.n, 1953, pp. 444-72. 
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transcending inner-reality by producing them in his activity. Otherwise, that 
is, at mere capacity, the individual as such lacks significance. 
--
And this ambiguity in Aristotle.s psychology points back finally to the 
, , 
metaph,ysioal question what reality (OU<I"'L t:L ) .means in the Aristotelian 
philosophy. whether there is anyone sense of reality to whioh the variety of 
uses of the word can generally be referred. It ma;y be that Aristotle never 
tries to systematize his use ot the terml nevertheless it is conceivable that 
his use J/JIJY tend to keep one general orientation. If so, two general 
orientations of meaning suggest themselves as possible t ou. u-(a" as substance 
(the existing subject), or oc.. (J"t t:AJ as essence. In the former sense real1 ty 
will mean an eXisting being, in which certain perfections exist and others may 
come to exist, but which is i teelf, beyond the perfections that may or may not 
be found in it, a sort of radical perfection, a self. In the latter sense 
-
1'8&11 ty will mean essence or Ideal, what amounts to the forms of perfection in 
their uncondi tionedness and their indifference to existence in \his or that 
subject. From the one viewpoint the subject of an activity is a reality beyond 
the level of i\.s activity and has significanoe on that countJ but in the other 
viewpoint the subject is only a capacity or at beat an unconsidered x in which 
-
a capacity is found. It has been remarked already whioh ot the two 
Aristotle'S general approach to value suggests. 
This characteristic Aristotelian tendency to conoentrate on the formal as-
peots of reality, on the knowable and assimilable patterns of reality in their 
unchangeableness, unconditionedness, eternalness-il. short, this attentiveness 
to the Ideal, is the quality to which Jaeger has reference in his closing 
remarks on Aristotle'8 contribution to philosophy'. 
The presuppositlon of this complete devotion to the oontetnplatlon ot the 
world is the objectiv1 t,., to the ulttmate spiri t'Hll deptha or which we can 
not penetrate, in which everything that Aristotle put out 1s steeped, and 
which he bequeathed to R<allenietic science. ~e have already r.marked that 
it is not to be oontused with impersonality, but is a sUE!p!Z"aonal torm 
of the mind. It 1s as tar removed trom t.he artist1o-o63ect1.v1tq wlth"Whtc 
'Prato-til Iit8 1f1'ltinga olothes his 8p1r1t\1al passion to transform. hUIWl 
lite, as from that Thuoydtdean kind whieh escapes the pains of a !rIgbtful 
hUtorical fate by regard1:Dg it as the necessary eourse ot events and 
turning 1 t into poUtioal knowledge. In those two Attic wrt tel'S tr.e 
struggle tor objectlvitq is the reaction of a selt that concentrates on 
sovereign values and is passionately interested in 11te. In tJ:le1r cues 
we oU8ht to speak of objeotIt1oatton rather than simple objectivity. The 
objectivity of Aristotle is something prlaar.1. It expresaes a great 
Bereni t7 towarcla 111e and the world, which we look tor vainly in Attica 
from Solon to Epicurua. It 1s to be found rather 1n Hecatae1l8, Herodotus, 
Anaxaeoraa, Eudoxus, and Dtlmoeritus, much as theM man diUer tNm each 
other. There is something psculiarly oontemplati va and non-traglc about 
them. Aristotle, too, possessed that world-widE) Ionian hartson, ot whoae 
soul-liberating breadth the broOding Attic spirt t had no lnkl1ng. At the 
same time the essence of the Att10 spir1 t bad a profound 1nnuence upon 
him as it had upon Herodotus; it gave to his comprehensive {(fT'opfa. or 
inquU.':y ita unity aDd strictness ot principle. Through these gifts he 
became, what it -*as not vouohsafed to any of the Ionian oontemplatons 0u 
the uniVerH to be, the c0J2\P8ll1ng organillar ot :reality and ot science. 
~uoh obj.ati veness ts the tendency of thought whioh the p:resent exa1natlon baa 
'. 
which the personal eleman t could be axpecterlto be ot oentral i~rtanee. 
Instead ot the person, however, the Ideal 18 at center of' bis thought-as 
pattiem ot Ute and oontent of thought, a be-all and end-all ot a man who 1s 
11 • .Ar1stotl.e open to the oontemplat1on ot the ordar ot thing., an objectiw 
man. 
<bjftCtivene •• , t.hen, i. the note Whioh oharacterize. the Aristotelian ap-
proach to philosop!v'. It has lett ita mark in Aristotle's treatment of 
hapJ'lines. and .m.r.v well be traced in the otMr areas ot h1a thought. As such 
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it is a positive factor, to be discerned, examined, recognized for what it is. 
It is also in its way a restrictive factor. Aristotle's objectlveness maJ, by 
a change of suffix which reflects a difference in critical viewpoint, be called 
his obJectivism. For, correspOnding to .Ar1,stotle'8 dominant attention to the 
Ideal, is hi6 inattentiveness to the extsting subject in which the Ideal is 
found. Revealing i tael! in the direction in which he doctrine tends to develo 
itself if not in many of the attitudes present in his daily conduct of life, it 
is his tendency to put the weight of philosophical concern on that aspect of 
experience which is other than-in Jaeger-s VieW', beyond-the personal. 
Aristotle's strong focus on the objective, projectible, structures of experienc 
tends to draw strength away from his Vision of what must lie under the 
struoture-the subject as a reality in itself prescindlng from ita signifioance 
as repository of powers and capaoi ties. 
This reverse-side of Aristotle fS objectiveness Jaeger calls with a certain 
appropriateness Ifa supra-personal form of "t.he mind". But such an (ixpression is 
at least questionable if it suggests that the aspect of reality which .Aristotle 
tends to disregard is inferior to the aspeot which he emphasizes. Insofar as 
reality and the experience of reality presents a twofold aspect, that of 
objectively discernible struotllre and that of existing subject, a phUosophy 
will oome short of its purpose of cot a! comprehenSion of reality to the degree 
that its foous on one aspeot of reality results, however unaVOidably, in 
unfoousing its vision of the other aspeot. 
Disoussion of the relationships of the two aspects, of the necessity of 
both in a comprehensive expreSSion of reality, and of the effect of objectivism 
in the work of Aristotle and of other philosophers, is a philosophioal question 
r 
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one of great moment. But historical or exegetical study of an author, the 
present study included, has as its proper purpose no more than to re-create the 
thinker's actual train of thought as far as it can be discovered. This 
interpretative function is a work distinct from the critical and reflective, 
though ultimately related to it, as memory is related to imagination and 
understanding, and expertence in the past to inventiveness in the present. 
r 
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